The wisdom in the story: Clarifying assumptions about radical uncertainty and reasonableness in narrative judgment.

Human lives are radically uncertain. Making sense of such uncertainties is the hallmark of wisdom. Sense-making requires narratives, putting them in the center stage of human everyday decision-making. Yet what if radical uncertainty is a narrative itself? Moreover, do laypeople always consider such narratives irrational? Here we pose these questions to enrich a theory of choice under uncertainty.

COVID-19 vaccine skeptics are persuaded by pro-vaccine expert consensus messaging.

To further understand how to combat COVID-19 vaccination hesitancy, we examined the effects of pro-vaccine expert consensus messaging on lay attitudes about vaccine safety and intention to get a COVID-19 vaccine. We surveyed 729 unvaccinated individuals from four countries in the early stages of the pandemic and 472 unvaccinated individuals from two countries after 2 years of the pandemic. We found belief of vaccine safety strongly correlated with intention to vaccinate in the first sample and less strongly in the second. We also found that consensus messaging improved attitudes toward vaccination even for participants who did not believe the vaccine is safe nor intended to get it. The persuasiveness of expert consensus was unaffected by exposing participants' lack of knowledge about vaccines. We conclude that highlighting expert consensus may be a way to increase support toward COVID-19 vaccination in those hesitant or skeptical. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Predictors and consequences of intellectual humility.

In a time of societal acrimony, psychological scientists have turned to a possible antidote - intellectual humility. Interest in intellectual humility comes from diverse research areas, including researchers studying leadership and organizational behaviour, personality science, positive psychology, judgement and decision-making, education, culture, and intergroup and interpersonal relationships. In this Review, we synthesize empirical approaches to the study of intellectual humility. We critically examine diverse approaches to defining and measuring intellectual humility and identify the common element: a meta-cognitive ability to recognize the limitations of one's beliefs and knowledge. After reviewing the validity of different measurement approaches, we highlight factors that influence intellectual humility, from relationship security to social coordination. Furthermore, we review empirical evidence concerning the benefits and drawbacks of intellectual humility for personal decision-making, interpersonal relationships, scientific enterprise and society writ large. We conclude by outlining initial attempts to boost intellectual humility, foreshadowing possible scalable interventions that can turn intellectual humility into a core interpersonal, institutional and cultural value.

Controlling the narrative: Euphemistic language affects judgments of actions while avoiding perceptions of dishonesty.

The present work (N = 1906 U.S. residents) investigates the extent to which peoples' evaluations of actions can be biased by the strategic use of euphemistic (agreeable) and dysphemistic (disagreeable) terms. We find that participants' evaluations of actions are made more favorable by replacing a disagreeable term (e.g., torture) with a semantically related agreeable term (e.g., enhanced interrogation) in an act's description. Notably, the influence of agreeable and disagreeable terms was reduced (but not eliminated) when making actions less ambiguous by providing participants with a detailed description of each action. Despite their influence, participants judged both agreeable and disagreeable action descriptions as largely truthful and distinct from lies, and judged agents using such descriptions as more trustworthy and moral than liars. Overall, the results of the current study suggest that a strategic speaker can, through the careful use of language, sway the opinions of others in a preferred direction while avoiding many of the reputational costs associated with less subtle forms of linguistic manipulation (e.g., lying). Like the much-studied phenomenon of "fake news," manipulative language can serve as a tool for misleading the public, doing so not with falsehoods but rather the strategic use of language.

The environmental malleability of base-rate neglect.

Across two experiments (N=799) we demonstrate that people's use of quantitative information (e.g., base-rates) when making a judgment varies as the causal link of qualitative information (e.g., stereotypes) changes. That is, when a clear causal link for stereotypes is provided, people make judgments that are far more in line with them. When the causal link is heavily diminished, people readily incorporate non-causal base-rates into their judgments instead. We suggest that people use and integrate all of the information that is provided to them to make judgements, but heavily prioritize information that is causal in nature. Further, people are sensitive to the underlying causal structures in their environment and adapt their decision making as such.