Some notes on the epistemology of empathy.

The nature of the knowledge base in empathy is explored. The presumption is that empathic responses are active in both analyst and analysand. The variety of meanings of empathic experience is reviewed and aspects of its implementation discussed. Reservations regarding the accuracy, certainty, and limitations of empathy are considered. The subsequent analysis focuses on empathic affective attunement. The role of underlying mechanisms, both neurophysiological-nonconscious and psychological-unconscious, are explored. An attempt is made to integrate contributory functions of these processes in a provisional model of empathic attunement and its differentiation from countertransference responses in the analyst.

Volition and will in psychoanalysis.

To clarify the role and function of the will in psychoanalytic theory and praxis, the use and meaning of the concept of will are traced in the philosophical tradition influencing Freud, in Freud's own view of will, and in the subsequent history of psychoanalysis. Functions of the will relevant to psychoanalysis are described in terms of intellective preference and executive functioning. Operations of will as an executive function of the ego-self are analyzed, emphasizing will as efficient cause of motivated actions. The will functions to decide, choose, and initiate action directed to motivationally determined goals. The conclusion is drawn that will action is determined and directed by motivational influences, and that will decision and choice, while predominantly secondary process in organization, can operate consciously or unconsciously. Expressions of will action in psychopathology and in the analytic process are briefly discussed.

The question of drive vs. motive in psychoanalysis: a modest proposal.

This essay explores the possibility of an alternative hypothesis to the prevailing psychoanalytic instinctual drive theory whose theoretical and clinical validity has been variously critiqued and challenged. Arguments are suggested in support of the concept of motive as a viable alternative theory to the drive theory and as a replacement for the traditional instinctual drive model. Issues discussed include the understanding of the mind-body relation, the meaning of psychic determinism and overdetermination, the opposition of drive vs. motive (and the related distinction of cause vs. motive), the meaning of psychic energy, and the difference between the concept of drives as the source of all mental energy and the concept of personal agency. The discussion concludes with some observations on the clinical implications of these concepts.

Religion in the psychoanalytic relationship-some aspects of transference and countertransference.

This case poses the problem of the nature of transference and counter-transference dynamics in analytic relationships in which analyst and analysand share a communality of religious background, training, belief, and commitment. In this analysis, both analyst and analysand were professionally trained and committed Catholic priests. The analysis revealed the preoedipal and oedipal determinants of the analysand's intrapsychic perspective on religious matters and his engagement in religious activities. Countertransference difficulties arose in relation to empathic resonances potentially leading to excessive empathic attunement and concordant identification on one hand and a contrary pull to possible complementary identification and role responsiveness.

Toward a neuropsychological reconstruction of projective identification.

The meaning of the concept of projective identification (PI) is examined in an effort to determine the mechanisms involved in its operation. Formulations of the concept are reviewed conceiving of the process of PI as a form of unconscious affective communication. Difficulties and ambiguities of the concept are discussed, including the lack of a satisfactory explanation for unconscious communication. Possible mechanisms and processes that might contribute to the process are explored, including on one hand nonconscious and automatic neurophysiological, physiological, neuromuscular, and autonomic processes, along with mechanisms of emotional simulation, and on the other unconscious and conflictual defensive psychological processes involving aspects of projection and introjection. An attempt is made to integrate these findings in a coherent theoretical model of PI that is comprehensible in psychoanalytically meaningful and cogent terms.

Self and time.

This article explores the meaning of subjective time and its implications for the understanding of the nature of the self in psychoanalytic terms. Subjective time, the time experience of intrapsychic life, is distinguished from objective time. Its development and evolution in the course of the life cycle are examined, and various aspects of its phenomenology explored. Implications for the understanding of the structure and functioning of the self, especially the combined influence of physiological and environmental processes reflecting the integration of body-mind in the time experience and self-organization are discussed. Some implications for the engagement of the self in the analytic process are suggested, particularly the focusing of therapeutic interaction in the present moment and the implications of the meaning of structural change in reference to the modification of the self-concept through the revision and integration of memory systems in the present interaction between analyst and analysand.

Narcissism and the self: psychoanalytic considerations.

This article addresses the relation of narcissism to the concept of the self. Based on the concept of the self-as-person, distinction is drawn between the self as a substantial, relatively autonomous source of agency and of both conscious and unconscious mentation and action on one hand and the self as the object of narcissistic investment on the other. The argument presumes abandonment of both the concept of narcissism as libidinal drive cathexis of the self (the most common understanding of narcissism among analysts) and the converse proposition defining the self as derived from and reflecting narcissistic origins. It is proposed that development of self structure arises on the basis of other than narcissistic considerations, but once established it can become the object of narcissistic investment. As such the self cannot be reduced to or defined in terms of narcissistic derivation. Implications for the understanding of self-esteem are explored and clinical implications suggested.

Narcissism as motive.

This essay proposes replacing the traditional concept of narcissism as derived from the theory of drives with a concept of narcissism that is concerned with motives and their correlative meanings-specifically, motives connected to self-organization, self-preservation, self-cohesion, self-valuation, and self-esteem. The reasons for and the metapsychological underpinnings of a motivationally based theory are discussed. This revised motivational view proposes that narcissistic dynamics can be preserved and articulated in exclusively motivational terms. Developmental aspects are explored, including formation and functioning of the ego ideal and self-esteem regulation. Implications for psychoanalytic technique are suggested in discussions of case material.

Mind-brain and consciousness in psychoanalysis.

Understanding how the brain produces conscious mentation is vital to the prospective integration of psychoanalytic and neuroscientific study of the mind-brain relation. This essay explores some of the current opinions, based on recent neuroscientific research, regarding origins of consciousness in the brain. Areas explored include levels of consciousness, waking versus dream consciousness, and issues of consciousness and self-organization in split-brain studies. Some tentative suggestions are made regarding clinical implications of this perspective.

What if there is an ethical dimension in psychoanalysis?

The implications of an ethical dimension in psychoanalysis are explored, together with the questions whether and in what sense analysis has anything to contribute to ethical reflection, and whether and in what sense ethical considerations can play a role in analytic theory and process. As regards theory, analytic construction of an ethical agent would require a refocusing of structural and dynamic considerations in order to provide an integrative source of decision-making capacity to serve as the responsible agent in ethical deliberation, choice, and action. Suggestions are made for formulating the nature of the ethical agent in terms of a theory of motivation rather than of drive, and in terms of an integrative theory of the self. To the extent that analysis involves ethical considerations, the way lies open for dialogue and mutually enriching contributions of analysis to ethics and vice versa. Various aspects of the analytic perspective are explored that in themselves carry ethical implications or can be enriched by ethical reflection. Beyond theoretical considerations, the interaction between ethical factors and genetic, structural, and dynamic issues in clinical psychoanalysis loom as matters for future exploration.

Psychoanalysis and the mind-body relation: Psychosomatic perspectives.

Psychosomatic medicine has been historically an important focus for psychoanalytic theorizing. The mind-body relation has special relevance for understanding psychosomatic conditions because psychological and psychodynamic factors are so intimately intertwined with physiological parameters that they cannot for all practical purposes be disentangled. Dualistic impressions of mind and body have given way to more integrated perspectives in which psychic and bodily processes are conceived of as operating within the same conceptual framework. Implications of a more integrated view of the mind-body relation are discussed in relation to emotions and psychosomatic symptoms, development of psychosomatic vulnerabilities, somatization, and alexithymia.

The mind-brain relation and neuroscientific foundations: III. Brain and psychopathology, the split brain, and dreaming.

In addition to the findings of neuroscientific research on brain function, reviewed in the previous articles (Meissner, 2006a, 2006b), contemporary findings relevant to the mind-brain relation derive also from the study of the underlying patterns of brain dysfunction related to various forms of psychopathology. Other information derives from study of split-brain conditions and from research on dream processes and their relation to brain mechanisms. Review of these research findings casts further light on aspects of the mind-brain relation and further substantiates a unified theory of mind-brain integration.

The mind-brain relation and neuroscientific foundations: I. The problem and neuroscientific approaches.

Understanding the mind-body relation is crucial for any meaningful advance in the psychoanalytic understanding of the neurobiological integrity of the human person and of the interaction between psychoanalysis and the neurosciences. Recent neuroscientific research has contributed significant findings having important implications for understanding the mind-body relation. Here the author comments on some theoretical positions regarding the mind-body problem of brain researchers in terms of the monistic-dualistic alternatives. Furthermore, the author briefly considers some of the recent technological advancements that have revolutionized thinking specifically about the mind-brain relation.