The Acute Effects of Ischemic Preconditioning on Short-Duration Cycling: A Randomized Crossover Study.

There is recent interest from coaches and athletes regarding IPC as an effective way to generate better competitive outcomes. Regarding cycling specifically, the impact of IPC remains unclear. This study aimed to assess the effectiveness of IPC treatment for improving athletic performance during short-duration cycling. After the exclusion and inclusion criteria, there were 11 volunteers for the 3-minute cycling TT and 13 volunteers for the 6-minute cycling TT. All volunteers were competitive athletes of aerobic sports. The IPC treatment consisted of three alternating cycles of 5 minutes of 100% occlusion followed by 5 minutes of reperfusion to each leg. The sham treatment consisted of three alternating cycles of 1 minute of 100% occlusion followed by 1 minute of reperfusion to each leg. The main finding was that IPC significantly improved (p<0.05) power output during 3-minute (4.22%) and 6-minute (2.29%) cycling TT relative to a sham. Additionally, about one-third of our participants required a tourniquet pressure higher than 220 mmHg to achieve 100% occlusion. These findings indicate ischemic preconditioning, administered bilaterally as three rounds of 5 minutes of total occlusion and ensuing reperfusion 20 minutes before a cycling TT, significantly enhanced average power output.

The 2021 Global Health Security (GHS) Index: Aotearoa New Zealand's improving capacity to manage biological threats must now be consolidated.

The 2021 Global Health Security (GHS) Index Report was published on 8 December 2021. With an average country score of 38.9 out of a possible 100 points, global scores are essentially unchanged from 2019. Despite experience with the COVID-19 pandemic, no country is adequately prepared for future biological threats. No country scored above 75.9 and the scores of the bottom 11 States have all fallen since 2019. Aotearoa New Zealand, however, has substantially improved its country score, rising to 13th in the world at 62.5/100. This gain is partly driven by consolidation of capabilities developed and deployed in response to COVID-19. This is promising progress, but a lot more can be done to ensure legacy benefits from the pandemic response, notably through the proposed restructuring of the health system (Pae Ora (Healthy Futures) Bill). In this viewpoint article, we discuss this recent further development of the GHS Index, highlight the global results for 2021, delve into New Zealand's progress, and discuss what more is needed.

BugSplit enables genome-resolved metagenomics through highly accurate taxonomic binning of metagenomic assemblies.

A large gap remains between sequencing a microbial community and characterizing all of the organisms inside of it. Here we develop a novel method to taxonomically bin metagenomic assemblies through alignment of contigs against a reference database. We show that this workflow, BugSplit, bins metagenome-assembled contigs to species with a 33% absolute improvement in F1-score when compared to alternative tools. We perform nanopore mNGS on patients with COVID-19, and using a reference database predating COVID-19, demonstrate that BugSplit's taxonomic binning enables sensitive and specific detection of a novel coronavirus not possible with other approaches. When applied to nanopore mNGS data from cases of Klebsiella pneumoniae and Neisseria gonorrhoeae infection, BugSplit's taxonomic binning accurately separates pathogen sequences from those of the host and microbiota, and unlocks the possibility of sequence typing, in silico serotyping, and antimicrobial resistance prediction of each organism within a sample. BugSplit is available at https://bugseq.com/academic .

Nanopore metagenomic sequencing for detection and characterization of SARS-CoV-2 in clinical samples.

OBJECTIVES: The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the need for rapid novel diagnostic strategies. Metagenomic Next-Generation Sequencing (mNGS) may allow for the detection of pathogens that can be missed in targeted assays. The goal of this study was to assess the performance of nanopore-based Sequence-Independent Single Primer Amplification (SISPA) for the detection and characterization of SARS-CoV-2. METHODS: We performed mNGS on clinical samples and designed a diagnostic classifier that corrects for barcode crosstalk between specimens. Phylogenetic analysis was performed on genome assemblies. RESULTS: Our assay yielded 100% specificity overall and 95.2% sensitivity for specimens with a RT-PCR cycle threshold value less than 30. We assembled 10 complete, and one near-complete genomes from 20 specimens that were classified as positive by mNGS. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that 10/11 specimens from British Columbia had a closest relative to another British Columbian specimen. We found 100% concordance between phylogenetic lineage assignment and Variant of Concern (VOC) PCR results. Our assay was able to distinguish between the Alpha and Gamma variants, which was not possible with the current standard VOC PCR being used in British Columbia. CONCLUSIONS: This study supports future work examining the broader feasibility of nanopore mNGS as a diagnostic strategy for the detection and characterization of viral pathogens.

A solution scan of societal options to reduce transmission and spread of respiratory viruses: SARS-CoV-2 as a case study.

Societal biosecurity - measures built into everyday society to minimize risks from pests and diseases - is an important aspect of managing epidemics and pandemics. We aimed to identify societal options for reducing the transmission and spread of respiratory viruses. We used SARS-CoV-2 (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2) as a case study to meet the immediate need to manage the COVID-19 pandemic and eventually transition to more normal societal conditions, and to catalog options for managing similar pandemics in the future. We used a 'solution scanning' approach. We read the literature; consulted psychology, public health, medical, and solution scanning experts; crowd-sourced options using social media; and collated comments on a preprint. Here, we present a list of 519 possible measures to reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission and spread. We provide a long list of options for policymakers and businesses to consider when designing biosecurity plans to combat SARS-CoV-2 and similar pathogens in the future. We also developed an online application to help with this process. We encourage testing of actions, documentation of outcomes, revisions to the current list, and the addition of further options.

The biosecurity benefits of genetic engineering attribution.

Biology can be misused, and the risk of this causing widespread harm increases in step with the rapid march of technological progress. A key security challenge involves attribution: determining, in the wake of a human-caused biological event, who was responsible. Recent scientific developments have demonstrated a capability for detecting whether an organism involved in such an event has been genetically modified and, if modified, to infer from its genetic sequence its likely lab of origin. We believe this technique could be developed into powerful forensic tools to aid the attribution of outbreaks caused by genetically engineered pathogens, and thus protect against the potential misuse of synthetic biology.

Validation analysis of Global Health Security Index (GHSI) scores 2019.

INTRODUCTION: The COVID-19 pandemic powerfully demonstrates the consequences of biothreats. Countries will want to know how to better prepare for future events. The Global Health Security Index (GHSI) is a broad, independent assessment of 195 countries' preparedness for biothreats that may aid this endeavour. However, to be useful, the GHSI's external validity must be demonstrated. We aimed to validate the GHSI against a range of external metrics to assess how it could be utilised by countries. METHODS: Global aggregate communicable disease outcomes were correlated with GHSI scores and linear regression models were examined to determine associations while controlling for a number of global macroindices. GHSI scores for countries previously exposed to severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Middle East respiratory syndrome and Ebola and recipients of US Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) investment were compared with matched control countries. Possible content omissions in light of the progressing COVID-19 pandemic were assessed. RESULTS: GHSI scores for countries had strong criterion validity against the Joint External Evaluation ReadyScore (rho=0.82, p<0.0001), and moderate external validity against deaths from communicable diseases (-0.56, p<0.0001). GHSI scores were associated with reduced deaths from communicable diseases (F(3, 172)=22.75, p<0.0001). The proportion of deaths from communicable diseases decreased 4.8% per 10-point rise in GHSI. Recipient countries of the GHSA (n=31) and SARS-affected countries (n=26), had GHSI scores 6.0 (p=0.0011) and 8.2 (p=0.0010) points higher than matched controls, respectively. Biosecurity and biosafety appear weak globally including in high-income countries, and health systems, particularly in Africa, are not prepared. Notably, the GHSI does not account for all factors important for health security. CONCLUSION: The GHSI shows promise as a valid tool to guide action on biosafety, biosecurity and systems preparedness. However, countries need to look beyond existing metrics to other factors moderating the impact of future pandemics and other biothreats. Consideration of anthropogenic and large catastrophic scenarios is also needed.

Bioengineering horizon scan 2020.

Horizon scanning is intended to identify the opportunities and threats associated with technological, regulatory and social change. In 2017 some of the present authors conducted a horizon scan for bioengineering (Wintle et al., 2017). Here we report the results of a new horizon scan that is based on inputs from a larger and more international group of 38 participants. The final list of 20 issues includes topics spanning from the political (the regulation of genomic data, increased philanthropic funding and malicious uses of neurochemicals) to the environmental (crops for changing climates and agricultural gene drives). The early identification of such issues is relevant to researchers, policy-makers and the wider public.

Who Should We Fear More: Biohackers, Disgruntled Postdocs, or Bad Governments? A Simple Risk Chain Model of Biorisk.

The biological risk landscape continues to evolve as developments in synthetic biology and biotechnology offer increasingly powerful tools to a widening pool of actors, including those who may consider carrying out a deliberate biological attack. However, it remains unclear whether it is the relatively large numbers of low-resourced actors or the small handful of high-powered actors who pose a greater biosecurity risk. To answer this question, this paper introduces a simple risk chain model of biorisk, from actor intent to a biological event, where the actor can successfully pass through each of N steps. Assuming that actor success probability at each independent step is sigmoidally distributed and actor power follows a power-law distribution, if a biorisk event were to occur, this model shows that the expected perpetrator would likely be highly powered, despite lower-powered actors being far more numerous. However, as the number of necessary steps leading to a biological release scenario decreases, lower-powered actors can quickly overtake more powerful actors as the likely source of a given event. If steps in the risk chain are of unequal difficulty, this model shows that actors are primarily limited by the most difficult step. These results have implications for biosecurity risk assessment and health security strengthening initiatives and highlight the need to consider actor power and ensure that the steps leading to a biorisk event are sufficiently difficult and not easily bypassed.

Assessing the Risks Posed by the Convergence of Artificial Intelligence and Biotechnology.

Rapid developments are currently taking place in the fields of artificial intelligence (AI) and biotechnology, and applications arising from the convergence of these 2 fields are likely to offer immense opportunities that could greatly benefit human health and biosecurity. The combination of AI and biotechnology could potentially lead to breakthroughs in precision medicine, improved biosurveillance, and discovery of novel medical countermeasures as well as facilitate a more effective public health emergency response. However, as is the case with many preceding transformative technologies, new opportunities often present new risks in parallel. Understanding the current and emerging risks at the intersection of AI and biotechnology is crucial for health security specialists and unlikely to be achieved by examining either field in isolation. Uncertainties multiply as technologies merge, showcasing the need to identify robust assessment frameworks that could adequately analyze the risk landscape emerging at the convergence of these 2 domains.This paper explores the criteria needed to assess risks associated with Artificial intelligence and biotechnology and evaluates 3 previously published risk assessment frameworks. After highlighting their strengths and limitations and applying to relevant Artificial intelligence and biotechnology examples, the authors suggest a hybrid framework with recommendations for future approaches to risk assessment for convergent technologies.

The 2019 Global Health Security Index (GHSI) and its implications for New Zealand and Pacific regional health security.

It is important for all countries to secure themselves against infectious disease threats, including potential global catastrophic biological risks. The Global Health Security Index (GHSI), first published in 2019, is a comprehensive, objective assessment of health security capabilities across 195 States Parties to the International Health Regulations. The GHSI is a broader assessment than the World Health Organization Joint External Evaluation and emphasises public documentation of preparedness as well as sustainable capabilities. New Zealand scored 54/100 on the GHSI (35th in the world). But also worryingly, the range of scores for New Zealand's Pacific neighbours was 19.2-27.8, highlighting potential regional vulnerabilities. Clearly, the New Zealand Government needs to do more to ensure its own optimal preparedness for global biological threats, and document these preparations to assure the international community. But it should also provide additional overseas development assistance (bringing this assistance up to 0.7% of GNI as per UN recommendations) and work with Pacific Nations to enhance health security in the region.

Infectious Disease Notification Practices in Victoria, 2016-17.

INTRODUCTION: Infectious disease surveillance in Victoria, Australia is based upon a legislated requirement for doctors and laboratories to notify suspected or diagnosed cases of specific conditions to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). The department undertakes regular audits of notification practices in Victoria typically every two years. The objective of this particular audit was to describe notification practices in 2016 and 2017, assess the effect of enhanced surveillance programs (ESPs) on Indigenous status data completeness and provide a baseline assessment that can be used to monitor the impact of a recent legislative change to notification requirements for several of the notifiable diseases which came into effect on 1 September 2018. METHODS: Notified cases reported to DHHS between 1 January 2016 and 31 December 2017 which met the confirmed and probable national case definitions were analysed by year, notifier type (doctor-only, laboratory-only, or both) and condition category (urgent versus routine). For three notifiable conditions (gonococcal infection and hepatitis B and hepatitis C of unspecified duration) Indigenous status completeness was compared pre- and post ESP commencement. RESULTS: The number of notified cases in Victoria increased 50% from 76,904 in 2016 to 115,318 in 2017 with a 277% increase in notified influenza alone. Almost half of cases were notified by both laboratory and doctor. Indigenous status was more likely to be complete following the introduction of ESPs (relative risk, RR 1.36 (95%CI: 1.33 - 1.40) p>0 .001). DISCUSSION: DHHS Victoria experienced a 1.5-fold increase in notified cases in 2017 compared with 2016, which was almost entirely attributable to influenza. For three notifiable conditions which had ESPs introduced during this period, Indigenous status reporting significantly improved. Indigenous identifiers on pathology request forms and data linkage are both interventions which are being considered to improve Indigenous status reporting in Victoria.