Not so motivated after all? Three replication attempts and a theoretical challenge to a morally motivated belief in free will.

Free will is often appraised as a necessary input to for holding others morally or legally responsible for misdeeds. Recently, however, Clark and colleagues (2014) argued for the opposite causal relationship. They assert that moral judgments and the desire to punish motivate people's belief in free will. Three replication experiments (Studies 1-2b) attempt to reproduce these findings. Additionally, a novel experiment (Study 3) tests a theoretical challenge derived from attribution theory, which suggests that immoral behaviors do not uniquely influence free will judgments. Instead, our nonviolation model argues that norm deviations of any kind-good, bad, or strange-cause people to attribute more free will to agents. Across replication experiments we found no consistent evidence for the claim that witnessing immoral behavior causes people to increase their general belief in free will. By contrast, we replicated the finding that people attribute more free will to agents who behave immorally compared to a neutral control (Studies 2a and 3). Finally, our novel experiment demonstrated broad support for our norm-violation account, suggesting that people's willingness to attribute free will to others is malleable, but not because people are motivated to blame. Instead, this experiment shows that attributions of free will are best explained by people's expectations for norm adherence, and when these expectations are violated, people infer that an agent expressed their free will to do so. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

People systematically update moral judgments of blame.

Six experiments examine people's updating of blame judgments and test predictions developed from a socially regulated blame perspective. According to this perspective, blame emerged in human history as a socially costly tool for regulating other's behavior. Because it is costly for both blamers and violators, blame is typically constrained by requirements for "warrant"-evidence that one's moral judgment is justified. This requirement motivates people to systematically process available causal and mental information surrounding a violation. That is, people are relatively calibrated and evenhanded in utilizing evidence that either amplifies or mitigates blame. Such systematic processing should be particularly visible when people update their moral judgments. Using a novel experimental paradigm, we test 2 sets of predictions derived from the socially regulated blame perspective and compare them with predictions from a motivated-blame perspective. Studies 1-4 demonstrate (across student, Internet, and community samples) that moral perceivers systematically grade updated blame judgments in response to the strength of new causal and mental information, without anchoring on initial evaluations. Further, these studies reveal that perceivers update blame judgments symmetrically in response to exacerbating and mitigating information, inconsistent with motivated-blame predictions. Study 5 shows that graded and symmetric blame updating is robust under cognitive load. Lastly, Study 6 demonstrates that biases can emerge once the social requirement for warrant is relaxed-as in the case of judging outgroup members. We conclude that social constraints on blame judgments render the normal process of blame well calibrated to causal and mental information, and biases may appear when such constraints are absent. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

The dark side of morality: Prioritizing sanctity over care motivates denial of mind and prejudice toward sexual outgroups.

Moral values bind communities together and foster cooperation, yet these same values can lead to the derogation and marginalization of outgroups. Five studies tested a theoretical framework proposing that preferentially endorsing moral values of sanctity versus care (the sanctity-care trade-off) produces a motivational bias whereby people perceive sexual outgroup members as less human. This denial of mind, in turn, legitimizes expressions of prejudice and discrimination toward sexual outgroups. Study 1 showed that natural variations in people's moral values predicted denial of mind and prejudice. Study 2 replicated this pattern, examining political liberals and conservatives, and demonstrating that moral values and denial of mind help explain the relationship between personal politics and prejudice. Study 3 measured people's moral values by examining people's willingness to trade-off a moral value for money and used this measure to predict denial of mind, prejudice, and decreased willingness to help transgender individuals. Study 4 used religion to boost sanctity values and found a corresponding increase in denial of mind and prejudice. Finally, Study 5 reduced denial of mind and prejudice by intensifying concerns about care. Together, these studies demonstrate that moral values importantly influence how people decide who possesses a mind and is entitled to moral rights and who is mindless and allowed to be hurt or neglected. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Two paths to blame: Intentionality directs moral information processing along two distinct tracks.

There is broad consensus that features such as causality, mental states, and preventability are key inputs to moral judgments of blame. What is not clear is exactly how people process these inputs to arrive at such judgments. Three studies provide evidence that early judgments of whether or not a norm violation is intentional direct information processing along 1 of 2 tracks: if the violation is deemed intentional, blame processing relies on information about the agent's reasons for committing the violation; if the violation is deemed unintentional, blame processing relies on information about how preventable the violation was. Owing to these processing commitments, when new information requires perceivers to switch tracks, they must reconfigure their judgments, which results in measurable processing costs indicated by reaction time (RT) delays. These findings offer support for a new theory of moral judgment (the Path Model of Blame) and advance the study of moral cognition as hierarchical information processing. (PsycINFO Database Record

Perceptions of intentionality for goal-related action: behavioral description matters.

Perceptions of intentionality critically guide everyday social interactions, though the literature provides diverging portraits of how such judgments are made. One view suggests that people have an "intentionality bias," predisposing them toward labeling behaviors as intentional. A second view focuses on a more complex pattern of reasoning whereby judgments of intentionality are shaped by information about social context and mental states. Drawing on the theory of action-identification, we attempt to integrate these two perspectives. We propose that people parse intentionality into two categories: judgments about concrete, low-level behaviors and judgments about relatively more abstract, high-level behaviors. Evidence from five studies supports this distinction. Low-level behaviors were perceived as intentional regardless of mental state information, supporting the "intentionality bias" view. In contrast, judgments about the intentionality of high-level behaviors varied depending on social context and mental states, supporting the systematic view of intentionality.

Bringing free will down to Earth: people's psychological concept of free will and its role in moral judgment.

Belief in free will is widespread, and this belief is supposed to undergird moral and legal judgment. Despite the importance of the free will concept, however, there remains widespread confusion regarding its definition and its connection to blame. We address this confusion by testing two prominent models of the folk concept of free will-a metaphysical model, in which free will involves a soul as an uncaused "first mover," and a psychological model, in which free will involves choice, alignment with desires, and lack of constraints. We test the predictions of these two models by creating agents that vary in their capacity for choice and the presence of a soul. In two studies, people's judgments of free will and blame for these agents show little to no basis in ascriptions of a soul but are powerfully predicted by ascriptions of choice capacity. These results support a psychological model of the folk concept of free will.

The infection of bad company: stigma by association.

Stigma by association represents the process through which the companions of stigmatized persons are discredited. Conduits for stigma by association range from the strong and enduring bonds of kinship to the arbitrary occasions of being seen in the company of someone who is stigmatized. A theoretical model is proposed in which both deliberative and spontaneous processes result in the spread of stigma to the companions of stigmatized persons. Support for this model was found across 3 studies that examined how explicit and implicit stigma-relevant attitudes moderate stigma-by-association effects. When social relationships were meaningful (e.g., kinship), both explicit and implicit attitudes moderated the devaluation of stigmatized persons' companions. On the other hand, when social relationships appeared coincidental only implicit attitudes moderated companion devaluation.

Impressions of Milgram's obedient teachers: situational cues inform inferences about motives and traits.

The research investigated impressions formed of a "teacher" who obeyed an experimenter by delivering painful electric shocks to an innocent person (S. Milgram, 1963, 1974). Three findings emerged across different methodologies and different levels of experimenter-induced coercion. First, contrary to conventional wisdom, perceivers both recognized and appreciated situational forces, such as the experimenter's orders that prompted the aggression. Second, perceivers' explanations of the teacher's behavior focused on the motive of obedience (i.e., wanting to appease the experimenter) rather than on hurtful (or evil) motivation. Despite this overall pattern, perceptions of hurtful versus helpful motivation varied as a function of information regarding the level of coercion applied by the experimenter. Finally, theoretically important relationships were revealed among perceptions of situations, motives, and traits. In particular, situational cues (such as aspects of the experimenter's behavior) signaled the nature of the teacher's motives, which in turn informed inferences of the teacher's traits. Overall, the findings pose problems for the lay dispositionism perspective but fit well with multiple inference models of dispositional inference.