Metacognitive processes accompanying the first stages of autobiographical retrieval in the self-memory system.

According to Conway's view, Autobiographical memory (AM) construction is accompanied by control processes. These processes range from filtering out relevant memories according to the current context, to generating or elaborating appropriate retrieval cues. These processes can be conceptualised as metacognition, the ability to control and monitor cognitive processes. Experimentally, little has been carried out to support the idea that metacognition is involved in AM. To assess this, we designed a task, the Feeling of Retrieval. Participants had to predict whether cue words would facilitate AM access (i.e., fluent access cues) or not (i.e., limited access cues) in a limited time (either 1 (Exp. 2) or 2 (Exp. 1) s). Later, they retrieved memories in response to both types of cues. Results show that cues judged as fluent access led to better AM generation, as illustrated by AM retrieval latency and a subjective measure of the ease with which the AMs were retrieved. These rapid predictions may rely on epistemic feelings and / or other mnemonic cues such as a partial retrieval of information. This metacognitive access to the earliest stages of AM retrieval illustrates the ability to monitor AM processes as proposed by Conway (2005).

Further advancing theories of retrieval of the personal past.

In our target article, we presented the idea that involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) and déjà vu may both be based on the same retrieval processes. Our core claim was thus straightforward: Both can be described as "involuntary" or spontaneous cognitions, where IAMs deliver content and déjà vu delivers only the feeling of retrieval. Our proposal resulted in 27 commentaries covering a broad range of perspectives and approaches. The majority of them have not only amplified our key arguments but also pushed our ideas further by offering extensions, refinements, discussing possible implications and providing additional empirical, neuroscientific and clinical support. The discussion launched by the commentaries proves to us the importance of bringing IAMs and déjà vu into mainstream discussions of memory retrieval processes.

Retrospective judgments of confidence in a complex span task.

Although the study of metamemory monitoring originated in predictions for simple span tasks, the study of metacognition for working memory (WM) has been somewhat neglected in comparison with long-term memory. We aimed to fill this gap by exploring the ability to self-assess WM operations. Thirty-four participants performed 16 series of complex span tasks and rated their confidence in a verbal recall paradigm. We manipulated the cognitive load based on the TBRS model in order to analyze the role of attentional resources on both WM and metacognitive evaluations. As expected, we found that recall is affected by cognitive load and we found standard serial position effects. Interestingly, metacognitive evaluations followed the same pattern, and measures of metacognitive sensitivity suggest that participants are able to make item-by-item retrospective judgments reflective of their performance. We discuss how these results contribute to our understanding of metacognitive access to newly-formed WM contents.

Confidence in visual detection, familiarity and recollection judgments is preserved in schizophrenia spectrum disorder.

An effective way to quantify metacognitive performance is to ask participants to estimate their confidence in the accuracy of their response during a cognitive task. A recent meta-analysis1 raised the issue that most assessments of metacognitive performance in schizophrenia spectrum disorders may be confounded with cognitive deficits, which are known to be present in this population. Therefore, it remains unclear whether the reported metacognitive deficits are metacognitive in nature or rather inherited from cognitive deficits. Arbitrating between these two possibilities requires equating task performance between experimental groups. Here, we aimed to characterize metacognitive performance among individuals with schizophrenia across three tasks (visual detection, familiarity, recollection) using a within-subject design while controlling experimentally for intra-individual task performance and statistically for between-subject task performance. In line with our hypotheses, we found no metacognitive deficit for visual detection and familiarity judgments. While we expected metacognition for recollection to be specifically impaired among individuals with schizophrenia, we found evidence in favor of an absence of a deficit in that domain also. We found no specific metacognitive deficit in schizophrenia spectrum disorder in the visual or memory domain. The clinical relevance of our findings is discussed in light of a hierarchical framework of metacognition.

Evidence for a metacognitive awareness of autobiographical memory organisation.

Models of autobiographical memory (AM) recall posit some form of control process, but the extent to which we can reflect on this form of retrieval is under-researched. Here we propose a method for measuring such metacognitive awareness in AM. Since the verification of personal facts is difficult, we based our design on AM organisation. AMs are proposed to be organised into a coherent life story, that is, a subjective chronology reflecting the goals of the individual over time. We investigated the metacognitive awareness of this coherence. Eighty-three participants generated AMs and made two judgements of order for pairs of memories and gave a confidence rating. We found that participants were indeed able to distinguish pairs of memories that were coherent with their life story chronology from pairs which were not. We also found a significant effect of response time and task difficulty on confidence, suggesting that judgement of order fluency was determinant for metacognitive evaluation. This suggests common properties between metacognitive abilities related to autobiographical memory and those related to other forms of memory.

The phenomenology of autobiographical retrieval.

In this article we review the literature on the phenomenology of retrieval from the personal past, and propose a framework for understanding how epistemic feelings and metacognitive reflections guide the retrieval of representations of past events in the Self Memory System. Our focus is on an overlooked aspect of autobiographical memory, the phenomenology of the retrieval process, as opposed to the products of retrieval themselves. As we argue in the present paper, this is not some magical collection of phenomena, but centers on the feeling of familiarity derived from retrieval fluency during the process of retrieval. The relationship between retrieval fluency and retrieved content, interpreted metacognitively is what gives autobiographical retrieval its particular phenomenological "flavor." To illustrate our point, we focus on two phenomena that only recently were considered alongside each other: the déjà vu experience and involuntary autobiographical memories. Our proposal is that the feeling of familiarity (i.e., this reminds me of something) for the personal past acts to guide deliberate, conscious memory search. We argue that the critical concept in the phenomenology of retrieval is fluency-how readily information comes to mind. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Memory Philosophy > Consciousness Philosophy > Knowledge and Belief.

Are involuntary autobiographical memory and déjà vu natural products of memory retrieval?

Involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) and déjà vu are phenomena that occur spontaneously in daily life. IAMs are recollections of the personal past, whereas déjà vu is defined as an experience in which the person feels familiarity at the same time as knowing that the familiarity is false. We present and discuss the idea that both IAMs and déjà vu can be explained as natural phenomena resulting from memory processing and, importantly, are both based on the same memory retrieval processes. Briefly, we hypothesise that both can be described as "involuntary" or spontaneous cognitions, where IAMs deliver content and déjà vu delivers only the feeling of retrieval. We map out the similarities and differences between the two, making a theoretical and neuroscientific account for their integration into models of memory retrieval and how the autobiographical memory literature can explain these quirks of daily life and unusual but meaningful phenomena. We explain the emergence of the déjà vu phenomenon by relating it to well-known mechanisms of autobiographical memory retrieval, concluding that IAMs and déjà vu lie on a continuum.

Déjà vu experiences in anxiety.

Déjà vu occurs when a novel event is experienced with an erroneous sense of familiarity. Memory researchers theorise that this arises due to an error in the processes underlying the recognition memory system. Research has indicated that there may be a link between high levels of anxiety and increased frequency and intensity of déjà vu, however, there has been a comparatively little characterisation of déjà vu as experienced by individuals with clinical anxiety. We used an online questionnaire to collect data from individuals self-reporting a clinical diagnosis of anxiety, as well as from age-matched controls. The Anxiety Group reported a significantly higher frequency of déjà vu episodes over the previous month than controls. They also reported experiencing déjà vu more frequently and with higher intensity during periods of high anxiety. In addition, the Anxiety Group reported finding déjà vu episodes significantly more distressing than the Control Group. The findings indicate that there are differences in déjà vu experienced by people reporting high levels of anxiety compared to healthy controls without an anxiety diagnosis. We discuss structural and neural mechanisms thought to underpin déjà vu in relation to these results.

The the the the induction of jamais vu in the laboratory: word alienation and semantic satiation.

Jamais vu is a phenomenon operationalised as the opposite of déjà vu, i.e. finding subjectively unfamiliar something that we know to be familiar. We sought to document that the subjective experience of jamais vu can be produced in word alienation tasks, hypothesising that déjà vu and jamais vu are similar experiential memory phenomena. Participants repeatedly copied words until they felt "peculiar", had completed the task, or had another reason to stop. About two-thirds of all participants (in about one-third of all trials) reported strange subjective experiences during the task. Participants reported feeling peculiar after about thirty repetitions, or one minute. We describe these experiences as jamais vu. This experimentally induced phenomenon was related to real-world experiences of unfamiliarity. Although we replicated known patterns of correlations with déjà vu (age and dissociative experiences), the same pattern was not found for our experimental analogue of jamais vu, suggesting some differences between the two phenomena. However, in daily life, those people who had déjà vu more frequently also had jamais vu more frequently. Findings are discussed with reference to the progress that has been made in déjà vu research in recent years, with a view to fast-tracking our understanding of jamais vu.

A Multidimensional Assessment of Metacognition Across Domains in Multiple Sclerosis.

OBJECTIVE: In neurological diseases, metacognitive judgements have been widely used in order to assess the degree of disease awareness. However, as yet little research of this type has focused on multiple sclerosis (MS). METHOD: We here focused on an investigation of item-by-item metacognitive predictions (using feeling-of-knowing judgements) in episodic and semantic memory and global metacognitive predictions in standard neuropsychological tests pertinent to MS (processing speed and verbal fluency). Twenty-seven relapsing-remitting MS (RR-MS) patients and 27 comparison participants took part. RESULTS: We found that RR-MS patients were as accurate as the group of comparison participants on our episodic and semantic item-by-item judgements. However, for the global predictions, we found that the MS group initially overestimated their performance (ds = .64), but only on a task on which performance was also impaired (ds = .89; processing speed). We suggest that MS patients, under certain conditions, show inaccurate metacognitive knowledge. However, postdictions and item-by-item predictions indicate that online metacognitive processes are no different from participants without MS. CONCLUSION: We conclude that there is no monitoring deficit in RR-MS and as such these patients should benefit from adaptive strategies and symptom education.

Retained ability to extract gist in childhood-acquired amnesia: Insights from a single case.

This paper presents the performance of a young amnesic person (CJ) in the DRM task. CJ was found to be sensitive to the DRM manipulation at a level comparable to controls in recognition and at a level higher than controls in free recall. Detailed analyses of recall intrusions lent further support to the finding that CJ is able to extract gist on the basis of semantic associations. Results are discussed with reference to relevant theory as well as the potential role of an impaired and immature cognitive system in adopting a semantic gist strategy in the absence of episodic memory.

Is there a G factor for metacognition? Correlations in retrospective metacognitive sensitivity across tasks.

Is metacognition a general resource shared across domains? Previous research has documented consistent biases in judgments across tasks. In contrast, there is debate regarding the domain generality or the domain specificity of the ability to discriminate between correct and incorrect answers (metacognitive sensitivity) because most previous work has documented nonsignificant correlations across domains. However, such null findings may be due to low statistical power and differences in task structure or performance, thereby masking a latent domain generality in metacognition. We examined across-domain correlations in confidence level and sensitivity in a large sample (N = 181). Participants performed 4 2-alternative forced-choice tasks (episodic memory, semantic memory, executive function, and visual perception) with trial-by-trial confidence judgments. We found significant correlations in average confidence level across tasks. By applying a hierarchical Bayesian model to estimate cross-task covariance, we found five out 6 cross-task correlations in metacognitive efficiency (meta-d'/d') were significant, even for pairs of tasks in which first-order performance was not correlated. This suggests that at least some components of metacognitive efficiency in retrospective confidence are domain general. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Metacognitive domain specificity in feeling-of-knowing but not retrospective confidence.

Previous research has converged on the idea that metacognitive evaluations of memory dissociate between semantic and episodic memory tasks, even if the type of metacognitive judgement is held constant. This often observed difference has been the basis of much theoretical reasoning about the types of cues available when making metacognitive judgements of memory and how metacognition is altered in memory pathologies. Here, we sought to revisit the difference between episodic and semantic feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgements in the light of recent research which has supported a domain general account of metacognition. One hundred participants performed classical episodic and semantic memory tasks with FOK judgements and confidence judgements. Using the meta-d' framework, we applied a hierarchical Bayesian model to estimate metacognitive sensitivity and cross-task covariance. Results revealed a significant correlation in metacognitive efficiency (meta-d'/d') between the episodic memory task and the semantic memory task for confidence judgements; however, no evidence was found for a cross-task correlation for FOK judgements. This supports the view that FOK judgements are based on different cues in semantic and episodic memory, whereas confidence judgements are domain general.

Perceptual identification task points to continuity between implicit memory and recall.

Adopting a continuous identification task (CID-R) with embedded questions about prior occurrence, recent research has proposed that implicit and explicit memory are underpinned by a single memory system, since there is a systematic relationship between implicit memory (measured by identification) and explicit memory (measured by subjective report of recognition; for an example, see Berry, Shanks, & Henson, 2008). We were interested in whether this pattern would extend to recall of information from a study phase (Experiment 1) or recall from semantic memory (Experiment 2). We developed a degraded face identification version of the CID-R task using Gaussian blur. We reproduced previous results regarding the relationship between explicit responses on the recognition task (old/new) and stimuli identification, pointing to a continuity between explicit and implicit memory. Critically, we also found that the strength of the implicit effect (i.e., stimuli identification) was predicted by the accuracy in recall (retrieval of context in Experiment 1 and correct responses to general knowledge questions about the face in Experiment 2). Our results support the idea that memory is unidimensional and related to memory trace strength; both for recall and recognition, and interestingly, for semantic and episodic recall.

Using memories to support the self in Alzheimer's disease.

The impact of memory loss on the self in Alzheimer's disease (AD) is poorly understood. Previous research is mixed on whether episodic or semantic memories are most important for supporting identity. The present study examined autobiographical memories cued by self-images (e.g., I am a father) and non-self-related cues in 16 AD patients and 29 healthy older adults. The AD group generated fewer self-images and memories compared to controls, but demonstrated similar temporal organization of self-cued memories. In both groups, self-images were supported by semantic memories that were temporally clustered around times of identity-formation. These self-supporting memories are proposed to form a scaffold to support the self and may persist the longest in AD, as opposed to memories from early adulthood per se. In both AD and control groups, self-images cued more semantic memories than non-self-relevant cues, further suggesting that semantic autobiographical memories play a fundamental role in supporting the self. These findings demonstrate that the self remains largely intact in AD, in spite of severe episodic memory deficits and global cognitive decline. In later stages of the disease, these self-supporting memories could provide effective tools for reminiscence therapy.

In the here and now: Short term memory predictions are preserved in Alzheimer's disease.

According to neuropsychological models of anosognosia, there is a failure to transfer on-line awareness of dysfunction into a more generalised long term belief about memory function in Alzheimer's disease. This failure results in specific metamemory deficits for global predictions: patients overestimate their performance before the task but are able to monitor their memory performance after having experienced the task. However, after a delay, they are still not able to make accurate predictions. As previous work has mainly focused on long-term memory, the present study investigates this issue in short-term and working memory. Using both global and item-by-item metacognitive judgements in a digit span task, we showed that Alzheimer's disease patients are as accurate as older adults in monitoring their performance despite impaired memory. When they have the opportunity to test themselves, or when they have already performed the task, patients are able to use feedback to adjust their metacognitive judgements. Overall, these results show that even for a relatively complex task, patients with Alzheimer's disease are aware of their difficulties in the here-and-now.

Metacognition and self-awareness in Multiple Sclerosis.

Although a large range of literature on awareness and metacognition focuses on different neurological populations, little attention has been paid to Multiple Sclerosis (MS). This paper gathers literatures related to studies of anosognosia and the theoretical construct of metacognition which both offer a means to operationalize and measure awareness in MS. We focused on both a clinical concern, regarding the relationship between subjective and objective evolution of cognitive performance, and the theoretical issue of metacognitive processes implicated in disease awareness. We identified 26 papers with findings related to awareness of cognitive impairment in MS using questionnaire-based or performance-based methods. We found support for the idea that the relationship between subjective evaluation and neuropsychological evaluation depends on disease duration and is strongly modulated by other variables, such as mood state. We propose that the metacognitive deficit for memory tasks in this population arises from memory impairment. Finally, we discuss methodological issues, variability in MS patients, and the domain specificity of metacognitive impairment.

Fractionating controlled memory processes and recall of context in recognition memory: a case report.

Recollection has been described as both a recognition memory judgment requiring cognitive control and the ability to retrieve contextual information about a prior occurrence. At the core of this article is the question whether or not these two subcomponents of recollection are dissociable in amnesia. In three experiments, we explored the influence of exclusion task instructions on performance in a single case (CJ), with the view to understand the relative contributions of control and source memory to recognition memory decisions. First, contrasting findings were obtained between tasks requiring strategic control or source reports. Second, even though CJ displayed some residual source memory relative to the ability to strategically control this information, his source memory capacity was time-limited. Our findings resonate with the novel proposal that recollection draws heavily upon working memory resources, and provide an example of how amnesic patients might utilize residual working memory capacity to solve episodic memory tasks.