ABSTRACT
In 2015, the Office of Diversion and Reentry Division (ODR), an internal department of the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services, was created to redirect individuals with serious mental illness from the criminal justice system. Part of ODR's mission is to identify individuals currently incarcerated in a Los Angeles County jail who are experiencing a serious mental health disorder and, to the extent practical, provide them with appropriate community-based care with the goals of reducing recidivism and improving health outcomes. Such redirection from the traditional criminal justice process is often characterized as diversion. To better build and scale efforts to support this work, in 2018, the Los Angeles County's Board of Supervisors asked for a study of the existing county jail mental health population to identify those who would likely be eligible for diversion based on legal and clinical factors. Researchers found that an estimated 61 percent of the jail mental health population were likely appropriate candidates for diversion; 7 percent were potentially appropriate; and 32 percent were likely not appropriate candidates for diversion. These findings will help the county determine how it would need to scale community-based treatment programs to accommodate these individuals. The authors also provide recommendations for future programming and research. This study will be of interest to state and county governments as well as other organizations serving criminal justice-involved populations with serious mental illness.
ABSTRACT
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health systems provide services through a mix of direct care, delivered at government facilities, and purchased care, provided through the private sector, mainly by community-based providers who have entered into contracts with third-party administrators (TPAs). In the interest of expanding DoD-VA resource sharing that may lead to greater efficiencies and cost savings, the DoD/VA Joint Executive Committee is exploring options to integrate DoD and VA's purchased care programs. This preliminary feasibility assessment examined how an integrated approach to purchasing care could affect access, quality, and costs for beneficiaries, DoD, and VA and identified general legislative, policy, and contractual challenges to implementing an integrated purchased care program. An integrated approach to purchasing care is feasible under current legal and regulatory authorities, but policy changes may be needed-and the practicality of such an approach depends on the contract and network design. For example, legal/regulatory changes in how contracts are established would be required to achieve any real savings to the government. There are also differences in the populations served by TRICARE (DoD health care) and VA, particularly in terms of age and geographic location. Implementation would be further complicated by contractual differences in the TPA contracts for VA and DoD as they relate to network standards, provider payments, network participation requirements, and reporting requirements and incentive structures. As a result, there are significant uncertainties with respect to increased efficiency or cost savings for the government.
ABSTRACT
The Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014 addressed the need for access to timely, high-quality health care for veterans. Section 201 of the legislation called for an independent assessment of various aspects of veterans' health care. The RAND Corporation was tasked with an assessment of the authorities and mechanisms by which the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) pays for health care services from non-VA providers. Purchased care accounted for 10 percent, or around $5.6 billion, of VA's health care budget in fiscal year 2014, and the amount of care purchased from outside VA is growing rapidly. VA purchases non-VA care through an array of programs, each with different payment processes and eligibility requirements for veterans and outside providers. A review and analysis of statutes, regulations, legislation, and literature on VA purchased care, along with interviews with expert stakeholders, a survey of VA medical facilities, and an evaluation of local-level policy documents revealed that VA's purchased care system is complex and decentralized. Inconsistencies in procedures, unclear goals, and a lack of cohesive strategy for purchased care could have ramifications for veterans' access to care. Adding to the complexity of VA's purchased care system is a lack of systematic data collection on access to and quality of care provided through VA's purchased care programs. The analysis also explored concepts of "episodes of care" and their implications for purchased care by VA.
ABSTRACT
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (ACA) changes the regulatory environment within which health insurance policies on the small-group market are bought and sold. New regulations include rate bands that limit premium price variation, risk-adjustment policies that will transfer funds from low-actuarial-risk to high-actuarial-risk plans, and requirements that plans include "essential health benefits." While the new regulations will be applied to all non-grandfathered fully insured policies purchased by businesses with 100 or fewer workers, self-insured plans are exempt from these regulations. As a result, some firms may have a stronger incentive to offer self-insured plans after the ACA takes full effect. In this article we identify factors that influence employers' decisions to self-insure and estimate how the ACA will influence self-insurance rates. We also consider the implications of higher self-insurance rates for adverse selection in the non-self-insured small-group market and whether enrollees in self-insured plans receive different benefits than enrollees in fully-insured plans. Results are based on data analysis, literature review, findings from discussions with stakeholders, and microsimulation analysis using the COMPARE model. Overall, we find little evidence that self-insured plans differ systematically from fully insured plans in terms of benefit generosity, price, or claims denial rates. Stakeholders expressed significant concern about adverse selection in the health insurance exchanges due to regulatory exemptions for self-insured plans. However, our microsimulation analysis predicts a sizable increase in self-insurance only if comprehensive stop-loss policies become widely available after the ACA takes full effect and the expected cost of self-insuring with stop-loss is comparable to the cost of being fully insured in a market without rating regulations.
