ABSTRACT
Importance: Private equity firms have been acquiring US nursing homes; an estimated 5% of US nursing homes are owned by private equity firms. Objective: To examine the association of private equity acquisition of nursing homes with the quality and cost of care for long-stay residents. Design Setting and Participants: In this cohort study of 302 private equity nursing homes with 9632 residents and 9562 other for-profit homes with 249 771 residents, a novel national database of private equity nursing home acquisitions was merged with Medicare claims and Minimum Data Set assessments for the period from 2012 to 2018. Changes in outcomes for residents in private equity-acquired nursing homes were compared with changes for residents in other for-profit nursing homes. Analyses were performed from March 25 to June 23, 2021. Exposure: Private equity acquisitions of 302 nursing homes between 2013 and 2017. Main Outcomes and Measures: This study used difference-in-differences analysis to examine the association of private equity acquisition of nursing homes with outcomes. Primary outcomes were quarterly measures of emergency department visits and hospitalizations for ambulatory care-sensitive (ACS) conditions and total quarterly Medicare costs. Antipsychotic use, pressure ulcers, and severe pain were examined in secondary analyses. Results: Of the 259 403 residents in the study (170 687 women [65.8%]; 211 154 White residents [81.4%]; 204 928 residents [79.0%] dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid; mean [SD] age, 79.3 [5.6] years), 9632 residents were in 302 private equity-acquired nursing homes and 249 771 residents were in 9562 other for-profit homes. The mean quarterly rate of ACS emergency department visits was 14.1% (336 072 of 2 383 491), and the mean quarterly rate of ACS hospitalizations was 17.3% (412 344 of 2 383 491); mean (SD) total quarterly costs were $8050.00 ($9.90). Residents of private equity nursing homes experienced relative increases in ACS emergency department visits of 11.1% (1.7 of 15.3; 1.7 percentage points; 95% CI, 0.3-3.0 percentage points; P = .02) and in ACS hospitalizations of 8.7% (1.0 of 11.5; 1.0 percentage point; 95% CI, 0.2-1.1 percentage points; P = .003) compared with residents in other for-profit homes; quarterly costs increased 3.9% (270.37 of 6972.04; $270.37; 95% CI, $41.53-$499.20; P = .02) or $1081 annually per resident. Private equity acquisition was not significantly associated with antipsychotic use (-0.2 percentage points; 95% CI, -1.7 to 1.4 percentage points; P = .83), severe pain (0.2 percentage points; 95% CI, -1.1 to 1.4 percentage points; P = .79), or pressure ulcers (0.5 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.4 to 1.3 percentage points; P = .30). Conclusions and Relevance: This cohort study with difference-in-differences analysis found that private equity acquisition of nursing homes was associated with increases in ACS emergency department visits and hospitalizations and higher Medicare costs.
Subject(s)
Antipsychotic Agents , Pressure Ulcer , Aged , Cohort Studies , Female , Humans , Medicare , Nursing Homes , Pain , United States/epidemiologyABSTRACT
Importance: It is not known whether nursing homes with private equity (PE) ownership have performed better or worse than other nursing homes during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Objective: To evaluate the comparative performance of PE-owned nursing homes on COVID-19 outcomes. Design, Setting, and Participants: This cross-sectional study of 11â¯470 US nursing homes used the Nursing Home COVID-19 Public File from May 17, 2020, to July 2, 2020, to compare outcomes of PE-owned nursing homes with for-profit, nonprofit, and government-owned homes, adjusting for facility characteristics. Exposure: Nursing home ownership status. Main Outcomes and Measures: Self-reported number of COVID-19 cases and deaths and deaths by any cause per 1000 residents; possessing 1-week supplies of personal protective equipment (PPE); staffing shortages. Results: Of 11â¯470 nursing homes, 7793 (67.9%) were for-profit; 2523 (22.0%), nonprofit; 511 (5.3%), government-owned; and 543 (4.7%), PE-owned; with mean (SD) COVID-19 cases per 1000 residents of 88.3 [2.1], 67.0 [3.8], 39.8 [7.6] and 110.8 [8.1], respectively. Mean (SD) COVID-19 deaths per 1000 residents were 61.9 [1.6], 66.4 [3.0], 56.2 [7.3], and 78.9 [5.9], respectively; mean deaths by any cause per 1000 residents were 78.1 [1.3], 91.5 [2.2], 67.6 [4.5], and 87.9 [4.8], respectively. In adjusted analyses, government-owned homes had 35.5 (95% CI, -69.2 to -1.8; P = .03) fewer COVID-19 cases per 1000 residents than PE-owned nursing homes. Cases in PE-owned nursing homes were not statistically different compared with for-profit and nonprofit facilities; nor were there statistically significant differences in COVID-19 deaths or deaths by any cause between PE-owned nursing homes and for-profit, nonprofit, and government-owned facilities. For-profit, nonprofit, and government-owned nursing homes were 10.5% (9.1 percentage points; 95% CI, 1.8 to 16.3 percentage points; P = .006), 15.0% (13.0 percentage points; 95% CI, 5.5 to 20.6 percentage points; P < .001), and 17.0% (14.8 percentage points; 95% CI, 6.5 to 23.0 percentage points; P < .001), respectively, more likely to have at least a 1-week supply of N95 masks than PE-owned nursing homes. They were 24.3% (21.3 percentage points; 95% CI, 11.8 to 30.8 percentage points; P < .001), 30.7% (27.0 percentage points; 95% CI, 17.7 to 36.2 percentage points; P < .001), and 29.2% (25.7 percentage points; 95% CI, 16.1 to 35.3 percentage points; P < .001) more likely to have a 1-week supply of medical gowns than PE-owned nursing homes. Government nursing homes were more likely to have a shortage of nurses (6.9 percentage points; 95% CI, 0.0 to 13.9 percentage points; P = .049) than PE-owned nursing homes. Conclusions and Relevance: In this cross-sectional study, PE-owned nursing homes performed comparably on staffing levels, resident cases, and deaths with nursing homes with other types of ownership, although their shortages of PPE may warrant monitoring.
