Incentive preferences for community health volunteers in Kenya: findings from a discrete choice experiment.

BACKGROUND: Community health volunteers (CHVs) play crucial roles in enabling access to healthcare at the community levels. Although CHVs are considered volunteers, programmes provide financial and non-financial incentives. However, there is limited evidence on which bundle of financial and non-financial incentives are most effective for their improved performance. METHODS: We used a discrete choice experiment (DCE) to understand incentive preferences of CHVs with the aim to improve their motivation, performance and retention. Relevant incentive attributes were identified through qualitative interviews with CHVs and with their supervisors. We then deployed a nominal group technique to generate and rank preferred attributes among CHVs. We developed a DCE based on the five attributes and administered it to 211 CHVs in Kilifi and Bungoma counties in Kenya. We used mixed multinomial logit models to estimate the utility of each incentive attribute and calculated the trade-offs the CHWs were willing to make for a change in stipend. RESULTS: Transport was considered the incentive attribute with most relative importance followed by tools of trade then monthly stipend. CHVs preferred job incentives that offered higher monthly stipends even though it was not the most important. They had negative preference for job incentives that provided award mechanisms for the best performing CHVs as compared with jobs that provided recognition at the community level and preferred job incentives that provided more tools of trade compared with those that provided limited tools. CONCLUSION: A bundled incentive of both financial and non-financial packages is necessary to provide a conducive working environment for CHVs. The menu of options relevant for CHVs in Kenya include transport, tools of trade and monthly stipend. Policy decisions should be contextualised to include these attributes to facilitate CHW satisfaction and performance.

Understanding community health worker incentive preferences in Uganda using a discrete choice experiment.

BACKGROUND: Community health workers (CHWs) play a critical role in supporting health systems, and in improving the availability and accessibility to health care. However, CHW programs globally continue to face challenges with poor performance and high levels of CHW attrition. CHW programs are often underfunded and poorly planned, which can lead to loss of motivation by CHWs. The study aims to determine preferences of CHWs for job incentives with the goal of furthering their motivation and success. METHODS: Relevant incentive attributes were identified through focus group discussions and in-depth interviews with CHWs, non-governmental organization CHWs, CHW supervisors, and policy-level stakeholders. Based on seven attributes (eg, training, workload, stipend) we developed a discrete choice experiment (DCE) that was administered to 399 CHWs across eight districts in Uganda. We used conditional and mixed multinomial logit models to estimate the utility of each job attribute. We calculated the marginal willingness to accept as the trade-off the CHWs were willing to make for a change in salary. RESULTS: CHWs preferred higher salaries, though salary was not the most important attribute. There was a preference for reliable transportation, such as a bicycle (ß = 1.86, 95% CI = 1.06, 2.67), motorcycle (ß = 1.81, 95% CI = 1.27, 2.34) or transport allowance (ß = 1.37, 95% CI = 0.65, 2.10) to no transport. Formal identification including identity badges (ß = 1.61, 95% CI = 0.72, 2.49), branded uniforms (ß = 1.04, 95% CI = 0.45, 1.63) and protective branded gear (ß = 0.76, 95% CI = 0.32, 1.21) were preferred compared to no identification. CHWs also preferred more regular refresher trainings, the use of mobile phones as job-aids and a lesser workload. The relative importance estimates suggested that transport was the most important attribute, followed by identification, refresher training, salary, workload, recognition, and availability of tools. CHWs were willing to accept a decrease in salary of USH 31 240 (US$8.5) for identity badges, and a decrease of USH85 300 (US$23) for branded uniforms to no identification. CONCLUSIONS: This study utilized CHW and policymaker perspectives to identify realistic and pragmatic incentives to improve CHW working conditions, which is instrumental in improving their retention. Non-monetary incentives (eg, identification, transportation) are crucial motivators for CHWs and should be considered as part of the compensation package to facilitate improved performance of CHW programs.

Preferences of healthcare providers for capitation payment in Kenya: a discrete choice experiment.

Provider payment mechanisms (PPMs) are important to the universal health coverage (UHC) agenda as they can influence healthcare provider behaviour and create incentives for health service delivery, quality and efficiency. Therefore, when designing PPMs, it is important to consider providers' preferences for PPM characteristics. We set out to uncover senior health facility managers' preferences for the attributes of a capitation payment mechanism in Kenya. We use a discrete choice experiment and focus on four capitation attributes, namely, payment schedule, timeliness of payments, capitation rate per individual per year and services to be paid by the capitation rate. Using a Bayesian efficient experimental design, choice data were collected from 233 senior health facility managers across 98 health facilities in seven Kenyan counties. Panel mixed multinomial logit and latent class models were used in the analysis. We found that capitation arrangements with frequent payment schedules, timelier disbursements, higher payment rates per individual per year and those that paid for a limited set of health services were preferred. The capitation rate per individual per year was the most important attribute. Respondents were willing to accept an increase in the capitation rate to compensate for bundling a broader set of health services under the capitation payment. In addition, we found preference heterogeneity across respondents and latent classes. In conclusion, these attributes can be used as potential targets for interventions aimed at configuring capitation to achieve UHC.

Mobile money use and social health insurance enrolment among rural dwellers outside the formal employment sector: Evidence from Kenya.

BACKGROUND: The study set out to explore whether mobile money use (mobile phone-based financial services) increased the probability of rural dwellers outside the formal employment sector of being enrolled in Kenya's social health insurance, the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF). METHODS: We used data from the 2015 FinAccess Household Survey and analysed responses of 4282 rural individuals outside the formal employment sector. Probit and bivariate probit models were used and adjusted for mobile phone ownership, sex, age, age-squared, education, wealth quintile, bank account use, informal group membership, occupation, and health shocks. RESULTS: We found that 16.26% (95% CI, 14.58% to 18.10%) of mobile money users had NHIF cover as compared with 2.44% (95% CI, 1.83% to 3.23%) of nonusers. Importantly, mobile money use increased the probability of being enrolled in NHIF by 4.6% (95% CI, 2.1% to 7.1%) after controlling for confounders. Access to mobile money was associated with reduced travel time and lower transport costs, which are likely to be key mechanisms for increasing NHIF enrolment. CONCLUSION: By lowering transport costs and saving travel time, mobile money provides an easy means to pay social health insurance premiums thus incentivising its uptake among rural people outside of formal employment.

Understanding incentive preferences of community health workers using discrete choice experiments: a multicountry protocol for Kenya, Uganda, Bangladesh and Haiti.

INTRODUCTION: There is a renewed global interest in improving community health worker (CHW) programmes. For CHW programmes to be effective, key intervention design factors which contribute to the performance of CHWs need to be identified. The recent WHO guidelines recommends the combination of financial and non-financial incentives to improve CHW performance. However, evidence gaps remain as to what package of incentives will improve their performance in different country contexts. This study aims to evaluate CHW incentive preferences to improve performance and retention which will strengthen CHW programmes and help governments leverage limited resources appropriately. METHODS AND ANALYSIS: A discrete choice experiment (DCE) will be conducted with CHWs in Bangladesh, Haiti, Kenya and Uganda with different levels of maturity of CHWs programmes. This will be carried out in two phases. Phase 1 will involve preliminary qualitative research including focus group discussions (FGDs) and key informant interviews to develop the DCE design which will include attributes relevant to the CHW country settings. Phase 2 will involve a DCE survey with CHWs, presenting them with a series of job choices with varying attribute levels. An orthogonal design will be used to generate the choice sets for the surveys. The surveys will be administered in locally-appropriate languages to at least 150 CHWs from each of the cadres in each country. Conditional and mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) models will be used for the estimation of stated preferences. ETHICS AND DISSEMINATION: This study has been reviewed and approved by the Population Council's Institutional Review Board in New York, and appropriate ethics review boards in Kenya, Uganda, Bangladesh and Haiti. The results of the study will be disseminated through in-country dissemination workshops, meetings with country-level stakeholders and policy working groups, print media, online blogs and peer-reviewed journals.

Attribute development and level selection for a discrete choice experiment to elicit the preferences of health care providers for capitation payment mechanism in Kenya.

BACKGROUND: Stated preference elicitation methods such as discrete choice experiments (DCEs) are now widely used in the health domain. However, the "quality" of health-related DCEs has come under criticism due to the lack of rigour in conducting and reporting some aspects of the design process such as attribute and level development. Superficially selecting attributes and levels and vaguely reporting the process might result in misspecification of attributes which may, in turn, bias the study and misinform policy. To address these concerns, we meticulously conducted and report our systematic attribute development and level selection process for a DCE to elicit the preferences of health care providers for the attributes of a capitation payment mechanism in Kenya. METHODOLOGY: We used a four-stage process proposed by Helter and Boehler to conduct and report the attribute development and level selection process. The process entailed raw data collection, data reduction, removing inappropriate attributes, and wording of attributes. Raw data was collected through a literature review and a qualitative study. Data was reduced to a long list of attributes which were then screened for appropriateness by a panel of experts. The resulting attributes and levels were worded and pretested in a pilot study. Revisions were made and a final list of attributes and levels decided. RESULTS: The literature review unearthed seven attributes of provider payment mechanisms while the qualitative study uncovered 10 capitation attributes. Then, inappropriate attributes were removed using criteria such as salience, correlation, plausibility, and capability of being traded. The resulting five attributes were worded appropriately and pretested in a pilot study with 31 respondents. The pilot study results were used to make revisions. Finally, four attributes were established for the DCE, namely, payment schedule, timeliness of payments, capitation rate per individual per year, and services to be paid by the capitation rate. CONCLUSION: By rigorously conducting and reporting the process of attribute development and level selection of our DCE,we improved transparency and helped researchers judge the quality.

Health care purchasing in Kenya: Experiences of health care providers with capitation and fee-for-service provider payment mechanisms.

BACKGROUND: Provider payment mechanisms (PPMs) play a critical role in universal health coverage due to the incentives they create for health care providers to deliver needed services, quality, and efficiency. We set out to explore public, private, and faith-based providers' experiences with capitation and fee-for-service in Kenya and identified attributes of PPMs that providers considered important. METHODS: We conducted a qualitative study in two counties in Kenya. Data were collected using semistructured interviews with 29 management team members in six health providers accredited by the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF). RESULTS: Capitation and fee-for-service payments from the NHIF and private insurers were reported as good revenue sources as they contributed to providers' overall income. The expected fee-for-service payment amounts from NHIF and private insurers were predictable while capitation funds from NHIF were not because providers did not have information on the number of enrolees in their capitation pool. Moreover, capitation payment rates were perceived as inadequate. Capitation and fee-for-service payments from NHIF and private insurers were disbursed late. Finally, public providers had lost their autonomy to access and utilise capitation and fee-for-service payments from the NHIF. CONCLUSION: Through their experiences, health care providers revealed characteristics of PPMs that they considered important.

What characteristics of provider payment mechanisms influence health care providers' behaviour? A literature review.

BACKGROUND: Provider payment mechanisms (PPMs) create incentives or signals that influence the behaviour of health care providers. Understanding the characteristics of PPMs that influence health care providers' behaviour is essential for aligning PPM reforms for improving access, quality, and efficiency of health care services. We reviewed empirical literature that examined the characteristics of PPMs that influence the behaviour of health care providers. METHODS: We systematically searched for empirical literature in PubMed, Web of Science, and Google Scholar databases and complemented these with physical searching of the references of selected papers for further relevant studies. A total of 16 studies that met our inclusion and exclusion criteria were identified. We analysed data using thematic review. RESULTS: We identified seven major characteristics of PPMs that influence health care providers' behaviour. Of these characteristics, payment rate, the sufficiency of payment rate to cover the cost of services, timeliness of payment, payment schedule, performance requirements, and accountability mechanisms were the most important. CONCLUSIONS: Our review found that health care providers' behaviour is influenced by the characteristics of PPMs. Provider payment mechanism reforms that optimally structure these characteristics can elicit required incentives for access, equity, quality, and efficiency in service delivery among health care providers towards achieving universal health coverage.