Early action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions before the commitment period of the Kyoto protocol: advantages and disadvantages.

Current "business as usual" projections suggest greenhouse gas emissions from industrialized nations will grow substantially over the next decade. However, if it comes into force, the Kyoto Protocol will require industrialized nations to reduce emissions to an average of 5% below 1990 levels in the 2008-2012 period. Taking early action to close this gap has a number of advantages. It reduces the risks of passing thresholds that trigger climate change "surprises." Early action also increases future generations' ability to choose greater levels of climate protection, and it leads to faster reductions of other pollutants. From an economic sense, early action is important because it allows shifts to less carbon-intensive technologies during the course of normal capital stock turnover. Moreover, many options for emission reduction have negative costs, and thus are economically worthwhile, because of paybacks in energy costs, healthcare costs, and other benefits. Finally, early emission reductions enhance the probability of successful ratification and lower the risk of noncompliance with the protocol. We discuss policy approaches for the period prior to 2008. Disadvantages of the current proposals for Credit for Early Action are the possibility of adverse selection due to problematic baseline calculation methods as well as the distributionary impacts of allocating a part of the emissions budget already before 2008. One simple policy without drawbacks is the so-called baseline protection, which removes the disincentive to early action due to the expectation that businesses may, in the future, receive emission rights in proportion to past emissions. It is particularly important to adopt policies that shift investment in long-lived capital stock towards less carbon-intensive technologies and to encourage innovation and technology development that will reduce future compliance costs.

Capping the cost of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol and recycling revenues into land-use projects.

There is the concern among some countries that compliance costs with commitments under the Kyoto Protocol may be unacceptably high. There is also the concern that technical difficulties with the inclusion of land use, land-use change, and forestry activities in non-Annex I countries might lead to an effective exclusion of such activities from consideration under the Protocol. This paper is proposing a mechanism that addresses both these concerns. In essence, it is suggested that parties should be able to purchase fixed-price offset certificates if they feel they cannot achieve compliance through other means alone, such as by improved energy efficiency, increased use of renewable energy, or use of the flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol. These offset certificates would act as a price cap for the cost of compliance for any party to the Protocol. Revenues from purchase of the offset certificates would be directed to forest-based activities in non-Annex I countries such as forest protection that may carry multiple benefits including enhancing net carbon sequestration.