ABSTRACT
We analyze a cooperative decision-making model that is based on individual aspiration levels using the framework of a public goods game in static and dynamic networks. Sensitivity to differences in payoff and dynamic aspiration levels modulates individual satisfaction and affects subsequent behavior. The collective outcome of such strategy changes depends on the efficiency with which aspiration levels are updated. Below a threshold learning efficiency, cooperators dominate despite short-term fluctuations in strategy fractions. Categorizing players based on their satisfaction level and the resulting strategy reveal periodic cycling between the different categories. We explain the distinct dynamics in the two phases in terms of differences in the dominant cyclic transitions between different categories of cooperators and defectors. Allowing even a small fraction of nodes to restructure their connections can promote cooperation across almost the entire range of values of learning efficiency. Our work reinforces the usefulness of an internal criterion for strategy updates, together with network restructuring, in ensuring the dominance of altruistic strategies over long time-scales.
