Tackling disrespect in health care: The relevance of socio-relational equality.

Disrespect in health care often persists despite firm commitments to respectful service provision. This conceptual paper highlights how the ways in which respect and disrespect are characterised can have practical implications for how well disrespect can be tackled. We stress the need to focus explicitly on disrespect (not only respect) and propose that disrespect can usefully be understood as a failure to relate to people as equals. This characterisation is consonant with some accounts of respect but sometimes obscured by a focus on respecting people's autonomy and dignity. Emphasising equality is consistent with connections patients draw between being (dis)respected and (in)equality. It readily accommodates microaggressions as forms of disrespect, helping to understand how and why experiences of disrespect may be unintentional and to explain why even small instances of disrespect are wrong. Our view of disrespect with an emphasis on equality strengthens the demand that health systems take disrespect seriously as a problem of social injustice and tackle it at institutional, not just individual levels. It suggests several strategies for practical action. Emphasising relational equality is not an easy or short-term fix for disrespect, but it signals a direction of travel towards an important improvement ambition.

A wide vocabulary for person-centred care.

Many different words and phrases are used to describe healthcare that treats patients as people. Do terms such as 'person centred', 'patient centred', 'people centred' and 'personalised' mean broadly the same thing or do they refer to distinct concepts? Should we prefer one over the others? In this essay, we set out the value and limitations of some of the different terms used to describe what we broadly refer to as 'person-centred care'. We offer a critical conceptual analysis of the most commonly used words and phrases in this domain, exploring how they differ from, and relate to, one another. We argue that there is value in retaining a wide vocabulary: the distinctive emphasis and connotations of different terms allow us to communicate about this multifaceted area of research and practice with nuance and context sensitivity.

We need to talk about values: a proposed framework for the articulation of normative reasoning in health technology assessment.

It is acknowledged that health technology assessment (HTA) is an inherently value-based activity that makes use of normative reasoning alongside empirical evidence. But the language used to conceptualise and articulate HTA's normative aspects is demonstrably unnuanced, imprecise, and inconsistently employed, undermining transparency and preventing proper scrutiny of the rationales on which decisions are based. This paper - developed through a cross-disciplinary collaboration of 24 researchers with expertise in healthcare priority-setting - seeks to address this problem by offering a clear definition of key terms and distinguishing between the types of normative commitment invoked during HTA, thus providing a novel conceptual framework for the articulation of reasoning. Through application to a hypothetical case, it is illustrated how this framework can operate as a practical tool through which HTA practitioners and policymakers can enhance the transparency and coherence of their decision-making, while enabling others to hold them more easily to account. The framework is offered as a starting point for further discussion amongst those with a desire to enhance the legitimacy and fairness of HTA by facilitating practical public reasoning, in which decisions are made on behalf of the public, in public view, through a chain of reasoning that withstands ethical scrutiny.

Patient Safety and the Question of Dignitary Harms.

Patient safety is a central aspect of healthcare quality, focusing on preventable, iatrogenic harm. Harm, in this context, is typically assumed to mean physical injury to patients, often caused by technical error. However, some contributions to the patient safety literature have argued that disrespectful behavior towards patients can cause harm, even when it does not lead to physical injury. This paper investigates the nature of such dignitary harms and explores whether they should be included within the scope of patient safety as a field of practice. We argue that dignitary harms in health care are-at least sometimes-preventable, iatrogenic harms. While we caution against including dignitary harms within the scope of patient safety just because they are relevantly similar to other iatrogenic harms, we suggest that thinking about dignitary harms can help to elucidate the value of patient safety, and to illuminate the evolving relationship between safety and quality.

Varieties of improvement expertise: Knowledge and contestation in health-care improvement.

The 'improvement' of health care is now established and growing as a field of research and practice. This article, based on qualitative data from interviews with 21 senior leaders in this field, analyses the growth of improvement expertise as not simply an expansion but also a multiplication of 'ways of knowing'. It illustrates how health-care improvement is an area where contests about relevant kinds of knowledge, approaches and purposes proliferate and intersect. One dimension of this story relates to the increasing relevance of sociological expertise-both as a disciplinary contributor to this arena of research and practice and as a spur to reflexive critique. The analysis highlights the threat of persistent hierarchies within improvement expertise reproducing and amplifying restricted conceptions of both improvement and 'better' health care.

An ethical analysis of policy dialogues.

BACKGROUND: A policy dialogue is a tool which promotes evidence-informed policy-making. It involves deliberation about a high-priority issue, informed by a synthesis of the best-available evidence, where potential policy interventions are discussed by stakeholders. We offer an ethical analysis of policy dialogues - an argument about how policy dialogues ought to be conceived and executed - to guide those organizing and participating in policy dialogues. Our analysis focuses on the deliberative dialogues themselves, rather than ethical issues in the broader policy context within which they are situated. METHODS: We conduct a philosophical conceptual analysis of policy dialogues, informed by a formal and an interpretative literature review. RESULTS: We identify the objectives of policy dialogues, and consider the procedural and substantive values that should govern them. As knowledge translation tools, the chief objective of policy dialogues is to ensure that prospective evidence-informed health policies are appropriate for and likely to support evidence-informed decision-making in a particular context. We identify five core characteristics which serve this objective: policy dialogues are (i) focused on a high-priority issue, (ii) evidence-informed, (iii) deliberative, (iv) participatory and (v) action-oriented. In contrast to dominant ethical frameworks for policy-making, we argue that transparency and accountability are not central procedural values for policy dialogues, as they are liable to inhibit the open deliberation that is necessary for successful policy dialogues. Instead, policy dialogues are legitimate insofar as they pursue the objectives and embody the core characteristics identified above. Finally, we argue that good policy dialogues need to actively consider a range of substantive values other than health benefit and equity. CONCLUSIONS: Policy dialogues should recognize the limits of effectiveness as a guiding value for policy-making, and operate with an expansive conception of successful outcomes. We offer a set of questions to support those organizing and participating in policy dialogues.

Truth and consequences.

In his 1987 paper "Truth or Consequences," Dan Brock describes a deep conflict between the goals and virtues of philosophical scholarship and public policymaking: whereas the former is concerned with the search for truth, the latter must primarily be concerned with promoting good consequences. When philosophers are engaged in policymaking, he argues, they must shift their primary goal from truth to consequences-but this has both moral and methodological costs. Brock's argument exemplifies a pessimistic, but not uncommon, view of the possible shape and nature of applied philosophy. The present paper paints a richer and more optimistic picture. It argues that the difference between theoretical philosophy and applied philosophy is not best understood as a choice between truth and consequences. On the contrary, applied philosophers engage in forms of truth-seeking that are properly concerned with consequences-including the consequences of philosophical practice itself.

Unifying and universalizing Personalised Care? An analysis of a national curriculum with implications for policy and education relating to person-centred care.

OBJECTIVE: To examine the Curriculum of England's Personalised Care Institute as a national initiative to promote person-centred practice. METHOD: Analysis of Curriculum content and discourse RESULTS: The Curriculum describes an educational framework which aspires to unify approaches and universalize provision of Personalised Care. It presents 8 "models and approaches" and 6 "components" within the "whole" of Personalised Care. It locates their unity in an underlying common core repertoire of professional capabilities and values and an anchoring belief in people's strengths, resourcefulness and ability to develop their own solutions with appropriate support. The Curriculum indicates some complexity in the provision of Personalised Care but leaves unanswered questions about the theoretical coherence of the concept. It also neglects some important aspects of person-centredness (especially values beyond empowerment and choice); the implications of entrenched social inequalities and systemic prejudices; and other practical-ethical implementation challenges that can be difficult for health professionals. CONCLUSION: The Curriculum signals a national commitment to person-centred practice, but its practical potential is limited by its neglect of the value tensions and diverse situational challenges involved. PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS: The Curriculum and similar policy-education initiatives could be strengthened by more explicit attention to the normative complexities of person-centred practice.

Vagueness and variety in person-centred care.

Person-centred care is a cornerstone of contemporary health policy, research and practice. However, many researchers and practitioners worry that it lacks a 'clear definition and method of measurement,' and that this creates problems for the implementation of person-centred care and limits understanding of its benefits. In this paper we urge caution about this concern and resist calls for a clear, settled definition and measurement approach. We develop a philosophical and conceptual analysis which is grounded in the body of literature concerning the theory and practice of person-centred care. We consider a range of influential definitional frameworks of person-centred care, highlighting their differences and showing that they do not correspond to a clearly circumscribed and consistent underlying concept. We argue that a degree of indeterminacy and vagueness should not be seen as a problem with the concept of person-centred care; these are features of a rich and contested concept which exists prior to and outside of practical and technical operational definitions and applications. We defend the value of operating with multiple accounts of person-centred care, arguing that what counts as being person-centred can vary across different care contexts, in relation to different patient groups, and as a reflection of different, defensible ethical perspectives. Although the idea of a single, agreed definition is attractive and may seem to be a practical or even necessary step towards meaningful and coordinated action, we argue that this is only the case in a qualified sense. Comprehensive attempts to narrow down the concept in this way should be resisted, as they risk undermining what it is that makes person-centredness a valuable concept in healthcare.

Talking it better: conversations and normative complexity in healthcare improvement.

In this paper, we consider the role of conversations in contributing to healthcare quality improvement. More specifically, we suggest that conversations can be important in responding to what we call 'normative complexity'. As well as reflecting on the value of conversations, the aim is to introduce the dimension of normative complexity as something that requires theoretical and practical attention alongside the more recognised challenges of complex systems, which we label, for short, as 'explanatory complexity'. In brief, normative complexity relates to the inherent difficulty of deciding what kinds of changes are 'improvements' or, more broadly, what is valuable in healthcare. We suggest that explanatory and normative complexity intersect and that anyone interested in healthcare improvement needs to be sensitive to both. After briefly introducing the idea of normative complexity, we consider some contrasting examples of conversations, reflecting on how they do and might contribute to healthcare quality. We discuss both conversations that are deliberately organised and facilitated ('orchestrated conversations') and more informally occurring and routine conversations. In the first half of the paper, we draw on some examples of orchestrated and routine conversations to open up these issues. In the second half of the paper, we bring some more theoretical lenses to bear on both conversations and normative complexity, summarise what we take to be the value of conversations and draw together some of the implications of our discussion. In summary, we argue that conversations can play a crucial role in negotiating the normative complexity of healthcare quality improvement because of their capacity to hold together a plurality of perspectives, to contribute and respond to emergence and to help underpin institutional conditions for empathy and imagination.

Pushing poverty off limits: quality improvement and the architecture of healthcare values.

BACKGROUND: Poverty and social deprivation have adverse effects on health outcomes and place a significant burden on healthcare systems. There are some actions that can be taken to tackle them from within healthcare institutions, but clinicians who seek to make frontline services more responsive to the social determinants of health and the social context of people's lives can face a range of ethical challenges. We summarise and consider a case in which clinicians introduced a poverty screening initiative (PSI) into paediatric practice using the discourse and methodology of healthcare quality improvement (QI). DISCUSSION: Whilst suggesting that interventions like the PSI are a potentially valuable extension of clinical roles, which take advantage of the unique affordances of clinical settings, we argue that there is a tendency for such settings to continuously reproduce a narrower set of norms. We illustrate how the framing of an initiative as QI can help legitimate and secure funding for practical efforts to help address social ends from within clinical service, but also how it can constrain and disguise the value of this work. A combination of methodological emphases within QI and managerialism within healthcare institutions leads to the prioritisation, often implicitly, of a limited set of aims and governing values for healthcare. This can act as an obstacle to a genuine broadening of the clinical agenda, reinforcing norms of clinical practice that effectively push poverty 'off limits.' We set out the ethical dilemmas facing clinicians who seek to navigate this landscape in order to address poverty and the social determinants of health. CONCLUSIONS: We suggest that reclaiming QI as a more deliberative tool that is sensitive to these ethical dilemmas can enable managers, clinicians and patients to pursue health-related values and ends, broadly conceived, as part of an expansive range of social and personal goods.

Embedding biodiversity research into climate adaptation policy and practice.

Addressing climate change risks requires collaboration and engagement across all sectors of society. In particular, effective partnerships are needed between research scientists producing new knowledge, policy-makers and practitioners who apply conservation actions on the ground. We describe the implementation of a model for increasing the application and useability of biodiversity research in climate adaptation policy and practice. The focus of the program was to increase the ability of a state government agency and natural resource practitioners in Australia to manage and protect biodiversity in a changing climate. The model comprised a five-stage process for enhancing impact (i) initiation of research projects that addressed priority conservation policy and management issues; (ii) co-design of the research using a collaborative approach involving multiple stakeholders; (iii) implementation of the research and design of decision tools and web-based resources; (iv) collaborative dissemination of the tools and resources via government and community working groups; and (v) evaluation of research impact. We report on the model development and implementation, and critically reflect on the model's impact. We share the lessons learnt from the challenges of operating within a stakeholder group with diverse objectives and criteria for success, and provide a template for creating an environmental research program with real world impact.

Made to Measure: The Ethics of Routine Measurement for Healthcare Improvement.

This paper analyses the ethics of routine measurement for healthcare improvement. Routine measurement is an increasingly central part of healthcare system design and is taken to be necessary for successful healthcare improvement efforts. It is widely recognised that the effectiveness of routine measurement in bringing about improvement is limited-it often produces only modest effects or fails to generate anticipated improvements at all. We seek to show that these concerns do not exhaust the ethics of routine measurement. Even if routine measurement does lead to healthcare improvements, it has associated ethical costs which are not necessarily justified by its benefits. We argue that the practice of routine measurement changes the function of the healthcare system, resulting in an unintended and ethically significant transformation of the sector. It is difficult to determine whether such changes are justified or offset by the benefits of routine measurement because there may be no shared understanding of what is 'good' in healthcare by which to compare the benefits of routine measurement with the goods that are precluded by it. We counsel that the practice of routine measurement should proceed with caution and should be recognised to be an ethically significant choice, rather than an inevitability.

Well-Being and Pluralism.

It is a commonly expressed sentiment that the science and philosophy of well-being would do well to learn from each other. Typically such calls identify mistakes and bad practices on both sides that would be remedied if scientists picked the right bit of philosophy and philosophers picked the right bit of science. We argue that the differences between philosophers and scientists thinking about well-being are more difficult to reconcile than such calls suggest, and that pluralism is central to this task. Pluralism is a stance that explicitly drives towards accommodating and nurturing the richness and diversity of well-being, both as a concept and as an object of inquiry. We show that well-being science manifests a contingent pluralism at the level of methodology, whereas philosophy of well-being has largely rejected pluralism at the conceptual level. Recently, things have begun to change. Within philosophy, conceptual monism is under attack. But so is methodological pluralism within science. We welcome the first development, and bemoan the second. We argue that a joined-up philosophy and science of well-being should recognise the virtues of both conceptual and methodological pluralism. Philosophers should embrace the methodological justification of pluralism that can be found in the well-being sciences, and scientists should embrace the conceptual reasons to be pluralist that can be found in philosophical debate.

What does 'quality' add? Towards an ethics of healthcare improvement.

In this paper, we argue that there are important ethical questions about healthcare improvement which are underexplored. We start by drawing on two existing literatures: first, the prevailing, primarily governance-oriented, application of ethics to healthcare 'quality improvement' (QI), and second, the application of QI to healthcare ethics. We show that these are insufficient for ethical analysis of healthcare improvement. In pursuit of a broader agenda for an ethics of healthcare improvement, we note that QI and ethics can, in some respects, be treated as closely related concerns and not simply as externally related agendas. To support our argument, we explore the gap between 'quality' and 'ethics' discourses and ask about the possible differences between 'good quality healthcare' and 'good healthcare'. We suggest that the word 'quality' both adds to and subtracts from the idea of 'good healthcare', and in particular that the technicist inflection of quality discourses needs to be set in the context of broader conceptualisations of healthcare improvement. We introduce the distinction between quality as a measurable property and quality as an evaluative judgement, suggesting that a core, but neglected, question for an ethics of healthcare improvement is striking the balance between these two conceptions of quality.

Affordability and Non-Perfectionism in Moral Action.

One rationale policy-makers sometimes give for declining to fund a service or intervention is on the grounds that it would be 'unaffordable', which is to say, that the total cost of providing the service or intervention for all eligible recipients would exceed the budget limit. But does the mere fact that a service or intervention is unaffordable present a reason not to fund it? Thus far, the philosophical literature has remained largely silent on this issue. However, in this article, we consider this kind of thinking in depth. Albeit with certain important caveats, we argue that the use of affordability criteria in matters of public financing commits what Parfit might have called a 'mistake in moral mathematics'. First, it fails to abide by what we term a principle of 'non-perfectionism' in moral action: the mere fact that it is practically impossible for you to do all the good that you have reason to do does not present a reason not to do whatever good you can do. And second, when used as a means of arbitrating between which services to fund, affordability criteria can lead to a kind of 'numerical discrimination'. Various attendant issues around fairness and lotteries are also discussed.

Defining What is Good: Pluralism and Healthcare Quality.

'Quality' is a widely invoked concept in healthcare, which broadly captures how good or bad a healthcare service is. While quality has long been thought to be multidimensional, and thus constitutively plural, we suggest that quality is also plural in a further sense, namely that different conceptions of quality are appropriately invoked in different contexts, for different purposes. Conceptual diversity in the definition and specification of quality in healthcare is, we argue, not only inevitable but also valuable. To treat one conception of healthcare quality as universally definitive of good healthcare unjustifiably constrains the ways in which healthcare can be understood to be better or worse. This indicates that there are limits to the extent to which improvement activities should be coordinated or standardized across the healthcare sector. While there are good reasons to advocate greater coordination in healthcare improvement activities, harmonization efforts should not advance conceptual uniformity about quality.

Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Natriuretic Peptide Testing and Specialist Management in Patients with Suspected Acute Heart Failure.

OBJECTIVES: To determine the cost-effectiveness of natriuretic peptide (NP) testing and specialist outreach in patients with acute heart failure (AHF) residing off the cardiology ward. METHODS: We used a Markov model to estimate costs and quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) for patients presenting to hospital with suspected AHF. We examined diagnostic workup with and without the NP test in suspected new cases, and we examined the impact of specialist heart failure outreach in all suspected cases. Inputs for the model were derived from systematic reviews, the UK national heart failure audit, randomized controlled trials, expert consensus from a National Institute for Health and Care Excellence guideline development group, and a national online survey. The main benefit from specialist care (cardiology ward and specialist outreach) was the increased likelihood of discharge on disease-modifying drugs for people with left ventricular systolic dysfunction, which improve mortality and reduce re-admissions due to worsened heart failure (associated with lower utility). Costs included diagnostic investigations, admissions, pharmacological therapy, and follow-up heart failure care. RESULTS: NP testing and specialist outreach are both higher cost, higher QALY, cost-effective strategies (incremental cost-effectiveness ratios of £11,656 and £2,883 per QALY gained, respectively). Combining NP and specialist outreach is the most cost-effective strategy. This result was robust to both univariate deterministic and probabilistic sensitivity analyses. CONCLUSIONS: NP testing for the diagnostic workup of new suspected AHF is cost-effective. The use of specialist heart failure outreach for inpatients with AHF residing off the cardiology ward is cost-effective. Both interventions will help improve outcomes for this high-risk group.