Source term estimation using noble gas and aerosol samples.

Algorithms that estimate the location, time, and magnitude of a point-source atmospheric release using remotely sampled air concentrations typically use data for a single chemical or radioactive isotope. A Bayesian algorithm is presented that uses data from multiple radioactive isotopes that are all released in the same short-duration event. Data from noble gas and aerosol samplers can be used simultaneously in the model. Application to a large synthetic data set using four isotopes shows the new algorithm generally gives more accurate location and time estimates than a comparable model using a single isotope.

Gamma-spectrometry measurements of filtration media from an Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor.

Filtration media used to quantify particulate and gaseous releases have been collected from Hartlepool Power Station in the United Kingdom and measured using high-sensitivity gamma-spectrometry systems. Radionuclides that are relevant to the monitoring regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) have been detected. Results are reported and compared to detections recorded on the International Monitoring System (IMS). Time series activity plots have been produced and results interpreted with respect to known plant activities. The reported results improve the understanding of trace-level radionuclide emissions from Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (AGRs) and aid interpretation of IMS measurements. This work is being performed as part of the Xenon Environmental Nuclide Analysis at Hartlepool (XENAH) collaboration between the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE, UK), EDF Energy (UK), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL, US) and the Swedish Defence Agency (FOI, Sweden).

Examining the potential for detecting simultaneous noble gas and aerosol samples in the international monitoring system radionuclide network.

The purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is to establish a legally binding ban on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) is developing the International Monitoring System (IMS) that includes a global network of 80 stations to monitor for airborne radionuclides upon entry into force of the CTBT. All 80 radionuclide stations will monitor for particulate radionuclides and at least half of the stations will monitor for radioxenon. The airborne radionuclide monitoring is an important verification technology both for the detection of a radionuclide release and in the determination of whether the release event originates from a nuclear explosion as opposed to an industrial use of nuclear materials. Nuclear power plants and many medical isotope production facilities release radioxenon into the atmosphere. Low levels of a few particulate isotopes, such as iodine, may also be released. Detections of multiple isotopes are useful for screening the radionuclide samples for relevance to the Treaty. This paper examines the anticipated joint detections in the IMS of noble gas and particulate isotopes from underground nuclear explosions where breaches in the underground containment vents from low levels to up to 1% of the radionuclide inventory of the resulting fission products to the atmosphere. Detection probabilities are based on 844 simulated release events spaced out at 17 release locations and one year in time. Six different release (venting) scenarios, including two fractionated scenarios, were analyzed. When ranked by detection probability, 11 particulate isotopes and one noble gas isotope (133Xe) appear in the top 20 isotopes for all six release scenarios. Using the 11 particulate isotopes and the one noble gas isotope, the IMS has nearly the same detection probability as when 45 particulate and 4 noble gas isotopes are used. Thus, a limited list of relevant radionuclides may be sufficient for treaty verification purposes. The probability that at least one particulate and at least one radioxenon isotope would be detected in the IMS from the release events ranged from 0.15 to 0.86 depending on the release scenario.

The detectability of the Wigwam underwater nuclear explosion by the radionuclide stations of the International Monitoring System.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans all nuclear explosions, including those detonated from an underwater nuclear explosion. To improve the understanding of the radionuclide signatures of such an event, and whether it would be detectable under the verification regime of the CTBT, the 1955 Wigwam underwater nuclear explosive test has been modelled. Inventory calculations and atmospheric transport modelling has been performed to estimate the activity at the radionuclide stations (RN) of the International Monitoring System (IMS). This has utilized reported release values (0.92%) and meteorological data from the event. The research shows that there is a high probability that Wigwam would have been detectable at U.S. IMS stations at Wake Island (RN77) at 8.4 d, Upi, Guam (RN80) at 10.7 d and Sand Point, AK (RN71) at 13.7 d. At these locations, the majority of IMS relevant radionuclides were fission products, such that additional radionuclides from the seawater activation had largely decayed before reaching the stations.

Radionuclide observables of underwater nuclear explosive tests.

There remain technical challenges for an On-site Inspection (OSI) in the high seas environment, which gathers evidence of a violation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). For terrestrial nuclear explosions, the radionuclide observables are well defined and States Parties have chosen 17 particulate radionuclides that allow discrimination from other nuclear events. However, an underwater nuclear explosion generates induced radionuclides from the neutron activation of seawater, which has the potential to interfere with the measurement of the radionuclide observables using gamma-spectrometry techniques. To understand these effects the inventory of OSI relevant (6.0 × 1016 Bq) and activation (1.6 × 1019 Bq) radionuclides has been calculated for a 1 kT underwater nuclear explosion. The activation products consist predominantly of 38Cl and 24Na, which decay to 5.56% and 0.0007% of their initial activity within 1 and 14 days. Monte Carlo techniques have been used to assess spectral interferences within this timeframe. It is demonstrated that during this period they do not interfere with the measurement of the existing radionuclide observables. Additionally, 24Na has been identified as useful for inspection purposes.

Radionuclide observables for the Platte underground nuclear explosive test on 14 April 1962.

Past nuclear weapon explosive tests provide invaluable information for understanding the radionuclide observables expected during an On-site Inspection (OSI) for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). These radioactive signatures are complex and subject to spatial and temporal variability. The Platte underground nuclear explosive test on 14 April 1962 provides extensive environmental monitoring data that can be modelled and used to calculate the maximum time available for detection of the OSI-relevant radionuclides. The 1.6 kT test is especially useful as it released the highest amounts of recorded activity during Operation Nougat at the Nevada Test Site - now known as the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). It has been estimated that 0.36% of the activity was released, and dispersed in a northerly direction. The deposition ranged from 1 × 10-11 to 1 × 10-9 of the atmospheric release (per m2), and has been used in this paper to evaluate an OSI and the OSI-relevant radionuclides at 1 week to 2 years post-detonation. Radioactive decay reduces the activity of the OSI-relevant radionuclides by 99.7% within 2 years of detonation, such that detection throughout the hypothesized inspection is only achievable close to the explosion where deposition was highest.

Using Atmospheric Dispersion Theory to Inform the Design of a Short-lived Radioactive Particle Release Experiment.

Atmospheric dispersion theory can be used to predict ground deposition of particulates downwind of a radionuclide release. This paper uses standard formulations found in Gaussian plume models to inform the design of an experimental release of short-lived radioactive particles into the atmosphere. Specifically, a source depletion algorithm is used to determine the optimum particle size and release height that maximizes the near-field deposition while minimizing both the required source activity and the fraction of activity lost to long-distance transport. The purpose of the release is to provide a realistic deposition pattern that might be observed downwind of a small-scale vent from an underground nuclear explosion. The deposition field will be used, in part, to study several techniques of gamma radiation survey and spectrometry that could be used by an On-Site Inspection team investigating such an event.

PRex: An Experiment to Investigate Detection of Near-field Particulate Deposition from a Simulated Underground Nuclear Weapons Test Vent.

A radioactive particulate release experiment to produce a near-field ground deposition representative of small-scale venting from an underground nuclear test was conducted to gather data in support of treaty capability development activities. For this experiment, a CO2-driven "air cannon" was used to inject (140)La, a radioisotope of lanthanum with 1.7-d half-life and strong gamma-ray emissions, into the lowest levels of the atmosphere at ambient temperatures. Witness plates and air samplers were laid out in an irregular grid covering the area where the plume was anticipated to deposit based on climatological wind records. This experiment was performed at the Nevada National Security Site, where existing infrastructure, radiological procedures, and support personnel facilitated planning and execution of the work. A vehicle-mounted NaI(Tl) spectrometer and a polyvinyl toluene-based backpack instrument were used to survey the deposited plume. Hand-held instruments, including NaI(Tl) and lanthanum bromide scintillators and high purity germanium spectrometers, were used to take in situ measurements. Additionally, three soil sampling techniques were investigated and compared. The relative sensitivity and utility of sampling and survey methods are discussed in the context of on-site inspection.

Radionuclide observables during the Integrated Field Exercise of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

In 2014 the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) undertook an Integrated Field Exercise (IFE14) in Jordan. The exercise consisted of a simulated 0.5-2 kT underground nuclear explosion triggering an On-site Inspection (OSI) to search for evidence of a Treaty violation. This research paper evaluates two of the OSI techniques used during the IFE14, laboratory-based gamma-spectrometry of soil samples and in-situ gamma-spectrometry, both of which were implemented to search for 17 OSI relevant particulate radionuclides indicative of nuclear explosions. The detection sensitivity is evaluated using real IFE and model data. It indicates that higher sensitivity laboratory measurements are the optimum technique during the IFE and within the Treaty/Protocol-specified OSI timeframes.