Comments on "cyclical swings" by Professor Hannah Decker: The underappreciated "solid center" of psychiatry.

The history of psychiatry is characterized by some deep ideological and conceptual divisions, as adumbrated in Professor Hannah Decker's essay. However, the schism between "biological" and "psychosocial" models of mental illness and its treatment represents extreme positions among some psychiatrists-not the model propounded by academic psychiatry or its affiliated professional organizations. Indeed, the "biopsycho-social model" (BPSM) developed by Dr. George L. Engel has been, and remains, the foundational model for academic psychiatry, notwithstanding malign market forces that have undermined the BPSM's use in clinical practice. The BPSM is integrally related to "centralizing" and integrative trends in American psychiatry that may be traced to Franz Alexander, Karl Jaspers, and Engel himself, among others. This "Alexandrian-Jaspersian-Engelian" tradition is explored in relation to Professor Decker's "cyclical swing" model of psychiatry's history.

The Bereavement Exclusion and DSM-5: An Update and Commentary.

The removal of the bereavement exclusion in the diagnosis of major depression was perhaps the most controversial change from DSM-IV to DSM-5. Critics have argued that removal of the bereavement exclusion will "medicalize" ordinary grief and encourage over-prescription of antidepressants. Supporters of the DSM-5's decision argue that there is no clinical or scientific basis for "excluding" patients from a diagnosis of major depression simply because the condition occurs shortly after the death of a loved one (bereavement). Though bereavement-related grief and major depression share some features, they are distinct and distinguishable conditions. Bereavement does not "immunize" the patient against a major depressive episode, and is in fact a common precipitant of clinical depression. Recognizing major depression in the context of recent bereavement takes careful clinical judgment, and by no means implies that antidepressant treatment is warranted. But given the serious risks of unrecognized major depression-including suicide- eliminating the bereavement exclusion from DSM-5 was, on balance, a reasonable decision.

The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: a pluralogue. Part 4: general conclusion.

In the conclusion to this multi-part article I first review the discussions carried out around the six essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis - the position taken by Allen Frances on each question, the commentaries on the respective question along with Frances' responses to the commentaries, and my own view of the multiple discussions. In this review I emphasize that the core question is the first - what is the nature of psychiatric illness - and that in some manner all further questions follow from the first. Following this review I attempt to move the discussion forward, addressing the first question from the perspectives of natural kind analysis and complexity analysis. This reflection leads toward a view of psychiatric disorders - and future nosologies - as far more complex and uncertain than we have imagined.

The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: a pluralogue part 3: issues of utility and alternative approaches in psychiatric diagnosis.

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM - whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part 1 of this article took up the first two questions. Part 2 took up the second two questions. Part 3 now deals with Questions 5 & 6. Question 5 confronts the issue of utility, whether the manual design of DSM-III and IV favors clinicians or researchers, and what that means for DSM-5. Our final question, Question 6, takes up a concluding issue, whether the acknowledged problems with the earlier DSMs warrants a significant overhaul of DSM-5 and future manuals. As in Parts 1 & 2 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances.

The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: a pluralogue part 2: Issues of conservatism and pragmatism in psychiatric diagnosis.

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM--whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article took up the first two questions. Part II will take up the second two questions. Question 3 deals with the question as to whether DSM-V should assume a conservative or assertive posture in making changes from DSM-IV. That question in turn breaks down into discussion of diagnoses that depend on, and aim toward, empirical, scientific validation, and diagnoses that are more value-laden and less amenable to scientific validation. Question 4 takes up the role of pragmatic consideration in a psychiatric nosology, whether the purely empirical considerations need to be tempered by considerations of practical consequence. As in Part 1 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances.

The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: a pluralogue part 1: conceptual and definitional issues in psychiatric diagnosis.

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM - whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article will take up the first two questions. With the first question, invited commentators express a range of opinion regarding the nature of psychiatric disorders, loosely divided into a realist position that the diagnostic categories represent real diseases that we can accurately name and know with our perceptual abilities, a middle, nominalist position that psychiatric disorders do exist in the real world but that our diagnostic categories are constructs that may or may not accurately represent the disorders out there, and finally a purely constructivist position that the diagnostic categories are simply constructs with no evidence of psychiatric disorders in the real world. The second question again offers a range of opinion as to how we should define a mental or psychiatric disorder, including the possibility that we should not try to formulate a definition. The general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances.

Depression and the pitfalls of causality: implications for DSM-V.

Causal narratives are often invoked as explanations for depressive episodes, and some have argued that even serious depressive symptoms in the context of recent bereavement should not be considered a psychiatric disorder. However, the limited data we have suggest that "bereavement-related depression" does not significantly differ from non-bereavement-related major depression, in terms of symptom picture, risk of recurrence, or clinical outcome. Furthermore, the notion of establishing a psychosocial precipitant (such as loss of a loved one) as the "cause" of a patient's depression fails to consider several confounding variables. The patient may have an inaccurate or distorted recollection of depression onset, or be unaware of pre-existing medical and neurological conditions that are strongly "driving" the depression. Moreover, judgments regarding how "proportionate" or "disproportionate" a person's depressive symptoms are in relation to a putative "precipitant" are fraught with uncertainties and may be influenced by cultural biases. Until we have controlled, longitudinal data showing that "bereavement-related depression" differs significantly from non-bereavement-related major depression, it is premature and risky to alter our current "cause-neutral" diagnostic framework. Indeed, there are compelling reasons to eliminate the so-called bereavement exclusion from DSM-V.

Emerging treatments for bipolar disorder: safety and adverse effect profiles.

OBJECTIVE: To provide an overview of the safety and tolerability of newer agents used to treat bipolar disorder (BPD) and provide clinicians with management strategies for drug-related toxicity and adverse effects. DATA SOURCES: MEDLINE was searched through July 2005 for BPD treatment, adverse effects, tolerability, safety, emerging agents, atypical antipsychotics, new antiepileptic drugs (AEDs), risperidone, quetiapine, clozapine, ziprasidone, aripiprazole, lamotrigine, topiramate, gabapentin, oxcarbazepine, and olanzapine. STUDY SELECTION AND DATA EXTRACTION: Results from randomized controlled trials, open-label studies, and reviews are described. DATA SYNTHESIS: Emerging agents recently approved for BPD include atypical antipsychotics and new AEDs. Safety and tolerability are as important as efficacy because poor adherence in BPD worsens outcome; metabolic and other comorbidities pose specific challenges; and manic patients often require combination therapy, which increases adverse effects. Most atypical antipsychotics cause fewer extrapyramidal symptoms than conventional antipsychotics, but may cause more weight gain and metabolic complications. The newer AEDs generally cause less weight gain than the older agents, and some even promote weight loss. Several newer AEDs used in BPD also offer the advantages of fewer drug interactions and less need for therapeutic drug monitoring compared with older AEDs. CONCLUSIONS: Pending the results of ongoing controlled studies, several emerging agents may be useful additions to the therapeutic arsenal for BPD.

Sensitivity and specificity of a new bipolar spectrum diagnostic scale.

OBJECTIVE: To assess the sensitivity and specificity of a self-report questionnaire for bipolar disorder, the Bipolar Spectrum Diagnostic Scale (BSDS). METHODS: The BSDS was administered to 68 consecutive patients with bipolar illness and 27 consecutive patients with unipolar major depressive disorder. Created by Ronald Pies, it consists of a descriptive story that captures subtle features of bipolar illness, to which patients may assent on a sentence-by-sentence basis. BSDS scores were compared to clinicians' DSM-IV-based diagnoses. RESULTS: Sensitivity of the BSDS was 0.76, approximately equal in bipolar I and II/NOS subjects (0.75 and 0.79, respectively). The BSDS identified 85% of unipolar-depressed patients as not having bipolar spectrum illness. A shift in the threshold of the BSDS resulted in a large increase in specificity (from 0.85 to 0.93), without a significant loss of sensitivity. CONCLUSIONS: The BSDS was highly sensitive and specific for bipolar spectrum illness, especially with the amended threshold for positive diagnosis.