Potential corporate uses of polygenic indexes: Starting a conversation about the associated ethics and policy issues.

Some commercial firms currently sell polygenic indexes (PGIs) to individual consumers, despite their relatively low predictive power. It might be tempting to assume that because the predictive power of many PGIs is so modest, other sorts of firms-such as those selling insurance and financial services-will not be interested in using PGIs for their own purposes. We argue to the contrary. We build this argument in two ways. First, we offer a very simple model, rooted in economic theory, of a profit-maximizing firm that can gain information about a single consumer's genome. We use the model to show that, depending on the specific economic environment, a firm would be willing to pay for statistically noisy PGIs, even if they allow for only a small reduction in uncertainty. Second, we describe two plausible scenarios in which these different kinds of firms could conceivably use PGIs to maximize profits. Finally, we briefly discuss some of the associated ethics and policy issues. They deserve more attention, which is unlikely to be given until it is first recognized that firms whose services affect a large swath of the public will indeed have incentives to use PGIs.

Wrestling with Public Input on an Ethical Analysis of Scientific Research.

Bioethicists frequently call for empirical researchers to engage participants and community members in their research, but don't themselves typically engage community members in their normative research. In this article, we describe an effort to include members of the public in normative discussions about the risks, potential benefits, and ethical responsibilities of social and behavioral genomics (SBG) research. We reflect on what might-and might not- be gained from engaging the public in normative scholarship and on lessons learned about public perspectives on the risks and potential benefits of SBG research and the responsible conduct and communication of such research. We also provide procedural lessons for others in bioethics who are interested in engaging members of the public in their research.

Wrestling with Social and Behavioral Genomics: Risks, Potential Benefits, and Ethical Responsibility.

In this consensus report by a diverse group of academics who conduct and/or are concerned about social and behavioral genomics (SBG) research, the authors recount the often-ugly history of scientific attempts to understand the genetic contributions to human behaviors and social outcomes. They then describe what the current science-including genomewide association studies and polygenic indexes-can and cannot tell us, as well as its risks and potential benefits. They conclude with a discussion of responsible behavior in the context of SBG research. SBG research that compares individuals within a group according to a "sensitive" phenotype requires extra attention to responsible conduct and to responsible communication about the research and its findings. SBG research (1) on sensitive phenotypes that (2) compares two or more groups defined by (a) race, (b) ethnicity, or (c) genetic ancestry (where genetic ancestry could easily be misunderstood as race or ethnicity) requires a compelling justification to be conducted, funded, or published. All authors agree that this justification at least requires a convincing argument that a study's design could yield scientifically valid results; some authors would additionally require the study to have a socially favorable risk-benefit profile.

Cases in Precision Medicine: Is There an Obligation to Return Reinterpreted Genetic Results to Former Patients?

Interpretation of many genetic test results can change over time as new data accumulate. Hence, physicians who order genetic tests may subsequently receive revised reports with important implications for patients' medical treatment-even for patients who are no longer in their care. Several of the ethical principles underlying medical practice suggest an obligation to reach out to former patients with this information. Discharging that obligation can be accomplished, at a minimum, by attempting to contact the former patient with their last known contact information.

Is there a way to reduce the inequity in variant interpretation on the basis of ancestry?

The underrepresentation of non-European ancestry groups in current genomic databases complicates interpretation of their genetic test results, yielding a much higher prevalence of variants of uncertain significance (VUSs). Such VUS findings can frustrate the goals of genetic testing, create anxiety in patients, and lead to unnecessary medical interventions. Approaches to addressing underrepresentation of people with genetic ancestries other than European are being undertaken by broad-based recruitment efforts. However, some underrepresented groups have concerns that might preclude participation in such efforts. We describe here two initiatives aimed at meeting the needs of underrepresented ancestry groups in genomic datasets. The two communities, the Sephardi Jewish community in New York and First Peoples of Canada, have very different concerns about contributing to genomic research and datasets. Sephardi concerns focus on the possible negative effects of genetic findings on the marriage prospects of family members. Canadian Indigenous populations seek control over the research uses to which their genetic data would be put. Both cases involve targeted efforts to respond to the groups' concerns; these efforts include governance models aimed at ensuring that the data are used primarily to inform clinical test analyses and at achieving successful engagement and participation of community members. We suggest that these initiatives could provide models for other ancestral groups seeking to improve the accuracy and utility of clinical genetic testing while respecting the underlying preferences and values of community members with regard to the use of their genetic data.

The Challenge of Genetic Variants of Uncertain Clinical Significance : A Narrative Review.

Genomic tests expand diagnostic and screening opportunities but also identify genetic variants of uncertain clinical significance (VUSs). Only a minority of VUSs are likely to prove pathogenic when later reassessed, but resolution of the uncertainty is rarely timely. That uncertainty adds complexity to clinical decision making and can result in harms and costs to patients and the health care system, including the time-consuming analysis required to interpret a VUS and the potential for unnecessary treatment and adverse psychological effects. Current efforts to improve variant interpretation will help reduce the scope of the problem, but the high prevalence of rare and novel variants in the human genome points to VUSs as an ongoing challenge. Additional strategies can help mitigate the potential harms of VUSs, including testing protocols that limit identification or reporting of VUSs, subclassification of VUSs according to the likelihood of pathogenicity, routine family-based evaluation of variants, and enhanced counseling efforts. All involve tradeoffs, and the appropriate balance of measures is likely to vary for different test uses and clinical settings. Cross-specialty deliberation and public input could contribute to systematic and broadly supported policies for managing VUSs.

Recommendations for Responsible Development and Application of Neurotechnologies.

Advancements in novel neurotechnologies, such as brain computer interfaces (BCI) and neuromodulatory devices such as deep brain stimulators (DBS), will have profound implications for society and human rights. While these technologies are improving the diagnosis and treatment of mental and neurological diseases, they can also alter individual agency and estrange those using neurotechnologies from their sense of self, challenging basic notions of what it means to be human. As an international coalition of interdisciplinary scholars and practitioners, we examine these challenges and make recommendations to mitigate negative consequences that could arise from the unregulated development or application of novel neurotechnologies. We explore potential ethical challenges in four key areas: identity and agency, privacy, bias, and enhancement. To address them, we propose (1) democratic and inclusive summits to establish globally-coordinated ethical and societal guidelines for neurotechnology development and application, (2) new measures, including "Neurorights," for data privacy, security, and consent to empower neurotechnology users' control over their data, (3) new methods of identifying and preventing bias, and (4) the adoption of public guidelines for safe and equitable distribution of neurotechnological devices.

Is there a duty to reinterpret genetic data? The ethical dimensions.

The evolving evidence base for the interpretation of variants identified in genetic and genomic testing has presented the genetics community with the challenge of variant reinterpretation. In particular, it is unclear whether an ethical duty of periodic reinterpretation should exist, who should bear that duty, and what its dimensions should be. Based on an analysis of the ethical arguments for and against a duty to reinterpret, we conclude that a duty should be recognized. Most importantly, by virtue of ordering and conducting tests likely to produce data on variants that cannot be definitively interpreted today, the health-care system incurs a duty to reinterpret when more reliable data become available. We identify four elements of the proposed ethical duty: data storage, initiation of reinterpretation, conduct of reinterpretation, and patient recontact, and we identify the parties best situated to implement each component. We also consider the reasonable extent and duration of a duty, and the role of the patient's consent in the process, although we acknowledge that some details regarding procedures and funding still need to be addressed. The likelihood of substantial patient benefit from a systematic approach to reinterpretation suggests the importance for the genetics community to reach consensus on this issue.

Admiring Dan's Creation.

Dan Callahan never tired of probing the fundamental ethical question that Socrates asked, "How should we live?" The investigation animated him. He asked, Can we, for a moment, set aside our preoccupation with better health and a longer life and think together about what we want those things for ? Can we explore what a good life consists in? It turned out there was no better alibi for asking that fundamental question than taking up the seemingly more manageable ones that were arising in the context of emerging medicine, science, and technology. When one asked about who should be born, or how we should die, or how we should prioritize investments in the myriad institutions that help to promote human well-being, the question concerning what we mean by a good life was always and palpably present.

On What We Have Learned and Still Need to Learn about the Psychosocial Impacts of Genetic Testing.

Since the start of the program to investigate the ethical, legal, and social implications (ELSI) of the Human Genome Project in 1990, many ELSI scholars have maintained that genetic testing should be used with caution because of the potential for negative psychosocial effects associated with receiving genetic information. More recently, though, some ELSI scholars have produced evidence suggesting that the original ELSI concerns were unfounded, exaggerated, or, at a minimum, misdirected. At least in the contexts that have been most studied, large negative impacts have not been found in the vast majority of people studied. What might explain the discrepancy between the original hypothesized outcomes and the growing impression that large negative effects appear to be few and far between? And if the original predictions of large negative psychosocial effects were simply wrong, is it time for ELSI researchers to move on? Should genetic testing be routinized, and would it be appropriate to relax or abandon the practice of engaging patients in a process of detailed informed consent before they receive genetic information? To confront those questions, we convened a conference entitled "Looking for the Psychosocial Impacts of Genomic Information" to review what is known about the negative impacts of genetic information on a variety of populations and in multiple medical and social contexts, to explore the implications of the findings, and to consider whether future research might benefit from different methods than have been used to date.

Sequencing Newborns: A Call for Nuanced Use of Genomic Technologies.

Many scientists and doctors hope that affordable genome sequencing will lead to more personalized medical care and improve public health in ways that will benefit children, families, and society more broadly. One hope in particular is that all newborns could be sequenced at birth, thereby setting the stage for a lifetime of medical care and self-directed preventive actions tailored to each child's genome. Indeed, commentators often suggest that universal genome sequencing is inevitable. Such optimism can come with the presumption that discussing the potential limits, cost, and downsides of widespread application of genomic technologies is pointless, excessively pessimistic, or overly cautious. We disagree. Given the pragmatic challenges associated with determining what sequencing data mean for the health of individuals, the economic costs associated with interpreting and acting on such data, and the psychosocial costs of predicting one's own or one's child's future life plans based on uncertain testing results, we think this hope and optimism deserve to be tempered. In the analysis that follows, we distinguish between two reasons for using sequencing: to diagnose individual infants who have been identified as sick and to screen populations of infants who appear to be healthy. We also distinguish among three contexts in which sequencing for either diagnosis or screening could be deployed: in clinical medicine, in public health programs, and as a direct-to-consumer service. Each of these contexts comes with different professional norms, policy considerations, and public expectations. Finally, we distinguish between two main types of genome sequencing: targeted sequencing, where only specific genes are sequenced or analyzed, and whole-exome or whole-genome sequencing, where all the DNA or all the coding segments of all genes are sequenced and analyzed. In a symptomatic newborn, targeted or genome-wide sequencing can help guide other tests for diagnosis or for specific treatment that is urgently needed. Clinicians use the infant's symptoms (or phenotype) to interrogate the sequencing data. These same complexities and uncertainties, however, limit the usefulness of genome-wide sequencing as a population screening tool. While we recognize considerable benefit in using targeted sequencing to screen for or detect specific conditions that meet the criteria for inclusion in newborn screening panels, use of genome-wide sequencing as a sole screening tool for newborns is at best premature. We conclude that sequencing technology can be beneficially used in newborns when that use is nuanced and attentive to context.

Building Capacity for a Global Genome Editing Observatory: Institutional Design.

A new infrastructure is urgently needed at the global level to facilitate exchange on key issues concerning genome editing. We advocate the establishment of a global observatory to serve as a center for international, interdisciplinary, and cosmopolitan reflection. This article is the second of a two-part series.

Building Capacity for a Global Genome Editing Observatory: Conceptual Challenges.

A new infrastructure is urgently needed at the global level to facilitate exchange on key issues concerning genome editing. We advocate the establishment of a global observatory to serve as a center for international, interdisciplinary, and cosmopolitan reflection. This article is the first of a two-part series.

Choosing Flourishing: Toward a More "Binocular" Way of Thinking about Disability.

There is a long-standing debate between people who can seem to be arguing "for" and "against" disability. Those arguing for have often been disability scholars and those arguing against have often been utilitarian philosophers. At least since the mid-2000s, some on both sides have sought to move beyond that debate, but that has proved difficult. Here I seek two small steps forward. One step is critical, and is aimed at we who line up "for" disability. Specifically, I suggest that the phrase "choosing disability" is misleading in at least two ways. First, when someone argues that she should be able to gestate a child who is, e.g., deaf, she does not view deafness as a disability, but as something more like an enhancement. Second, when someone else argues that no one should selectively abort fetuses with traits like deafness, she is not arguing for choosing deafness, but against making a choice based on the presence of a disabling trait. The other step is constructive, and aimed at those lined up on both sides. I suggest that we should adopt a more "binocular" approach to thinking about disability: one which, using the social and medical "lenses" on disability, helps us see it in more depth. If we get better at having a conversation about what disability is, rather than arguing for or against it, we can get better at promoting the flourishing of people with disabilities.

An Introduction to Thinking about Trustworthy Research into the Genetics of Intelligence.

The advent of new technologies has rekindled some hopes that it will be possible to identify genetic variants that will help to explain why individuals are different with respect to complex traits. At least one leader in the development of "whole genome sequencing"-the Chinese company BGI-has been quite public about its commitment to using the technique to investigate the genetics of intelligence in general and high intelligence in particular. Because one needs large samples to detect the small effects associated with small genetic differences in the sequence of those base pairs, to make headway with the new sequencing technologies, one also needs to enlist much larger numbers of study participants than geneticists have enrolled before. In an effort to increase the size of a sample, one team of researchers approached the Center for Talented Youth at Johns Hopkins University. They wanted to gain access to records concerning participants in CTY's ongoing Study of Exceptional Talent, and they wanted to approach those individuals to see if they would be willing to share samples of their DNA. We agreed that CTY's dilemma about whether to give the researchers access to those records raised larger questions about the ethics of research into the genetics of intelligence, and we decided to hold a workshop at The Hastings Center that could examine those questions. Our purpose was to create what, borrowing from Sarah Richardson, we came to call a "transformative conversation" about research into the genetics of general cognitive ability-a conversation that would take a wide and long view and would involve a diverse group of stakeholders, including both people who have been highly critical of the research and people who engage in it. This collection of essays, which grew out of that workshop, is intended to provide an introduction to and exploration of this complex and important area.