Physical Exercise to Redynamize Interoception in Substance use Disorders.

Physical exercise is considered a promising medication-free and cost-effective adjunct treatment for substance use disorders (SUD). Nevertheless, evidence regarding the effectiveness of these interventions is currently limited, thereby signaling the need to better understand the mechanisms underlying their impact on SUD, in order to reframe and optimize them. Here we advance that physical exercise could be re-conceptualized as an "interoception booster", namely as a way to help people with SUD to better decode and interpret bodily-related signals associated with transient states of homeostatic imbalances that usually trigger consumption. We first discuss how mismatches between current and desired bodily states influence the formation of reward-seeking states in SUD, in light of the insular cortex brain networks. Next, we detail effort perception during physical exercise and discuss how it can be used as a relevant framework for re-dynamizing interoception in SUD. We conclude by providing perspectives and methodological considerations for applying the proposed approach to mixed-design neurocognitive research on SUD.

Baseline Intraocular Pressure Is Associated With Subjective Sensitivity to Physical Exertion in Young Males.

PURPOSE: The purposes of this study were to (a) investigate the effect of physical effort (cycling for 60 min at 60 ± 5% of individually computed reserve heart-rate capacity), combined with 2 different levels of cognitive demand (2-back, oddball), on intraocular pressure (IOP) and subjective judgments of perceived exertion (ratings of perceived exertion [RPE]), affect (Affective Valence subscale of the Self-Assessment Manikin [SAM]), and mental workload (National Aeronautics and Space Administration Task Load Index [NASA-TLX]); and (b) ascertain whether baseline IOP, measured before exercise, is associated with individual differences in subjective assessments of effort and affective response during exercise. METHOD: Seventeen participants (Mage = 23.28 ± 2.37 years) performed 2 physical/cognitive dual tasks, matched in physical demand but with different mental requirements (2-back, oddball). We assessed IOP before exercise, after 2 min of active recovery, and after 15 min of passive recovery, and we also collected RPE and SAM measures during the sessions (28 measurement points). We used NASA-TLX and cognitive performance as checks of the mental manipulation. RESULTS: (a) Intraocular pressure increased after concomitant physical/mental effort, with the effect reaching statistical significance after the 2-back task (p = .002, d = 0.35) but not after the oddball condition (p = .092, d = 0.29). (b) Baseline IOP was associated with subjective sensitivity to effort and showed statistical significance for the oddball condition (p = .03, ƞp2 = .622) but not for the 2-back task (F < 1). CONCLUSIONS: Results suggest a relationship between IOP and physical/cognitive effort, which could have implications for the management of glaucoma. Additionally, a rapid measure of IOP could be used as a marker of individual effort sensitivity in applied settings.

Una revisión del fenómeno Hot Hand como creencia subjetiva y sus consecuencias conductuales en el deporte / Uma revisao sobre o fenômeno Hot Mao e crença com oconsequências comportamentais subjetivo em sport / A review of Hot Hand as subjective belief and it´s consequences in the sport behavioral phenomenon

El término efecto hot hand (‘fenómeno de estar en racha’) hace referencia a un hipotético aumento del rendimiento tras el encadenamiento de varios ensayos acertados. Se identifican tres tipos de investigaciones en contextos deportivos: (1) centradas en la (in)existencia de rachas, (2) en los mecanismos psicológicos de la creencia humana en las rachas y (3) en las posibles consecuencias conductuales provocadas por la creencia. Esta revisión abarca los dos últimos aspectos: la psicología de la creencia en rachas y de la conducta provocada por ésta. El proceso de revisión sistemática se llevó a cabo mediante un protocolo estandarizado basado en las pautas sugeridas por Fernández-Ríos y Buela-Casal (2009). Los estudios relacionados con la creencia en rachas confirman que las personas creen firmemente en su existencia en la mayoría de deportes observándose diferencias en función del nivel de pericia y de modificaciones de framing. No obstante, aún queda por investigar en profundidad en los factores situacionales y las características psicológicas que afectan a la percepción de rachas. Desde un punto de vista conductual, los estudios demuestran que creer en la existencia de rachas tiene un enorme impacto en las decisiones. Los estudios aquí revisados parecen mostrar que la influencia de la creencia en rachas provoca una toma de decisiones peor y más arriesgada. Sin embargo, queda por aclarar en el futuro el impacto de esa tendencia sobre indicadores objetivos de rendimiento en contextos reales de juego (AU)

O efeito mão quente prazo ( ‘sobre um fenômeno roll’) refere-se a um hipotético aumento de desempenho depois de vários cadeia de testes bem sucedidos. Três tipos de pesquisa são identificados em contextos desportivos: (1) incidindo sobre a existência (em) de surtos, (2) mecanismos psicológicos de crença humana em jorros e (3) as possíveis consequências comportamentais causados pela crença . Esta avaliação abrange os dois últimos aspectos: a psicologia da crença em jorros e comportamento causados por ele. O processo de revisão sistemática foi conduzida usando um protocolo padronizado com base nas diretrizes sugeridas por Fernández-Ríos e Buela-Casal (2009). Estudos relacionados à crença em jorros confirmar que as pessoas acreditam fortemente em sua existência na maioria dos esportes observadas diferenças, dependendo do nível de especialização e de enquadramento modificações. No entanto, ele continua a investigar mais profundamente os fatores situacionais e características psicológicas que afetam a percepção de pistas. Do ponto de vista comportamental, estudos mostram que a crença nos surtos de existência tem um enorme impacto sobre as decisões. Os estudos revisados parecem mostrar que a influência da crença em jorros faz com que a tomada de decisões piores e mais arriscados. No entanto, ele ainda precisa ser esclarecida no futuro o impacto desta tendência em indicadores de desempenho objetivas em contextos reais de jogo (AU)

The hot hand phenomenom (also known as hot hat effect or streaks) refers to a hypothetical performance increase after chaining several trials successfully. Three types of research are identified in sports contexts: (1) focused on the (in) existence of streaks, (2) on the psychological mechanisms of human belief in streaks and (3) on possible behavioral consequences caused by belief in streaks. This review covers the last two aspects: the psychology of the belief in streaks and the behavior caused by it. The systematic review process was carried out using a standardized protocol based on the guidelines suggested by Fernández-Ríos and Buela-Casal (2009). The studies related to belief in streaks confirm that people strongly believe in their existence in most sports, showing differences depending on expertise and framing modifications. However, it remains to be further investigated situational factors and psychological characteristics that affect the perception of streaks. From a behavioral point of view, the studies show that belief in the existence of streaks has a huge impact on decisions. The studies here reviewed seem to show that the influence of belief on streaks leads to worse and more risky decision making. However, it remains to be clarified the impact of this trend on objective performance indicators in real game contexts (AU)

Neuropsychological profiling of impulsivity and compulsivity in cocaine dependent individuals.

RATIONALE: Research on the relative impact of trait impulsivity vs. drug exposure on neuropsychological probes of response inhibition vs. response perseveration has been posited as a valid pathway to explore the transition between impulsivity and compulsivity on psychostimulant dependence. OBJECTIVES: The objectives of this study are to examine performance differences between cocaine-dependent individuals (CDI) and healthy comparison individuals (HCI) on neuropsychological probes of inhibition and perseveration and to examine the predictive impact of trait impulsivity-a proxy of premorbid vulnerability, and severity of cocaine use-a proxy of drug exposure, on CDI's performance. METHODS: Forty-two CDI and 65 HCI were assessed using the UPPS-P Scale (trait impulsivity), the Stroop and go/no-go (inhibition) and revised-strategy application and probabilistic reversal tests (perseveration). RESULTS: CDI, compared to HCI, have elevated scores on trait impulsivity and perform significantly poorer on inhibition and perseveration, with specific detrimental effects of duration of cocaine use on perseveration. CONCLUSIONS: CDI have both inhibition and perseveration deficits; both patterns were broadly indicative of orbitofrontal dysfunction in the context of reinforcement learning. Impulsive personality and cocaine exposure jointly contribute to deficits in response perseveration or compulsivity.

Cognitive biases in human causal learning.

The main aim of this work was to look for cognitive biases in human inference of causal relationships in order to emphasize the psychological processes that modulate causal learning. From the effect of the judgment frequency, this work presents subsequent research on cue competition (overshadowing, blocking, and super-conditioning effects) showing that the strength of prior beliefs and new evidence based upon covariation computation contributes additively to predict causal judgments, whereas the balance between the reliability of both, beliefs and covariation knowledge, modulates their relative weight. New findings also showed "inattentional blindness" for negative or preventative causal relationships but not for positive or generative ones, due to failure in codifying and retrieving the necessary information for its computation. Overall results unveil the need of three hierarchical levels of a whole architecture for human causal learning: the lower one, responsible for codifying the events during the task; the second one, computing the retrieved information; finally, the higher level, integrating this evidence with previous causal knowledge. In summary, whereas current theoretical frameworks on causal inference and decision-making usually focused either on causal beliefs or covariation information, the present work shows how both are required to be able to explain the complexity and flexibility involved in human causal learning.

Cognitive biases in human causal learning

The main aim of this work was to look for cognitive biases in human inference of causal relationships in order to emphasize the psychological processes that modulate causal learning. From the effect of the judgment frequency, this work presents subsequent research on cue competition (overshadowing, blocking, and super-conditioning effects) showing that the strength of prior beliefs and new evidence based upon covariation computation contributes additively to predict causal judgments, whereas the balance between the reliability of both, beliefs and covariation knowledge, modulates their relative weight. New findings also showed «inattentional blindness» for negative or preventative causal relationships but not for positive or generative ones, due to failure in codifying and retrieving the necessary information for its computation. Overall results unveil the need of three hierarchical levels of a whole architecture for human causal learning: the lower one, responsible for codifying the events during the task; the second one, computing the retrieved information; finally, the higher level, integrating this evidence with previous causal knowledge. In summary, whereas current theoretical frameworks on causal inference and decision-making usually focused either on causal beliefs or covariation information, the present work shows how both are required to be able to explain the complexity and flexibility involved in human causal learning (AU)

El objetivo de este trabajo fue la búsqueda de sesgos cognitivos en la inferencia de relaciones causales para descubrir qué procesos psicológicos modulan el aprendizaje causal. A partir del efecto de la frecuencia de juicio, este trabajo presenta investigación consecuente sobre competición entre claves (ensombrecimiento, bloqueo o súper-condicionamiento) para demostrar cómo la fuerza de las creencias previas y la evidencia sobre la covariación de cada causa contribuyen aditivamente en los juicios causales y en la toma de decisiones, siendo su fuerza relativa modulada por la fiabilidad otorgada a cada tipo de información. Nuevos datos muestran también la incapacidad para detectar relaciones causales incidentales preventivas, pero no generativas. Esta «ceguera inatencional» parece deberse a un fallo en la codificación o recuperación de la información. Todos estos datos revelan que una arquitectura cognitiva del aprendizaje causal debe basarse en tres niveles. El primer nivel sería responsable de la codificación de los eventos en cada ensayo. El segundo nivel computaría la nueva evidencia a partir de la información recibida del primer nivel. En el tercer nivel, el individuo debe interpretar e integrar toda esta información con su conocimiento causal previo. En suma, los modelos sobre juicios de causalidad y toma de decisiones normalmente se han centrado en el efecto exclusivo de las «creencias y conocimiento causal» ode la «experiencia directa y covariación» entre causas y efectos. Este trabajo demuestra que ambos tipos de información se requieren e interactúan cuando se trata de explicar la complejidad y flexibilidad que implica el aprendizaje y la inferencia de relaciones causales en humanos (AU)