Adolescents' future in the balance of family, school, and the neighborhood: A multidimensional application of two theoretical perspectives.

Objective: Family, school, and neighborhood contexts provide cultural resources that may foster children's ambitions and bolster their academic performance. Reference group theory instead highlights how seemingly positive settings can depress educational aspirations, expectations, and performance. We test these competing claims. Methods: We test these claims using the British Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children (N = 4968). Results: Results are broadly in line with the cultural resource perspective. However, important exceptions to this pattern point to reference group processes for children from low-educated parents, whose academic aspirations are especially low when they either attended an affluent school or lived in an affluent neighborhood-but not both, and for children from highly educated parents attending poor schools, whose realistic expectations of the future are higher than their peers in affluent schools. Conclusion: The resource perspective strongly predicts adolescents' (ideas about) education, but reference group processes also play an important role in neighborhoods and schools.

Belief change in times of crisis: Providing facts about COVID-19-induced inequalities closes the partisan divide but fuels intra-partisan polarization about inequality.

Population-based survey research demonstrates that growing economic divides in Western countries have not gone together with increased popular concern about inequality. Extant explanations focus on 'misperception': people generally underestimate the extent of inequality and overestimate society's meritocratic nature. However, scholarly attempts to correct people's misperceptions have produced mixed results. We ask whether COVID-19, by upending everyday life, has made people responsive to information about inequality, even if that entails crossing ideological divides. We field an original survey experiment in the United States, a least-likely case of belief change, given high levels of inequality and partisan polarization. Our informational treatment increases (1) concerns over economic inequality, (2) support for redistribution, and (3) acknowledgement that COVID-19 has especially hurt the most vulnerable. Information provision renders non-significant the partisan gap between moderate Democrats and Republicans but increases that between moderate and strong Republicans. We discuss our findings' implications and suggestions for further research.