COVID-19 Vaccination and the Role of Informed Consent: England as a Case Study.

Informed consent (IC), following the Supreme Court judgment in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board, [2015] UKSC 11, constitutes a key patients' right. There is a vast literature exploring the significance of this right, while an analysis of the role that this has played in England during the COVID-19 vaccine distribution has been under-explored. Using England as a case study, this paper argues that IC has received limited protection in the COVID-19 vaccination context of the adult population, upholding at its best only a minimalistic approach where mere 'consent' has been safeguarded. It suggests that new approaches should be brainstormed so as to more properly safeguard IC in a Montgomery-compliant-approach, namely in a way that enhances patients' autonomy and medical partnership, and also to better prepare and respond to future pandemics.

The role of knowledge and medical involvement in the context of informed consent: a curse or a blessing?

Informed consent (IC) is a key patients' right. It gives patients the opportunity to access relevant information/knowledge and to support their decision-making role in partnership with clinicians. Despite this promising account of IC, the relationship between 'knowledge', as derived from IC, and the role of clinicians is often misunderstood. I offer two examples of this: (1) the prenatal testing and screening for disabilities; (2) the consent process in the abortion context. In the first example, IC is often over-medicalized, that is to say the disclosure of information appears to be strongly in the clinicians' hands. In this context, knowledge has often been a curse on prospective parents. Framing information in a doctor-centred and often negative way has hindered upon prospective parents' decision-making role and also portrayed wrong assumptions upon disabled people more widely. In the second context, information is more often than not dismissed and, in a de-medicalized scenario, medical contribution often underplayed. The latter leads to an understanding of the dialogue with clinicians as a mere hinderance to the timely access to an abortion. Ultimately, I claim that it is important that knowledge, as derived from IC, is neither altogether dismissed via a process of de-medicalization, nor used as a curse on patients via a process of over-medicalization. None of the two gives justice to IC. Only when a better balance between medical and patients' contribution is sought, knowledge can aspire to be a blessing (i.e. an opportunity for them), not a curse on patients in the IC context.

Love as a Journey in the Informed Consent Context: Legal Abortion in England and Wales as a Case Study.

The right to informed consent (IC), as established in the Supreme Court judgment in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, I claim involves a 'journey of love' between clinicians and patients. The latter entails a process of dialogue and support between the parties, concerning disclosure of risks, benefits and alternatives to medical treatment(s). In this paper, I first claim that IC, in the light of the spirit of Montgomery, is predicated upon two pillars, namely patients' autonomy and medical partnership. I will then explore a case study: the case of legal abortion in England and Wales. Regarding this case, the progressive reduction of medical involvement has meant that little opportunity has been provided for this 'journey' to be unpacked in a medical context. I will ultimately claim that more needs to be done to safeguard IC as a 'journey of love' through valuing both patients' autonomy and medical partnership.