Are ambiguity aversion and ambiguity intolerance identical? A neuroeconomics investigation.

In recent years, there has been growing interest in understanding a person's reaction to ambiguous situations, and two similar constructs related to ambiguity, "ambiguity aversion" and "ambiguity intolerance," are defined in different disciplines. In the field of economic decision-making research, "ambiguity aversion" represents a preference for known risks relative to unknown risks. On the other hand, in clinical psychology, "ambiguity intolerance" describes the tendency to perceive ambiguous situations as undesirable. However, it remains unclear whether these two notions derived from different disciplines are identical or not. To clarify this issue, we combined an economic task, psychological questionnaires, and voxel-based morphometry (VBM) of structural brain magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) in a sample of healthy volunteers. The individual ambiguity aversion tendency parameter, as measured by our economic task, was negatively correlated with agreeableness scores on the self-reported version of the Revised NEO Personality Inventory. However, it was not correlated with scores of discomfort with ambiguity, one of the subscales of the Need for Closure Scale. Furthermore, the ambiguity aversion tendency parameter was negatively correlated with gray matter (GM) volume of areas in the lateral prefrontal cortex and parietal cortex, whereas ambiguity intolerance was not correlated with GM volume in any region. Our results suggest that ambiguity aversion, described in decision theory, may not necessarily be identical to ambiguity intolerance, referred to in clinical psychology. Cautious applications of decision theory to clinical neuropsychiatry are recommended.

Honesty mediates the relationship between serotonin and reaction to unfairness.

How does one deal with unfair behaviors? This subject has long been investigated by various disciplines including philosophy, psychology, economics, and biology. However, our reactions to unfairness differ from one individual to another. Experimental economics studies using the ultimatum game (UG), in which players must decide whether to accept or reject fair or unfair offers, have also shown that there are substantial individual differences in reaction to unfairness. However, little is known about psychological as well as neurobiological mechanisms of this observation. We combined a molecular imaging technique, an economics game, and a personality inventory to elucidate the neurobiological mechanism of heterogeneous reactions to unfairness. Contrary to the common belief that aggressive personalities (impulsivity or hostility) are related to the high rejection rate of unfair offers in UG, we found that individuals with apparently peaceful personalities (straightforwardness and trust) rejected more often and were engaged in personally costly forms of retaliation. Furthermore, individuals with a low level of serotonin transporters in the dorsal raphe nucleus (DRN) are honest and trustful, and thus cannot tolerate unfairness, being candid in expressing their frustrations. In other words, higher central serotonin transmission might allow us to behave adroitly and opportunistically, being good at playing games while pursuing self-interest. We provide unique neurobiological evidence to account for individual differences of reaction to unfairness.

Dopamine D1 receptors and nonlinear probability weighting in risky choice.

Misestimating risk could lead to disadvantaged choices such as initiation of drug use (or gambling) and transition to regular drug use (or gambling). Although the normative theory in decision-making under risks assumes that people typically take the probability-weighted expectation over possible utilities, experimental studies of choices among risks suggest that outcome probabilities are transformed nonlinearly into subjective decision weights by a nonlinear weighting function that overweights low probabilities and underweights high probabilities. Recent studies have revealed the neurocognitive mechanism of decision-making under risk. However, the role of modulatory neurotransmission in this process remains unclear. Using positron emission tomography, we directly investigated whether dopamine D1 and D2 receptors in the brain are associated with transformation of probabilities into decision weights in healthy volunteers. The binding of striatal D1 receptors is negatively correlated with the degree of nonlinearity of weighting function. Individuals with lower striatal D1 receptor density showed more pronounced overestimation of low probabilities and underestimation of high probabilities. This finding should contribute to a better understanding of the molecular mechanism of risky choice, and extreme or impaired decision-making observed in drug and gambling addiction.

Impact of changing the Japanese term for "schizophrenia" for reasons of stereotypical beliefs of schizophrenia in Japanese youth.

The old term for schizophrenia, "Seishin-Bunretsu-Byo" (Mind-Split Disease), has been replaced by "Togo-Shitcho-Sho" (Integration Disorder) in Japan. Stigma research requiring individuals to report personal beliefs is useful but is subject to social desirability bias. Using the Implicit Association Test, a measurement designed to minimize this bias, we assessed the impact of this renaming on the stereotype of schizophrenia held by a younger generation. The old term was strongly associated with "criminal", and this association became significantly weaker with the new term. The strategy of renaming holds considerable promise for tempering negative bias toward this disorder in Japan.