Against age limits for men in reproductive care.

Almost all countries and fertility clinics impose age limits on women who want to become pregnant through Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART). Age limits for aspiring fathers, however, are much less common and remain a topic of debate. This article departs from the principle of reproductive autonomy and a conditional positive right to receive ART, and asks whether there are convincing arguments to also impose age limits on aspiring fathers. After considering three consequentialist approaches to justifying age limits for aspiring fathers, we take in a concrete normative stance by concluding that those are not strong enough to justify such cut-offs. We reinforce our position by drawing a comparison between the case of a 39-year-old woman who wants to become a single mother via a sperm donor on the one hand, and on the other hand the same woman who wants to have a child with a 64-year-old man who she loves and who is willing to care for the child as long as he is able to. We conclude that, as long as appropriate precautions are taken to protect the welfare of the future child, couples who want to receive fertility treatment should never be limited on the basis of the age of the (male) partner. An absence of age limits for men would respect the reproductive autonomy of both the man and the woman.

Age-based restrictions on reproductive care: discerning the arbitrary from the necessary.

Policies that determine whether someone is allowed access to reproductive healthcare or not vary widely among countries, especially in their age requirements. This raises the suspicion of arbitrariness, especially because often no underlying justification is provided. In this article, we pose the question-under which circumstances is it morally acceptable to use age for policy and legislation in the first place? We start from the notion that everyone has a conditional positive right to fertility treatment. Subsequently, we set off to formulate a framework that helps to determine who should be excluded from treatment nonetheless. The framework's three core elements are: choosing and ethically justifying exclusion criteria (target), determining the actual limit between in- and exclusion (cut-off), and selecting variables that help to predict the exclusion criteria via correlation (as they are not directly measurable) (proxy). This framework allows us to show that referring to age in policy and legislation is only ethically justifiable if there is a sufficiently strong correlation with a non-directly measurable exclusion criterion. Moreover, since age is only one of many predicting variables, it should therefore not be ascribed any special status. Finally, our framework may be used as an argumentative scheme to critically assess the ethical legitimacy of policies that regulate access to (fertility) treatments in general.