An Orangutan Hangs Up a Tool for Future Use.

Observational reports suggest that great apes perform tool-orientated actions in preparation for a tool's future use. Some of these observations suggest remarkable planning skills because the target for the tool's intended use was not present during the tool-orientated actions. Although these observational reports are intriguing, such planning ability has yet to be studied experimentally. To address this issue, I conducted two experiments that were inspired by an orangutan's innovative behaviour during a novel enrichment task: the orangutan spontaneously secured a tool he was using to rake-in rewards by hanging it up when it was not in use but would be required a short time later. Experiment 1 showed that securing the tool predominately occurred when the orangutan could anticipate the tool's future use, but rarely occurred when he could anticipate no further use for it. Experiment 2 indicated that the tool's atypical size and/or weight were possible factors that prompted the orangutan to hang up the tool. Overall, the findings suggest that an orangutan not only innovated a novel way of securing a tool, but did so in anticipation of its future use.

Orangutans (Pongo abelii) seek information about tool functionality in a metacognition tubes task.

Nonhuman primates appear to engage in metacognition by knowing when they need to search for relevant information for solving the tubes task. The task involves presenting subjects with a number of tubes with only 1 having food hidden inside. Before choosing, subjects look inside the tubes more often when they do not know which 1 contains the food (hidden trials) compared to when they do know this information (visible trials). It is argued, however, that nonmetacognitive general food searching strategies can explain this looking behavior. To address this issue, 3 orangutans were tested with a novel tubes task in which they were only required to seek information about tool functionality. The results showed that subjects had the ability to search for tool functionality but no subject looked significantly more in hidden trials compared to visible trials. Subjects were retested with the same condition and given a second condition in which the cost of a wrong choice was increased. In both conditions, 2 subjects looked significantly more inside the hidden trials compared to the visible trials. Subjects were also tested with the traditional tubes task in which food was hidden inside 1 tube. All subjects looked inside the tubes significantly more in the hidden trials compared to the visible trials. However, subjects conducted more excessive looks compared to when looking for tool functionality. I suggest that excessive searches may be caused by food being a strong stimulus and discuss the relevance of this possibility for metacognitive research involving the tubes task. (PsycINFO Database Record

Can orangutans (Pongo abelii) infer tool functionality?

It is debatable whether apes can reason about the unobservable properties of tools. We tested orangutans for this ability with a range of tool tasks that they could solve by using observational cues to infer tool functionality. In experiment 1, subjects successfully chose an unbroken tool over a broken one when each tool's middle section was hidden. This prevented seeing which tool was functional but it could be inferred by noting the tools' visible ends that were either disjointed (broken tool) or aligned (unbroken tool). We investigated whether success in experiment 1 was best explained by inferential reasoning or by having a preference per se for a hidden tool with an aligned configuration. We conducted a similar task to experiment 1 and included a functional bent tool that could be arranged to have the same disjointed configuration as the broken tool. The results suggested that subjects had a preference per se for the aligned tool by choosing it regardless of whether it was paired with the broken tool or the functional bent tool. However, further experiments with the bent tool task suggested this preference was a result of additional demands of having to attend to and remember the properties of the tools from the beginning of the task. In our last experiment, we removed these task demands and found evidence that subjects could infer the functionality of a broken tool and an unbroken tool that both looked identical at the time of choice.

Orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus and Pongo abelii) understand connectivity in the skewered grape tool task.

Great apes appear to have limited knowledge of tool functionality when they are presented with tasks that involve a physical connection between a tool and a reward. For instance, they fail to understand that pulling a rope with a reward tied to its end is more beneficial than pulling a rope that only touches a reward. Apes show more success when both ropes have rewards tied to their ends but one rope is nonfunctional because it is clearly separated into aligned sections. It is unclear, however, whether this success is based on perceptual features unrelated to connectivity, such as perceiving the tool's separate sections as independent tools rather than one discontinuous tool. Surprisingly, there appears to be no study that has tested any type of connectivity problem using natural tools made from branches with which wild and captive apes often have extensive experience. It is possible that such ecologically valid tools may better help subjects understand connectivity that involves physical attachment. In this study, we tested orangutans with natural tools and a range of connectivity problems that involved the physical attachment of a reward on continuous and broken tools. We found that the orangutans understood tool connectivity involving physical attachment that apes from other studies failed when tested with similar tasks using artificial as opposed to natural tools. We found no evidence that the orangutans' success in broken tool conditions was based on perceptual features unrelated to connectivity. Our results suggest that artificial tools may limit apes' knowledge of connectivity involving physical attachment, whereas ecologically valid tools may have the opposite effect.

An obedient orangutan (Pongo abelii) performs perfectly in peripheral object-choice tasks but fails the standard centrally presented versions.

Mulcahy and Call (2009) found that bonobos (Pan paniscus) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) but not orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) perform significantly better in a peripheral version of the object-choice task compared to the original central version. Orangutans may have failed because they avoided direct eye contact with the experimenter when the cue was given. We investigated this possibility by conducting peripheral and central object choice tasks with an obedient orangutan (Pongo abelii) whom the experimenter could elicit eye contact with in each trial. In contrast to Mulcahy and Call's findings, the subject only failed the object choice task when tested with the central and not the peripheral version. We investigated whether success was because of the greater distance the subject was required to move in order to make a choice in peripheral trials. Results show that this was an unlikely factor in the subject's success. We discuss our findings in relation to previous and future object-choice research.

The performance of bonobos (Pan paniscus), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) in two versions of an object-choice task.

The object-choice task tests animals' ability to use human-given cues to find a hidden reward located in 1 of 2 (or more) containers. Great apes are generally unskillful in this task whereas other species including dogs (Canis familiaris) and goats (Capra hircus) can use human-given cues to locate the reward. However, great apes are typically positioned proximal to the containers when receiving the experimenter's cue whereas other species are invariably positioned distally. The authors investigated how the position of the subject, the human giving the cue and the containers (and the distance among them) affected the performance of 19 captive great apes. Compared to the proximal condition, the distal condition involved larger distances and, critically, it reduced the potential ambiguity of the cues as well as the strong influence that the sight of the containers may have had when subjects received the cue. Subjects were far more successful in the distal compared to the proximal condition. The authors suggest several possibilities to account for this difference and discuss our findings in relation to previous and future object-choice research.

Apes save tools for future use.

Planning for future needs, not just current ones, is one of the most formidable human cognitive achievements. Whether this skill is a uniquely human adaptation is a controversial issue. In a study we conducted, bonobos and orangutans selected, transported, and saved appropriate tools above baseline levels to use them 1 hour later (experiment 1). Experiment 2 extended these results to a 14-hour delay between collecting and using the tools. Experiment 3 showed that seeing the apparatus during tool selection was not necessary to succeed. These findings suggest that the precursor skills for planning for the future evolved in great apes before 14 million years ago, when all extant great ape species shared a common ancestor.

How great apes perform on a modified trap-tube task.

To date, neither primates nor birds have shown clear evidence of causal knowledge when attempting to solve the trap tube task. One factor that may have contributed to mask the knowledge that subjects may have about the task is that subjects were only allowed to push the reward away from them, which is a particularly difficult action for primates in certain problem solving situations. We presented five orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), two chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), two bonobos (Pan paniscus), and one gorilla (Gorilla gorilla) with a modified trap tube that allowed subjects to push or rake the reward with the tool. In two additional follow-up tests, we inverted the tube 180 degrees rendering the trap nonfunctional and also presented subjects with the original task in which they were required to push the reward out of the tube. Results showed that all but one of the subjects preferred to rake the reward. Two orangutans and one chimpanzee (all of whom preferred to rake the reward), consistently avoided the trap only when it was functional but failed the original task. These findings suggest that some great apes may have some causal knowledge about the trap-tube task. Their success, however, depended on whether they were allowed to choose certain tool-using actions.

Gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) encode relevant problem features in a tool-using task.

Two important elements in problem solving are the abilities to encode relevant task features and to combine multiple actions to achieve the goal. The authors investigated these 2 elements in a task in which gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) had to use a tool to retrieve an out-of-reach reward. Subjects were able to select tools of an appropriate length to reach the reward even when the position of the reward and tools were not simultaneously visible. When presented with tools that were too short to retrieve the reward, subjects were more likely to refuse to use them than when tools were the appropriate length. Subjects were proficient at using tools in sequence to retrieve the reward.

Delayed administration of interleukin-1 receptor antagonist protects against transient cerebral ischaemia in the rat.

The cytokine interleukin-1 (IL-1) has been implicated in ischaemic, excitotoxic and traumatic brain damage in rodents. The naturally occurring IL-1 receptor antagonist (IL-1ra) markedly reduces neuronal injury in these conditions. However, the effects of IL-1ra on focal, transient cerebral ischaemia in the rat, which is of major clinical relevance, have not been reported. The objectives of this study were to test the effects of IL-1ra on cell death after temporary cerebral ischaemia, and to investigate the therapeutic time window for IL-1ra treatment. Ischaemia was induced by temporary (60 min) occlusion of the middle cerebral artery (MCAO) in rats, via surgical insertion (and subsequent removal) of a thread into the internal carotid artery. Damage was quantified at various times after MCAO to investigate the temporal progression of damage and establish an appropriate time to assess the effects of IL-1ra on cell death. Cell death was complete 18-24 h after temporary MCAO. Intracerebroventricular injection of IL-1ra (10 microg) at the time of MCAO and 60 min later reduced the lesion volume measured 24 h (57% reduction) or 48 h (52% reduction) after MCAO. Cell death was also significantly reduced when IL-1ra (20 microg) was administered as a single injection, 1 h (47%), 2 h (57%) or 3 h (46%) after MCAO, when compared to vehicle. These data show that IL-1ra markedly reduces cell death even when administration is delayed until 3 h after induction of reversible, focal cerebral ischaemia in the rat, and support our proposal that IL-1ra may be of therapeutic benefit in stroke.