Developmental sequences in class reasoning and propositional reasoning.

This study explored the theoretical prediction that class and propositional reasoning skills emerge as a function of the developing ability to coordinate increasingly complex negation and affirmation operations. Children from Grades 1, 3, 5, and 7 (7-, 9-, 11-, and 13-year-olds) were presented with problems from each domain. Rasch analyses of the children's responses were consistent with the hypothesis that both types of problems measured a single underlying dimension (i.e., the coordination of affirmation and negation operations). Qualitatively distinct levels of class and propositional reasoning were identified along this dimension, adding support to the notion that children's reasoning follows a logical developmental sequence. Planned comparisons supported the order-theoretical prediction that different groups of items account for solution differences between grade levels. Results also indicated that children encounter significant difficulties when they have to reason on the basis of negative information.

Proof construction: adolescent development from inductive to deductive problem-solving strategies.

Inductive and deductive approaches to the construction of problem-solving proofs were examined using a task that requires the discovery of a geometrical figure hidden behind a series of covers. It was proposed that during adolescence, with the acquisition of a formal reasoning competence (as measured by Overton's [1990] version of Wason's selection task), there would be a transition from inductive to deductive proof construction strategies. One hundred adolescents were assessed on both the problem-solving proof task and the reasoning competence is associated with taking a deductive approach to proof construction. Formal reasoners tend to construct a proof based on the use of a falsification strategy as demonstrated by their search for disconfirming instances. A nonformal level of competence on the other hand is associated with inductive approaches. In this situation nonformal subjects tend to employ a verification strategy as demonstrated by the generation of redundant information. Results support the hypothesis that there is a cognitive developmental progression from an inductive approach to the construction of proofs to a deductive approach.

Metaphor, recursive systems, and paradox in science and developmental theory.

The contradictions found at any level of abstraction among concepts such as subject-object, whole-part, synthesis-analysis, metaphor-observation, organicism-mechanism, and interpretationism-realism cannot be eliminated or resolved at that level. They can, however, be reconciled into productive paradoxes by recognizing them as components of recursive systems. The resolution of the paradox occurs only at the next higher level of abstraction where a synthesis can be established. However, this synthesis at the next higher level entails its own contradictions. These can again be reconciled into productive paradoxes through the recognition of broader recursive systems. This progressive solution continues at each iteration, or level or recursion, and it is illustrated in Fig. 5. In the figure, the innermost cycle represents the knowing organism, knowing in the paradoxical cycle of metaphor-assumptions-concepts-observations. This knowing organism is explained and hence understood, and the paradoxes reconciled, only by moving to the next level of recursive cycle. At this next level, the first level of abstraction, psychological theories operate to explain the phenomenological knowing organism of the first cycle. In fact, it is only by moving to this level that we transcend the paradox of man knowing and explaining himself. And only by moving to this level do we avoid the vicious circularity that could befall the use of recursive systems. However, the theories themselves involve a new paradoxical cycle of metaphor-assumptions-concepts-observation. Thus, explanation of this level requires movement to the next level of abstraction or next outer cycle. Here metatheoretical assumptions provide the transcendence and the opportunity to reconcile the paradoxes of psychological theory. But this level too operates in a cycle of paradoxes and consequently the process continues as it does for any dialectic process. In closing, I should in fairness note that I have outlined only one type of solution to contradictions that are found among approaches to the game called science and the game called developmental psychology. It is a solution that draws heavily on the categories of dialectical method, and it is just this method that is both the reason for, and the consequence of, the organismic metaphor. Thus, my solution generates its own contradiction for I have again, as Scholnick argues, based my solution at some level of organicism: a point that will not escape the discerning realist or, for that matter, the discerning rationalist.

Personality as the basis for theoretical predilections.

Four groups of behavioral scientists with divergent theoretical persuasions--43 sociobiologists, 25 behaviorists, 35 personality psychologists, and 16 human developmentalists--showed significantly different mean scores on two measures of philosophical assumptions: the World Hypothesis Scale (WHS) and the Organicism-Mechanism Paradigm Inventory (OMPI). The OMPI, which appears to be more psychometrically sound than the WHS, showed in 12 additional groups of subjects (N = 622) consistent correlations with self-report and peer ratings of personality, intellectual and interpersonal style, and occupational interests. Taken together, the two studies suggest that behavioral scientists' philosophical presuppositions (e.g., whether reality is better described by stable, isolated elements or changing holistic patterns; and whether persons are passive and reactive or purposive and active) may mirror their views of themselves.

Individual differences in formal operational thought: sex role and learned helplessness.

Research on sex differences in the utilization of formal operations is equivocal, yet where such differences have been observed, males generally perform better than females. It is unclear, however, whether this sex difference reflects a difference in competence or performance. The purpose of this study was to investigate sex-role identity and learned helplessness as possible mediating factors affecting performance on formal operational tasks. Performance on 4 tasks requiring formal operations was assessed for 13-year-old males and females. Contrary to expectations, the performance of individuals with a feminine sex role did not differ significantly from that of individuals with a masculine sex role. While adolescents who were classified as both androgynous and helpless performed poorly on several of the measures, this result was not completely consistent across tasks. Possible explanations for this lack of consistency are explored.

The development of cognitive gender constancy and sex role preferences.

The chief purpose of this study was to examine the development of stable concepts of "boy" and "girl" (gender identity constancy) in kindergartners and first and second graders. Gender constancy was explored in relation to cognitive level (assessed both by grade and conservation measures); whether the concept was applied to the subject himself or to another child; whether the concept was applied to live children or pictorial representations; and sex role preferences (games, television characters, peer preferences). In support of a cognitive-developmental position, gender constancy was found to be related to cognitive level, and most children conformed to a developmental sequence (Guttman scalogram) in which conservation preceded gender constancy. Gender constancy performance was better when the concept was applied to the self versus another child and when applied to pictorial representations versus live forms. Gender constancy was not related to sex role preferences.

Concrete and formal operational thought processes in young adulthood and old age.

A study was conducted to examine the role of concrete and formal operations in a young and old population. In addition, the present study explored the relation between operational thought and Cattell's concept of fluid and crystallized intelligence, as well as the role of differential living arrangements in maintaining operational thought. Eighty females from three age groups (18-20 years, 60-70 years and 70-80 years of age) were tested on a series of Piagetian tasks and indices of fluid and crystallized intelligence. The findings supported the notion that age-related performance differences occur in the area of formal operational thought prior to the time they occur in concrete operational thought. Except for the young sample, the operational tasks were found to be unrelated to fluid intelligence at the age levels represented in this study. Living independently as opposed to living in an old age home did not appear to be a significant factor in maintaining operational thought. Discussion focused on the necessity of identifying those factors which influence the developmental course of formal operational thought across the life span.