An analysis of select swine feed ingredients and pork products imported into the United States from African swine fever virus affected countries.

The potential for feed ingredients to serve as a vehicle for African swine fever virus (ASFV) introduction to the United States remains a significant concern. It is therefore imperative that channels through which high-risk livestock feeds and feed ingredients are imported into the United States from ASFV-positive countries are identified and considered into the USDA's ASF National Response Framework. The purpose of this study is to demonstrate the use of a novel analytical tool to categorically quantify pork products and potential high-risk feed ingredients that have entered the United States from ASFV-positive countries over a 5-year period (2016-2020). Data for this study were obtained at the United States International Trade Commission Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) website (www.hs.usitc.gov), a publicly available website that provides transaction information on specific trade commodities between the United States and its international trading partners. A total of 29 high-risk pork products or feed ingredients with the potential to be fed to pigs were analysed. High risk products and ingredients were defined as those that previous research has shown to facilitate extended viral survivability, and includes products such as soybean oilcake, distillers grains, pet food, and pork sausage casings. Data were exported into Microsoft Excel and organized into pivot tables to describe the quantity of each product by country of origin and Port of Entry (POE). The analysis focused on the 60 ASFV-positive countries as currently reported by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). In 2020, a total of 486,902 metric tons (MT) of these high-risk products were imported into the United States from a total of 19 of the 60 foreign countries currently listed as ASFV positive by the OIE. A majority of imported animal feed ingredients came from India in 2020 (85.8%; 392,243 MT), whereas the majority of pork products and by-products were imported from Poland (21,191 MT, 70.6%). Soybean oilcake from India entered the United States through a total of 15 ports of entry (POEs) in 2020. Of these POEs, a total of five POEs received greater than 91% of all of soy oilcake originating from India, including Baltimore, MD (37.7%); San Francisco, CA (30.1%); Seattle, WA (12.7%); New Orleans, LA (5.9%); and Detroit, MI (5.1%). When examining trends over a 5-year period, a few noteworthy findings include the dramatic rise in soybean oilcake imported from India when compared to China, and a dramatic decrease in the total volume of pork sausage casings imported from China into the United States. To support the risk management of feed imports, our novel approach focuses on seaport of highest risk and quantity of product received. Data provided in this report represent an initial listing of suspect pork products and feed ingredients entering the United States, much of which is destined for animal feed. Specific detailed examples are provided in order to demonstrate the tool's flexible interface, which can be quickly modified to zero-in on specific feed ingredients, countries, or POEs depending on what the user's question may be. To the authors' knowledge, the use of and application of such a tool has not been previously utilized to support ongoing risk mitigation efforts. Potential outlets for future use of the analytical tool will include a more user-friendly and interactive interface providing an inclusive analysis of global livestock feed ingredient sourcing.

Mitigating the risk of African swine fever virus in feed with anti-viral chemical additives.

African swine fever (ASF) is currently considered the most significant global threat to pork production worldwide. Disease caused by the ASF virus (ASFV) results in high case fatality of pigs. Importantly, ASF is a trade-limiting disease with substantial implications on both global pork and agricultural feed commodities. ASFV is transmissible through natural consumption of contaminated swine feed and is broadly stable across a wide range of commonly imported feed ingredients and conditions. The objective of the current study was to investigate the efficacy of medium-chain fatty acid and formaldehyde-based feed additives in inactivating ASFV. Feed additives were tested in cell culture and in feed ingredients under a transoceanic shipment model. Both chemical additives reduced ASFV infectivity in a dose-dependent manner. This study provides evidence that chemical feed additives may potentially serve as mitigants for reducing the risk of ASFV introduction and transmission through feed.

Quantification of soya-based feed ingredient entry from ASFV-positive countries to the United States by ocean freight shipping and associated seaports.

African swine fever virus (ASFV) can survive in soya-based products for 30 days with T ½ ranging from 9.6 to 12.9 days in soya bean meals and soya oil cake. As the United States imports soya-based products from several ASFV-positive countries, knowledge of the type and quantity of these specific imports, and their ports of entry (POE), is necessary information to manage risk. Using the data from the International Trade Commission Harmonized Tariff Schedule website in conjunction with pivot tables, we analysed imports across air, land and sea POE of soya-based products from 43 ASFV-positive countries to the United States during 2018 and 2019. In 2018, 104,366 metric tons (MT) of soya-based products, specifically conventional and organic soya bean meal, soya beans, soya oil cake and soya oil were imported from these countries into the United States via seaports only. The two largest suppliers were China (52.7%, 55,034 MT) and the Ukraine (42.9%, 44,775 MT). In 2019, 73,331 MT entered the United States and 54.7% (40,143 MT) came from the Ukraine and 8.4% (6,182 MT) from China. Regarding POE, 80.9%-83.2% of soya-based imports from China entered the United States at the seaports of San Francisco, CA, and Seattle, WA, while 89.4%-100% entered from the Ukraine via the seaports of New Orleans, LA, and Charlotte, NC. Analysis of five-year trends (2015-2019) of the volume of soya imports from China indicated reduction over time (with a noticeably sharp decrease between 2018 and 2019), and seaport utilization was consistent. In contrast, volume remained high for Ukrainian soya imports, and seaport utilization was inconsistent. Overall, this exercise introduced a new approach to collect objective data on an important risk factor, providing researchers, government officials and industry stakeholders a means to objectively identify and quantify potential channels of foreign animal disease entry into the United States.

Serosurvey of arthropod-borne diseases among shelter dogs in the Cumberland Gap Region of the United States.

BACKGROUND: The Cumberland Gap Region (CGR) of the United States is a natural corridor between the southeastern, northeastern, and midwestern regions of the country. CGR has also many species of ticks and mosquitos that serve as competent vectors for important animal and human pathogens. In this study, we tested dogs from six different animal shelters in the CGR for Rocky Mountain spotted fever (RMSF), anaplasmosis, Lyme disease, canine ehrlichiosis and canine heartworm disease. RESULTS: Sera from 157 shelter dogs were tested for antibodies to RMSF agent, Rickettsia rickettsii, using an indirect immunofluorescence assay. Sixty-six dogs (42.0%) were positive for either IgM or IgG, or both IgM and IgG antibodies to R. rickettsii. Moreover, the same set of sera (n = 157) plus an and additional sera (n = 75) from resident dogs at the same shelters were tested using the SNAP 4Dx Plus. Of 232 dogs tested, two (0.9%) were positive for antibodies to Anaplasma phagocytophilum/A. platys, nine (3.9%) were positive for antibodies to Borrelia burgdorferi, 23 (9.9%) for positive for antibodies to Ehrlichia canis/E. ewingii, and 13 (5.6%) were positive for Dirofilaria immitis antigen. Co-infection with two or more etiologic agents was detected in five animals. Three dogs had antibodies to both B. burgdorferi and E. canis/E. ewingii, and two dogs were positive for D. immitis antigen and antibodies to B. burgdorferi and E. canis/E. ewingii. CONCLUSIONS: Shelter dogs in the CGR are exposed to a number of important vector-borne pathogens. Further studies are required to ascertain the roles these animals play in maintenance and transmission of these pathogens.

Veterinarians' attitudes and practices regarding opioid-related vet shopping practices in tri-state Appalachian counties: an exploratory study.

BACKGROUND: The opioid crisis continues to grow in the United States with 46,700 drug overdose deaths due to opioids in 2017 alone. Vet shopping, the practice of soliciting veterinarians for prescription medications, has been receiving national media attention in recent years. A 2014 review of Prescription Monitoring Drug Programs found less than 10 veterinary shoppers nationwide. Still much is unknown about the role of vet shopping and the opioid crisis. This study sought to understand the practice of vet shopping through the eyes of veterinarians practicing in Appalachian counties within the states of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia, United States. RESULTS: Fourteen veterinarians were asked a set of 13 questions related to vet shopping. Results indicated that 13 veterinarians in the study had heard of the phenomenon of vet shopping and eight veterinarians had personally encountered vet shopping in their practices. Qualitative analysis of the interviews identified six key themes including a need for interprofessional communication and how important a valid veterinary-client-patient-relationship is within the profession. CONCLUSIONS: The study hopefully sheds some light on the how often vet shopping is encountered in practice, concerns of veterinarians regarding vet shopping, and potential areas for improvement.

Stability of classical swine fever virus and pseudorabies virus in animal feed ingredients exposed to transpacific shipping conditions.

Classical swine fever virus (CSFV) and pseudorabies virus (PRV) are two of the most significant trade-limiting pathogens affecting swine worldwide. Both viruses are endemic to China where millions of kilograms of feed ingredients are manufactured and subsequently imported into the United States. Although stability and oral transmission of both viruses through contaminated pork products has been demonstrated as a risk factor for transboundary spread, stability in animal feed ingredients had yet to be investigated. The objective of this study was to determine the survival of CSFV and variant PRV in 12 animal feeds and ingredients exposed to environmental conditions simulating a 37-day transpacific shipment. Virus was detected by PCR, virus isolation and nursery pig bioassay. CSFV and PRV nucleic acids were stable throughout the 37-day period in all feed matrices. Infectious CSFV was detected in two ingredients (conventional soybean meal and pork sausage casings) at 37 days post-contamination, whereas infectious PRV was detected in nine ingredients (conventional and organic soybean meal, lysine, choline, vitamin D, moist cat and dog food, dry dog food and pork sausage casings). This study demonstrates the relative stability of CSFV and PRV in different feed ingredients under shipment conditions and provides evidence that feed ingredients may represent important risk factors for the transboundary spread of these viruses.

Correction: Survival of viral pathogens in animal feed ingredients under transboundary shipping models.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0194509.].

Correction: Survival of viral pathogens in animal feed ingredients under transboundary shipping models.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0194509.].

Survival of viral pathogens in animal feed ingredients under transboundary shipping models.

The goal of this study was to evaluate survival of important viral pathogens of livestock in animal feed ingredients imported daily into the United States under simulated transboundary conditions. Eleven viruses were selected based on global significance and impact to the livestock industry, including Foot and Mouth Disease Virus (FMDV), Classical Swine Fever Virus (CSFV), African Swine Fever Virus (ASFV), Influenza A Virus of Swine (IAV-S), Pseudorabies virus (PRV), Nipah Virus (NiV), Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome Virus (PRRSV), Swine Vesicular Disease Virus (SVDV), Vesicular Stomatitis Virus (VSV), Porcine Circovirus Type 2 (PCV2) and Vesicular Exanthema of Swine Virus (VESV). Surrogate viruses with similar genetic and physical properties were used for 6 viruses. Surrogates belonged to the same virus families as target pathogens, and included Senecavirus A (SVA) for FMDV, Bovine Viral Diarrhea Virus (BVDV) for CSFV, Bovine Herpesvirus Type 1 (BHV-1) for PRV, Canine Distemper Virus (CDV) for NiV, Porcine Sapelovirus (PSV) for SVDV and Feline Calicivirus (FCV) for VESV. For the remaining target viruses, actual pathogens were used. Virus survival was evaluated using Trans-Pacific or Trans-Atlantic transboundary models involving representative feed ingredients, transport times and environmental conditions, with samples tested by PCR, VI and/or swine bioassay. SVA (representing FMDV), FCV (representing VESV), BHV-1 (representing PRV), PRRSV, PSV (representing SVDV), ASFV and PCV2 maintained infectivity during transport, while BVDV (representing CSFV), VSV, CDV (representing NiV) and IAV-S did not. Notably, more viruses survived in conventional soybean meal, lysine hydrochloride, choline chloride, vitamin D and pork sausage casings. These results support published data on transboundary risk of PEDV in feed, demonstrate survival of certain viruses in specific feed ingredients ("high-risk combinations") under conditions simulating transport between continents and provide further evidence that contaminated feed ingredients may represent a risk for transport of pathogens at domestic and global levels.

Prioritization of Managed Pork Supply Movements during a FMD Outbreak in the US.

In the event of a foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in the United States, local, state, and federal authorities will implement a foreign animal disease emergency response plan restricting the pork supply chain movements and likely disrupting the continuity of the swine industry business. To minimize disruptions of the food supply while providing an effective response in an outbreak, it is necessary to have proactive measures in place to ensure minimal disease spread and maximum continuation of business. Therefore, it is critical to identify candidate movements for proactive risk assessments: those that are both most likely to contribute to disease spread and most necessary for business continuity. To do this, experts from production, harvest, retail, and allied pork industries assessed 30 common pork supply movements for risk of disease spread and industry criticality. The highest priority movements for conducting a risk assessment included the movement of weaned pigs originating from multiple sow farm sources to an off-site nursery or wean to finish facility, the movement of employees or commercial crews, the movement of vaccination crews, the movement of dedicated livestock hauling trucks, and the movement of commercial crews such as manure haulers and feed trucks onto, off, or between sites. These critical movements, along with several others identified in this study, will provide an initial guide for prioritization of risk management efforts and resources to be better prepared in the event of a FMD outbreak in the United States. By specifically and proactively targeting movements that experts agree are likely to spread the disease and are critical to the continuity of business operations, potentially catastrophic consequences in the event of an outbreak can be limited.

Parameter Values for Epidemiological Models of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in Swine.

In the event of a foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) incursion, response strategies are required to control, contain, and eradicate the pathogen as efficiently as possible. Infectious disease simulation models are widely used tools that mimic disease dispersion in a population and that can be useful in the design and support of prevention and mitigation activities. However, there are often gaps in evidence-based research to supply models with quantities that are necessary to accurately reflect the system of interest. The objective of this study was to quantify values associated with the duration of the stages of FMD infection (latent period, subclinical period, incubation period, and duration of infection), probability of transmission (within-herd and between-herd via spatial spread), and diagnosis of a vesicular disease within a herd using a meta-analysis of the peer-reviewed literature and expert opinion. The latent period ranged from 1 to 7 days and incubation period ranged from 1 to 9 days; both were influenced by strain. In contrast, the subclinical period ranged from 0 to 6 days and was influenced by sampling method only. The duration of infection ranged from 1 to 10 days. The probability of spatial spread between an infected and fully susceptible swine farm was estimated as greatest within 5 km of the infected farm, highlighting the importance of possible long-range transmission through the movement of infected animals. Finally, while most swine practitioners are confident in their ability to detect a vesicular disease in an average sized swine herd, a small proportion expect that up to half of the herd would need to show clinical signs before detection via passive surveillance would occur. The results of this study will be useful in within- and between-herd simulation models to develop efficient response strategies in the event an FMD in swine populations of disease-free countries or regions.

Modeling the transboundary risk of feed ingredients contaminated with porcine epidemic diarrhea virus.

BACKGROUND: This study describes a model developed to evaluate the transboundary risk of PEDV-contaminated swine feed ingredients and the effect of two mitigation strategies during a simulated transport event from China to the US. RESULTS: Ingredients imported to the USA from China, including organic & conventional soybeans and meal, lysine hydrochloride, D-L methionine, tryptophan, Vitamins A, D & E, choline, carriers (rice hulls, corn cobs) and feed grade tetracycline, were inoculated with PEDV. Control ingredients, and treatments (ingredients plus a liquid antimicrobial (SalCURB, Kemin Industries (LA) or a 2% custom medium chain fatty acid blend (MCFA)) were tested. The model ran for 37 days, simulating transport of cargo from Beijing, China to Des Moines, IA, US from December 23, 2012 to January 28, 2013. To mimic conditions on land and sea, historical temperature and percent relative humidity (% RH) data were programmed into an environmental chamber which stored all containers. To evaluate PEDV viability over time, ingredients were organized into 1 of 4 batches of samples, each batch representing a specific segment of transport. Batch 1 (segment 1) simulated transport of contaminated ingredients from manufacturing plants in Beijing (day 1 post-contamination (PC)). Batch 2 (segments 1 and 2) simulated manufacturing and delivery to Shanghai, including time in Anquing terminal awaiting shipment (days 1-8 PC). Batch 3 (segments 1, 2 and 3) represented time in China, the crossing of the Pacific and entry to the US at the San Francisco, CA terminal (day 1-27 PC). Batch 4 (segments 1-4) represented the previous events, including transport to Des Moines, IA (days 1-37 PC). Across control (non-treated) ingredients, viable PEDV was detected in soybean meal (organic and conventional), Vitamin D, lysine hydrochloride and choline chloride. In contrast, viable PEDV was not detected in any samples treated with LA or MCFA. CONCLUSIONS: These results demonstrate the ability of PEDV to survive in a subset of feed ingredients using a model simulating shipment from China to the US. This is proof of concept suggesting that contaminated feed ingredients could serve as transboundary risk factors for PEDV, along with the identification of effective mitigation options.