Updating false beliefs: The role of misplaced vs. well-placed certainty.

People can update their misconceptions or false beliefs by learning from corrective sources. However, research has shown that people vary drastically in the extent to which they learn from feedback and update their false beliefs accordingly. That past work drew attention to cognitive and motivational factors such as cognitive rigidity and closed-mindedness as inhibitors of belief updating. Here we examined a novel epistemic structure, misplaced certainty, a subjective sense of certainty while recognizing uncertainty in oneself or most people (e.g., I feel certain although I recognize X is technically uncertain or it is technically uncertain according to most people), as a unique predictor of lower belief updating. In a preregistered study, we hypothesized that those with high chronic misplaced certainty would be less likely to learn from feedback and revise their misconceptions in a feedback-learning task. In our analyses, we controlled for well-placed certainty-certainty while recognizing no doubt in oneself or most others. We also controlled for variables associated with closed-minded cognition. Consistent with our predictions, those with high misplaced certainty were less likely to revise their false beliefs in response to corrective feedback. In contrast, those with high well-placed certainty were more likely to learn from corrective feedback and revise their false beliefs. By shedding light on the nuances of different forms of subjective certainty, the present work aims to pave the way for further research on epistemic factors in the perseverance and correction of false beliefs.

Discordant knowing: A social cognitive structure underlying fanaticism.

Examining the epistemic and social-cognitive structures underlying fanaticism, radicalization, and extremism should shed light on how these harmful phenomena develop and can be prevented. In nine studies (N = 3,277), we examined whether discordant knowing-felt knowledge about something that one perceives as opposed by most others-underlies fanaticism. Across multifaceted approaches, experimentally manipulating participants' views to fall under this framework (e.g., "I am certain about X, but most other people think X is unknowable or wrong") heightened indicators of fanaticism, including aggression, determined ignorance, and wanting to join extreme groups in the service of these views. Additional analyses found that this effect occurs via threat-based mechanisms (Studies 1-7), can be intervened on to prevent fanaticism (Study 2), is conditional on the potency of opposition (Study 3), differs from effects on extremism (Study 4), and extends to mental representations of the self (Study 5). Generalizing these findings to real-world contexts, inducing participants with discordant knowledge about the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election and the morality of abortion heightened fanaticism regarding these topics (Studies 6 and 7). Additionally, antivaccine fanatics and followers of a real-world fanatical religious group exhibited greater discordant knowing than nonfanatical individuals (Studies 8 and 9). Collectively, the present studies suggest that a specific epistemic structure-discordant knowing-underlies fanaticism, and further, highlight the potential of investigating constructs like fanaticism from an epistemic social cognitive perspective. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

On the updating of spontaneous impressions.

A large body of work has shown that perceivers form spontaneous inferences about others' characteristics (e.g., mean, bad) as soon as they observe their behaviors. However, a question that has not been addressed by previous research is the integration of contingencies of those actions (e.g., perceivers' ultimate goals) that are typically learned over time into the initial spontaneous impressions of those others. Three experiments examined updating of spontaneously formed trait inferences (STIs) and evaluative inferences (SEIs) as a function of the contingency information that alters the meaning of the initial information. All three studies showed that perceivers update their SEIs (both positive and negative) immediately after learning about the contingencies (i.e., transforming information). STIs, however, were not updated, even when the contingency information was provided immediately after the initial behavior information (Experiment 3). Instead, in all three experiments participants formed multiple STIs; one from the behavior information before and one from the information after the contingency. It was only when participants had the opportunity to elaborate on their trait judgments within explicit measures that they revised their judgments and aligned them with the contingency information. The results and the implications of the findings are discussed in light of the theoretical models suggesting separate mechanisms of semantic and evaluative processing in person perception. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Stereotype activation and self-regulation by conservatives and liberals in political encounters.

We examined stereotyping and its effect on self-regulation in preparation for inter-ideological interactions. Turkish conservative and liberal students anticipated interacting with a political outgroup (vs. ingroup) member and the accessibility of outgroup and ingroup stereotypes was measured. Conservatives in both outgroup and ingroup interaction conditions showed higher accessibility for outgroup stereotypes. Liberals, however, showed lower accessibility for both outgroup and ingroup stereotypes in both conditions. Liberals' suppression of stereotypes about the anticipated partner led to worse self-regulation when the anticipated partner was conservative but better self-regulation when the partner was liberal. Conservatives' stereotype accessibility did not affect their self-regulation. These findings show that liberals may tend to rely on self-regulatory resources to suppress their stereotypes while anticipating inter-ideological interactions, while conservatives rely on stereotypes to navigate such interactions.

Goal versus trait explanations: Causal attributions beyond the trait-situation dichotomy.

In 4 studies, we show that two behavioral dimensions specified in Kelley's (1967) model of attribution, consistency and distinctiveness of behaviors, determine perceivers' likelihood to explain others' behaviors in terms of their goals versus traits. Participants tended to attribute the cause of others' behaviors to their goals (vs. traits and other characteristics) when behaviors were characterized by high distinctiveness (Study 1A & 1B) or low consistency (Study 2). On the other hand, traits were ascribed as predominant causal explanations when behaviors had low distinctiveness or high consistency. Study 3 investigated the combined effect of those behavioral dimensions on causal attributions and showed that behaviors with high distinctiveness and consistency as well as low distinctiveness and consistency trigger goal attributions. We discuss the implications of the present research in terms of going beyond the dominant approach of trait-situation dichotomy in attribution research. (PsycINFO Database Record

Distortion in time perception as a result of concern about appearing biased.

Two experiments illustrate that the perception of a given time duration slows when white participants observe faces of black men, but only if participants are concerned with appearing biased. In Experiment 1 the concern with the appearance of bias is measured as a chronic state using the external motivation to respond without prejudice scale (Plant & Devine, 1998). In Experiment 2 it is manipulated by varying the race of the experimenter (black versus white). Time perception is assessed via a temporal discrimination task commonly used in the literature. Models of time perception identify arousal as a factor that causes perceived time to slow, and we speculate that arousal arising in intergroup interactions can alter time perception.

On Race and Time.

Arousal is known to shape time perception, and heightened arousal causes one to perceive that time has slowed (i.e., a given length of time feels longer than it actually is). The current experiments illustrate that among White people who experience arousal when contemplating race (specifically those for whom appearing biased is an ongoing concern), time perception slows when they observe faces of Black men. We asked participants to judge the duration of presentation for faces of White and Black men (shown for periods ranging from 300 to 1,200 ms) relative to a standard duration of 600 ms. Evidence of bias emerged when White participants concerned with bias saw faces of Black men (e.g., durations of less than 600 ms were perceived as being greater than 600 ms). The current findings have implications for intergroup interactions in which timing is essential-for example, length of job interviews, police officers' perception of the length of an encounter and when force should be initiated, and doctors' perception of the length of medical encounters. Racially biased time perception is a new form of implicit bias, one exerted at the perceptual level.