Doctors' duty to provide abortion information.

With abortion remaining legal in over half of the country and a proliferation of websites offering information on how to access abortion medications, for those who know where to look, there are sound options for safely ending an unwanted early-stage pregnancy. But not all patients have equal access to reliable information. This Article addresses the urgent downstream harms caused by the lack of access to abortion information, and argues that in view of these consequences, regardless of abortion's legal status, clinicians have a duty to provide their patients with abortion information. We begin by documenting clinicians' hesitation to share abortion information, drawing on our interviews with 25 doctors practicing medicine in a state where abortion is criminalized. Next, we explain why clinicians are duty-bound to provide all-options counseling. We then consider whether such duties shift where abortion is criminalized. After identifying the limited legal risks associated with supplying abortion information, and showing how, by requiring all-options counseling, professional societies might reduce risks to patients and clinicians, we conclude that, regardless of the legal status of abortion, clinicians have a professional responsibility to share basic abortion information - including treatment options and how to access those options.

What will and won't happen when abortion is banned.

For the past 50 years, abortion opponents have fought for the power to ban abortion without little attention to how things might change when they won. The battle to make abortion illegal has been predicated on three nebulous assumptions about how abortion bans work. First, supporters believe banning abortion will deter it. Second, they hope bans will send a message about abortion-specifically, that abortion is immoral. And third, they expect bans to be competently implemented and enforced. Drawing on empirical work from within and outside of the U.S., this Article offers an evidence-based assessment of each of these assumptions. Part One examines the question of deterrence by exploring findings from countries with relatively high and relatively low abortion rates. After explaining why restrictive abortion laws alone do not reduce aggregate abortion rates, I consider the matter of individual deterrence. By identifying those most likely to be deterred by U.S. abortion bans, I illustrate how abortion bans intersect with structural inequalities to disproportionately impact poor women of color and their children. Part Two tests the idea that abortion bans send a message. I consider the bans' meaning in context with U.S. laws and policies affecting families, exposing the difference between laws discouraging abortion, and those encouraging childbirth. Then, drawing from literature on the expressive function of the law, I assess the limits on the message-sending capacity of abortion bans in a society divided over abortion and over its commitment to children living in poverty. Part Three turns to the expectation that abortion bans will be competently enforced, noting the legitimacy struggles arising from law enforcement patterns, along with the administrative challenges inherent in overseeing the various exceptions to abortion bans. This article concludes by considering why the consequences and limitations of abortion bans should matter to supporters and opponents, alike.

Motherhood, Abortion, and the Medicalization of Poverty.

This article considers the impact of laws and policies that determine who experiences unplanned pregnancy, who has abortions, and how economic status shapes one's response to unplanned pregnancy. There is a well-documented correlation between abortion and poverty: poor women have more abortions than do their richer sisters. Equally well-documented is the correlation between unplanned pregnancy and poverty. Finally, the high cost of motherhood for poor women and their offspring manifests in disproportionately high lifelong rates of poverty, ill-health and mortality for offspring and mothers, alike. Read together, these factors offer a vivid illustration of the medicalization of poverty.

Abortion Bans, Doctors, and the Criminalization of Patients.

January 2018, the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology issued a position statement opposing the punishment of women for self-induced abortion. To those unfamiliar with emerging trends in abortion in the United States and worldwide, the need for the declaration might not be apparent. Several studies suggest that self-induced abortion is on the rise in the United States. Simultaneously, prosecutions of pregnant women for behavior thought to harm the fetus are increasing. The ACOG statement responds to both trends by urging doctors to honor the integrity and confidentiality inherent in the doctor-patient relationship. Seen in the context of the larger battle over legal abortion, the statement has far broader implications. By acknowledging the role doctors play in enforcing pregnancy-related crimes, the ACOG position statement wisely anticipates the ways in which doctors will be implicated should access to legal abortion be further restricted. To understand the need for the ACOG directive, you must first understand that the story of what will happen if abortion becomes a crime in the United States is not to be found in history books; it is staring at us across our southern border.

The Sticky Standard of Care.

The problem at the heart of "Stemming the Standard-of-Care Sprawl: Clinician Self-Interest and the Case of Electronic Fetal Monitoring," an article by Kayte Spector-Bagdady and colleagues in the November-December 2017 issue of the Hastings Center Report, is the persistence of a suboptimal standard of care long after evidence-driven approaches would dictate a change. That problem is not simply defensive medicine, or what the authors call "standard-of-care sprawl." Instead, it is that, in some cases, the standard of care lags behind best practices. It gets stuck. The authors point to the genesis of the stickiness problem in their passing reference to a core truth: "The problem is that standard of care is not synonymous with best or evidence-based medicine." In my view, we might best understand the persistence of ineffective and even harmful medical interventions by acknowledging the regulatory vacuum in which such practices thrive. It is by default, not by design, that the profession relies on medical malpractice law to set the boundaries on acceptable practice.

Importing human pluripotent stem cell lines derived at another institution: tailoring review to ethical concerns.

Stem cell researchers commonly use human pluripotent stem cell lines derived by other investigators. Researchers may use lines derived elsewhere, provided that their derivation met consensus core standards. Some types of derivation raise heightened levels of ethical concern and require greater scrutiny. To maintain public trust, research institutions need to justify why they allow researchers to use lines whose derivation would not have been permitted locally.

A new era in the ethics of human embryonic stem cell research.

Scientific progress in human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research and increased funding make it imperative to look ahead to the ethical issues generated by the expected use of hESCs for transplantation. Several issues should be addressed now, even though phase I clinical trials of hESC transplantation are still in the future. To minimize the risk of hESC transplantation, donors of materials used to derive hESC lines will need to be recontacted to update their medical history and screening. Because of privacy concerns, such recontact needs to be discussed and agreed to at the time of donation, before new hESC lines are derived. Informed consent for phase I clinical trials of hESC transplantation also raises ethical concerns. In previous phase I trials of highly innovative interventions, allegations that trial participants had not really understood the risk and benefits caused delays in subsequent trials. Thus, researchers should consider what information needs to be discussed during the consent process for hESC clinical trials and how to verify that participants have a realistic understanding of the study. Lack of attention to the special ethical concerns raised by clinical trials of hESC transplantation and their implications for the derivation of new hESC lines may undermine or delay progress toward stem cell therapies.