Why good work in philosophical bioethics often looks strange.

Papers in philosophical bioethics often discuss unrealistic scenarios and defend controversial views. Why is that, and what is this kind of work good for? My aim in the first part of this paper is to specify how philosophical bioethics relates to other types of work in bioethics, and to explain the role of the unrealistic scenarios and the controversial views. In the second part, I propose three strategies for doing research in philosophical bioethics that makes a valuable contribution to the bioethics community at large.

Palliative Farming.

Billions of animals live and die under deplorable conditions in factory farms. Despite significant efforts to reduce human consumption of animal products and to encourage more humane farming practices, the number of factory-farmed animals is nevertheless on an upward trajectory. In this paper, we suggest that the high levels of suffering combined with short life-expectancies make the situation of many factory-farmed animals relevantly similar to that of palliative patients. Building on this, we discuss the radical option of seeking to reduce the suffering of factory-farmed animals through the use of drugs that alleviate pain and distress, administered under a regimen where experiential wellbeing is prioritized over the aim of avoiding drug-dependence.

The Unabomber's ethics.

In this paper, I present and criticize Ted Kaczynski's ("The Unabomber") theory that industrialization has been terrible for humanity, and that we should use any means necessary, including violent means, to induce a return to pre-industrial ways of living. Although Kaczynski's manifesto, Industrial society and its future, has become widely known, his ideas have never before been subject to careful philosophical criticism. In this paper I show how Kaczynski's arguments rely on a number of highly implausible philosophical premises. I further make the case that, although his theory as a whole should be rejected, Kaczynski raises a number of worries about technological development that ought to receive serious attention. Some of these worries have recently come to be shared by prominent defenders of human enhancement, including Nick Bostrom and Julian Savulescu. In the last section I indicate why I believe it is important that academic philosophers scrutinize ideas that motivate acts of violence.

Paying for sex-only for people with disabilities?

Thomsen (2015) argues that people with disabilities should be granted an exception to a general prohibition on paying for sex. In this response, we argue that Thomsen's call for an exception does not withstand careful scrutiny. The concerns that appear to motivate his argument point instead, we argue, to a case for legalization of prostitution, coupled with sensible health and safety regulations.

The case for cryonics.

Cryonics is the low temperature preservation of people who can no longer be sustained by contemporary medicine in the hope that future medicine will make it possible to revive them and restore their health. A speculative practice at the outer edge of science, cryonics is often viewed with suspicion. In this paper I defend two theses. I first argue that there is a small, yet non-negligible, chance that cryonics is technically feasible. I make the case for this by reference to what we know about death and cryobiology, and what we can expect of future nanorobotics. I further argue that insofar as the alternatives to cryonics are burial or cremation, and thus certain, irreversible death, even small chances for success can be sufficient to make opting for cryonics a rational choice. Finally, I reply to five objections.

Is prostitution harmful?

A common argument against prostitution states that selling sex is harmful because it involves selling something deeply personal and emotional. More and more of us, however, believe that sexual encounters need not be deeply personal and emotional in order to be acceptable--we believe in the acceptability of casual sex. In this paper I argue that if casual sex is acceptable, then we have few or no reasons to reject prostitution. I do so by first examining nine influential arguments to the contrary. These arguments purport to pin down the alleged additional harm brought about by prostitution (compared to just casual sex) by appealing to various aspects of its practice, such as its psychology, physiology, economics and social meaning. For each argument I explain why it is unconvincing. I then weight the costs against the benefits of prostitution, and argue that, in sum, prostitution is no more harmful than a long line of occupations that we commonly accept without hesitation.