Recommending teams promotes prosocial lending in online microfinance.

This paper reports the results of a large-scale field experiment designed to test the hypothesis that group membership can increase participation and prosocial lending for an online crowdlending community, Kiva. The experiment uses variations on a simple email manipulation to encourage Kiva members to join a lending team, testing which types of team recommendation emails are most likely to get members to join teams as well as the subsequent impact on lending. We find that emails do increase the likelihood that a lender joins a team, and that joining a team increases lending in a short window (1 wk) following our intervention. The impact on lending is large relative to median lender lifetime loans. We also find that lenders are more likely to join teams recommended based on location similarity rather than team status. Our results suggest team recommendation can be an effective behavioral mechanism to increase prosocial lending.

Essentialism in the absence of language? Evidence from rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta).

We explored whether rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) share one important feature of human essentialist reasoning: the capacity to track category membership across radical featural transformations. Specifically, we examined whether monkeys--like children (Keil, 1989)--expect a transformed object to have the internal properties of its original category. In two experiments, monkeys watched as an experimenter visually transformed a familiar fruit (e.g. apple) into a new kind of fruit (e.g. coconut) either by placing a fruit exterior over the original, or by removing an exterior shell and revealing the inside kind of fruit. The experimenter then pretended to place an inside piece of the transformed fruit into a box which the monkey was allowed to search. Results indicated that monkeys searched the box longer when they found a piece of fruit inconsistent with the inside kind, suggesting that the monkeys expected that the inside of the transformed fruit would taste like the innermost kind they saw. These results suggest that monkeys may share at least one aspect of psychological essentialism: they maintain category-specific expectations about an object's internal properties even when that object's external properties change. These results therefore suggest that some essentialist expectations may emerge in the absence of language, and thus raise the possibility that such tendencies may emerge earlier in human development than has previously been considered.

'Unwilling' versus 'unable': capuchin monkeys' (Cebus apella) understanding of human intentional action.

A sensitivity to the intentions behind human action is a crucial developmental achievement in infants. Is this intention reading ability a unique and relatively recent product of human evolution and culture, or does this capacity instead have roots in our non-human primate ancestors? Recent work by Call and colleagues (2004) lends credence to the latter hypothesis, providing evidence that chimpanzees are also sensitive to human intentions. Specifically, chimpanzees remained in a testing area longer and exhibited fewer frustration behaviors when an experimenter behaved as if he intended to give food but was unable to do so, than when the experimenter behaved as if he had no intention of giving food. The present research builds on and extends this paradigm, providing some of the first evidence of intention reading in a more distant primate relative, the capuchin monkey (Cebus apella). Like chimpanzees, capuchin monkeys distinguish between different goal-directed acts, vacating an enclosure sooner when an experimenter acts unwilling to give food than when she acts unable to give food. Additionally, we found that this pattern is specific to animate action, and does not obtain when the same actions are performed by inanimate rods instead of human hands (for a similar logic, see Woodward, 1998). Taken together with the previous evidence, the present research suggests that our own intention reading is not a wholly unique aspect of the human species, but rather is shared broadly across the primate order.

Evidence for kind representations in the absence of language: experiments with rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta).

How do we come to recognize and represent different kinds of objects in the world? Some developmental psychologists have hypothesized that learning language plays a crucial role in this capacity. If this hypothesis were correct, then non-linguistic animals should lack the capacity to represent objects as kinds. Previous research with rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) has shown that this species can successfully individuate different kinds of objects - monkeys who saw one kind of object hidden inside a box searched longer after finding a different kind of object. However, in these studies and the infant studies on which they were based, the objects to be individuated differed both in kind and in properties. Thus, subjects in these experiments may not be representing the kinds of objects per se, but instead only their immediate perceptual properties. Here, we show that rhesus monkeys successfully individuate different kinds of objects even when their perceptual properties are held constant. Although these data provide the best evidence to date that language is not necessary to represent kinds, we discuss our findings in terms of possible associative hypotheses as well.