ABSTRACT
The aim of the present study was to compare the activity patterns of young, healthy right- (RH, n = 25) and left-handed (LH, n = 20) subjects in high-density electroencephalograpic (EEG) recordings during a deliberation task. The deliberation task consisted of pressing one of two keys depending on a color-word Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) presented on a computer screen. Depending on the color shown and the meaning of the color word, participants responded with the index finger of the dominant or non-dominant hand. This leads to different activities in the hemispheres depending on the acting hand and on subject's handedness. Presenting the word "black" in black color, subjects were not to press any key (no-go-trial). Prior to this, subjects were tested for simple motor tasks, during which they were informed about the motor action to be performed. The temporal activity patterns obtained from RH and LH were very similar in shape and constituent components. The comparison of the three types of trials lead to the assumption that the deliberation process is based on a two-step decision: The first decision was characterized by the choice between move (match-trials, mismatch-trials) or not to move (no-go-trials). The second decision resulted in the final judgment of which index finger has to be used. The latter decision, in particular, can be tracked via the local spread of activity over the scalp. Our hypothesis is based on a comparison of activities and locations of RH and LH and yields some insights about processing a two-step decision in a deliberation task.
Subject(s)
Functional Laterality , Hand , Humans , FingersABSTRACT
A number of companies including Google and BMW are currently working on the development of autonomous cars. But if fully autonomous cars are going to drive on our roads, it must be decided who is to be held responsible in case of accidents. This involves not only legal questions, but also moral ones. The first question discussed is whether we should try to design the tort liability for car manufacturers in a way that will help along the development and improvement of autonomous vehicles. In particular, Patrick Lin's concern that any security gain derived from the introduction of autonomous cars would constitute a trade-off in human lives will be addressed. The second question is whether it would be morally permissible to impose liability on the user based on a duty to pay attention to the road and traffic and to intervene when necessary to avoid accidents. Doubts about the moral legitimacy of such a scheme are based on the notion that it is a form of defamation if a person is held to blame for causing the death of another by his inattention if he never had a real chance to intervene. Therefore, the legitimacy of such an approach would depend on the user having an actual chance to do so. The last option discussed in this paper is a system in which a person using an autonomous vehicle has no duty (and possibly no way) of interfering, but is still held (financially, not criminally) responsible for possible accidents. Two ways of doing so are discussed, but only one is judged morally feasible.
