ABSTRACT
La FIV puede llevar aparejada ia acumulación de embriones humanos excedentes. Aunque la ley prevé varios posibles destinos, las clínicas de reproducción asistida, que con frecuencia han de decidir qué hacer con ellos, buscan criterios para hacerlo de la forma más razonable posible. Este trabajo pretende aportar razones jurídicas y éticas que ayuden a esa decisión (AU)
IVF may entail the accumulation of surplus human embryos, Although Spanish law provides several possible destinations, assisted reproduction clinics, that of-ten have to decide what to do with them, look for criteria to help them to make their decisions as reasonably as possible. The aim of this paper is to provide legal and ethical reasons to help them to decide (AU)
Subject(s)
Humans , Male , Female , Reproductive Techniques/ethics , Reproductive Techniques/legislation & jurisprudence , Reproductive Techniques , Fertilization in Vitro/ethics , Fertilization in Vitro/legislation & jurisprudence , Embryo Culture Techniques/ethics , Reproductive Health/ethics , Reproductive Health/legislation & jurisprudence , Personhood , Embryo Transfer/ethicsABSTRACT
IVF may entail the accumulation of surplus human embryos. Although Spanish law provides several possible destinations, assisted reproduction clinics, that often have to decide what to do with them, look for criteria to help them to make their decisions as reasonably as possible. The aim of this paper is to provide legal and ethical reasons to help them to decide.
Subject(s)
Bioethical Issues/legislation & jurisprudence , Embryo Disposition/ethics , Embryo Disposition/legislation & jurisprudence , Humans , SpainABSTRACT
Since World War II, human dignity has made its way into many constitutions, bills of rights and international treaties. As its roots can be traced easily back to the Judeo-Christian tradition, and, later on, to the influential Kantian vision, dignity cannot be deemed an entirely new concept. For the same token, it cannot be said that dignity has been entirely alien to the legal realm till 1945. On the other hand, the latest philosophical and anthropological trends, as well as the politicisation of the human being, along with some recent advances in biotechnologies, help to explain its growing presence in the legal world. However, these authors suggest that writing down dignity in legal texts does not fully settle its meaning, not even if such texts are constitutions, and the fact remains that its presence in the judicial reasoning does not always imply being the ratio decidendi, as the study of some relevant judicial decisions shows.
Subject(s)
Personhood , HumansABSTRACT
De la Segunda Guerra Mundial en adelante, la dignidad humana es recogida en muchas constituciones, declaraciones de derechos y tratados internacionales. Esto no significa que sea un concepto nuevo, pues su significado puede rastrearse sin dificultad en la tradición judeo-cristiana y, mucho más tarde, en la influyente comprensión kantiana; y tampoco significa que no haya tenido relación con el Derecho antes de 1945. Por otro lado, las nuevas tendencias filosóficas y antropológicas así como la politización del hombre, junto con los avances de la técnica, explican su presencia cada vez mayor en el Derecho. Sin embargo, la inclusión de la dignidad en los textos jurídicos no es capaz de agotar su significado -ni aunque los textos sean los constitucionales-, y el hecho de que los jueces la aleguen no significa que la empleen realmente como criterio para su decisión, como puede verse al estudiar algunas sentencias relevantes
Since World War II, human dignity has made its way into many constitutions, bills of rights and international treaties. As its roots can be traced easily back to the Judeo-Christian tradition, and, later on, tothe influential Kantian vision, dignity cannot be deemed an entirely new concept. For the same token, it cannot be said that dignity has been entirely alien to the legal realm till 1945. On the other hand, the latestphilosophical and anthropological trends, as well as the politicisation of the human being, along with some recent advances in biotechnologies, help to explain its growing presence in the legal world. However, these authors suggest that writing down dignity in legal texts does not fully settle its meaning -not even if such texts are constitutions- and the fact remains that its presence in the judicial reasoning does not always imply being the ratio decidendi, as the study of some relevant judicial decisions shows
