Are you better than me? Social comparisons in carrion crows (Corvus corone).

Comparing oneself to others is a key process in humans that allows individuals to gauge their performances and abilities and thus develop and calibrate their self-image. Little is known about its evolutionary foundations. A key feature of social comparison is the sensitivity to other individuals' performance. Recent studies on primates produced equivocal results, leading us to distinguish between a 'strong' variant of the social comparison hypothesis formulated for humans and a 'weak' variant found in non-human primates that would comprise some elements of human social comparison. Here, we focus on corvids that are distantly related to primates and renowned for their socio-cognitive skills. We were interested in whether crows' task performances were influenced (i) by the presence of a conspecific co-actor performing the same discrimination task and (ii) by the simulated acoustic cues of a putative co-actor performing better or worse than themselves. Crows reached a learning criterion quicker when tested simultaneously as compared to when tested alone, indicating a facilitating effect of social context. The performance of a putative co-actor influenced their performance: crows were better at discriminating familiar images when their co-actor was better than they were. Standard extremity (how pronounced the difference was between the performance of the subject and that of the co-actor), and category membership (affiliation status and sex), of the putative co-actors had no effect on their performance. Our findings are in line with the 'weak' variant of social comparison and indicate that elements of human social comparison can be found outside of primates.

First offers as anchors: the role of perspective-taking and negotiator focus.

Three experiments explored the role of first offers, perspective-taking, and negotiator self-focus in determining distributive outcomes in a negotiation. Across 3 experiments, whichever party, the buyer or seller, made the 1st offer obtained a better outcome. In addition, 1st offers were a strong predictor of final settlement prices. However, when the negotiator who did not make a 1st offer focused on information that was inconsistent with the implications of the opponent's 1st offer, the advantageous effect of making the 1st offer was eliminated: Thinking about one's opponent's alternatives to the negotiation (Experiment 1), one's opponent's reservation price (Experiment 2), or one's own target (Experiment 3) all negated the effect of 1st offers on outcomes. These effects occurred for both face-to-face negotiations and E-mail negotiations. Implications for negotiations and perspective-taking are discussed.

The sex-->aggression link: a perception-behavior dissociation.

Four studies suggest that priming may yield directionally different effects on social perception and behavior if perceptual and behavioral experiences with the stimulus diverge. This seems true for sex and aggression: Men are more likely to behave aggressively than women, whereas women are more likely to perceive aggressive behavior than men. Using a sequential priming paradigm, Study 1 demonstrates that a basic semantic link between sex and aggression exists for both genders. This link, however, has opposing behavioral and perceptual consequences for men and women. Studies 2 and 3 demonstrate that sex priming facilitates aggressive behavior only for men. Study 4 shows that only women perceive the ambiguously aggressive behavior of a male target person as more aggressive after sex priming. Thus, the perceptual and behavioral responses to sex priming are consistent with the experiences men and women typically have with sex and aggression.

Shifting social identities as a strategy for deflecting threatening social comparisons.

Results of three studies suggest that the multifaceted nature of identity provides a strategic basis for reducing the threat involved in upward social comparisons. After performing worse than a comparison standard, people may strategically emphasize aspects of their identity that differentiate them from the standard, thereby making the standard less relevant for self-evaluation. On the basis of previous research showing that persons low in self-esteem are less likely to make effective use of self-protection strategies, we hypothesized that this strategy of deflecting the threat involved in upward comparison (i.e., decreasing perceived comparability by emphasizing an unshared social identity) would be used primarily by persons who are characteristically high in self-esteem. This pattern was confirmed in three studies. Moreover, use of the strategy was associated with relatively more positive affect following threatening upward comparisons.

The "relative self": informational and judgmental consequences of comparative self-evaluation.

Results of 5 studies demonstrated that self-evaluative comparisons have 2 distinct informational consequences with opposing judgmental effects: They selectively increase the accessibility of standard-consistent self-knowledge and provide an evaluative reference point. The first informational consequence produces assimilation in self-evaluative judgments, whereas the latter yields contrast. Using a lexical decision task, Study 1 demonstrated that a social comparison selectively increases the accessibility of standard-consistent self-knowledge. Study 2 showed that this effect also holds for comparisons with objective standards. Studies 3 and 4 revealed that the same comparison may lead to assimilation on objective and contrast on subjective self-judgments. Finally, Study 5 demonstrated that assimilation results for comparisons with relevant and irrelevant standards, whereas contrast occurs only for relevant standards.

The use of category and exemplar knowledge in the solution of anchoring tasks.

Five studies examine the role that category and exemplar knowledge play in the mediation of anchoring effects--the assimilation of an absolute estimate to a previously considered standard. Studies 1 through 3 demonstrate that comparing the target object with a plausible anchor (i.e., a standard that constitutes a possible value for the target) leads to a selective increase in the accessibility of anchor-consistent exemplar knowledge about the target. This easily accessible knowledge is then used to generate the absolute estimate, which leads to its assimilation to the standard. Studies 4 and 5 demonstrate that comparing the target with an implausible anchor, however, involves the activation of knowledge about the general category of the target, rather than exemplar knowledge about the target itself.