The role of cognitive control and referential complexity on adults' choice of referring expressions: Testing and expanding the referential complexity scale.

This study aims to advance our understanding of the nature and source(s) of individual differences in pragmatic language behavior over the adult lifespan. Across four story continuation experiments, we probed adults' (N = 496 participants, ages 18-82) choice of referential forms (i.e., names vs. pronouns to refer to the main character). Our manipulations were based on Fossard et al.'s (2018) scale of referential complexity which varies according to the visual properties of the scene: low complexity (one character), intermediate complexity (two characters of different genders), and high complexity (two characters of the same gender). Since pronouns signal topic continuity (i.e., that the discourse will continue to be about the same referent), the use of pronouns is expected to decrease as referential complexity increases. The choice of names versus pronouns, therefore, provides insight into participants' perception of the topicality of a referent, and whether that varies by age and cognitive capacity. In Experiment 1, we used the scale to test the association between referential choice, aging, and cognition, identifying a link between older adults' switching skills and optimal referential choice. In Experiments 2-4, we tested novel manipulations that could impact the scale and found both the TIMING of a competitor referent's presence and EMPHASIS placed on competitors modulated referential choice, leading us to refine the scale for future use. Collectively, Experiments 1-4 highlight what type of contextual information is prioritized at different ages, revealing older adults' preserved sensitivity to (visual) scene complexity but reduced sensitivity to linguistic prominence cues, compared to younger adults. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Event-Related Potential Evidence of Implicit Metric Structure during Silent Reading.

Under the Implicit Prosody Hypothesis, readers generate prosodic structures during silent reading that can direct their real-time interpretations of the text. In the current study, we investigated the processing of implicit meter by recording event-related potentials (ERPs) while participants read a series of 160 rhyming couplets, where the rhyme target was always a stress-alternating noun-verb homograph (e.g., permit, which is pronounced PERmit as a noun and perMIT as a verb). The target had a strong-weak or weak-strong stress pattern, which was either consistent or inconsistent with the stress expectation generated by the couplet. Inconsistent strong-weak targets elicited negativities between 80-155 ms and 325-375 ms relative to consistent strong-weak targets; inconsistent weak-strong targets elicited a positivity between 365-435 ms relative to consistent weak-strong targets. These results are largely consistent with effects of metric violations during listening, demonstrating that implicit prosodic representations are similar to explicit prosodic representations.

How do you know that? Automatic belief inferences in passing conversation.

There is an ongoing debate, both in philosophy and psychology, as to whether people are able to automatically infer what others may know, or whether they can only derive belief inferences by deploying cognitive resources. Evidence from laboratory tasks, often involving false beliefs or visual-perspective taking, has suggested that belief inferences are cognitively costly, controlled processes. Here we suggest that in everyday conversation, belief reasoning is pervasive and therefore potentially automatic in some cases. To test this hypothesis, we conducted two pre-registered self-paced reading experiments (N1 = 91, N2 = 89). The results of these experiments showed that participants slowed down when a stranger commented 'That greasy food is bad for your ulcer' relative to conditions where a stranger commented on their own ulcer or a friend made either comment - none of which violated participants' common-ground expectations. We conclude that Theory of Mind models need to account for belief reasoning in conversation as it is at the center of everyday social interaction.