ABSTRACT
South Australia's Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2021 commenced operation on 31 January 2023. However, ss 474.29A and 474.29B of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) prohibit the use of "carriage services" to promote or provide instructions about suicide and may impede access to voluntary assisted dying (VAD). Attempts to clarify whether VAD is suicide have been unsuccessful and doctors risk prosecution if they use telehealth to participate in VAD. This article examines specific steps in the VAD pathway that are likely to breach the federal law. Although there have been attempts to clarify what information can permissibly be discussed using a carriage service, doctors risk breaching the federal law at multiple stages of the VAD process. This article concludes arguing that this conflict of laws must be resolved and calls upon the Commonwealth Government to amend the Criminal Code to exclude VAD from the definition of suicide.
Subject(s)
Suicide, Assisted , Humans , Suicide, Assisted/legislation & jurisprudence , South Australia , Health Services Accessibility/legislation & jurisprudenceSubject(s)
Emergency Service, Hospital/legislation & jurisprudence , Malpractice/legislation & jurisprudence , State Medicine/legislation & jurisprudence , Waiting Lists , Communication , Hematoma, Epidural, Cranial/surgery , Hematoma, Epidural, Cranial/therapy , Humans , Triage/legislation & jurisprudence , United KingdomABSTRACT
This article considers the requirements to assess for elements of undue influence under the Oregon Death with Dignity Act (2013) and California's recently assented to End of Life Option Act (2015). Acting voluntarily, that is free from undue influence, is critical to the operation of these statutes. Indeed, assisted dying largely draws its legitimacy from the requirement that voluntariness is well protected. However, this article argues that the requirements under these statutes fall short of adequately protecting a voluntary decision. This article discusses the provisions concerning voluntariness and undue influence under these two statutes, highlighting ostensible limitations therein. Basic recommendations for improvement are proffered. This article concludes by arguing that Australia should not draw inspiration from these statutory provisions because they fail to protect freedom of choice in a meaningful way.
Subject(s)
Right to Die/legislation & jurisprudence , Suicide, Assisted/legislation & jurisprudence , Australia , California , Humans , OregonSubject(s)
Decision Making , Informed Consent , Radiotherapy , Social Control, Formal , Therapies, Investigational , Adult , Child , Female , Humans , MaleABSTRACT
A major appellate court decision from the United States seriously questions the legal sufficiency of prevailing medical criteria for the determination of death by neurological criteria. There may be a mismatch between legal and medical standards for brain death, requiring the amendment of either or both. In South Australia, a Bill seeks to establish a legal right for a defined category of persons suffering unbearably to request voluntary euthanasia. However, an essential criterion of a voluntary decision is that it is not tainted by undue influence, and this Bill falls short of providing adequate guidance to assess for undue influence.
