Why Do I Choose an Animal Model or an Alternative Method in Basic and Preclinical Biomedical Research? A Spectrum of Ethically Relevant Reasons and Their Evaluation.

BACKGROUND: Research model selection decisions in basic and preclinical biomedical research have not yet been the subject of an ethical investigation. Therefore, this paper aims, (1) to identify a spectrum of reasons for choosing between animal and alternative research models (e.g., based on in vitro or in silico models) and (2) provides an ethical analysis of the selected reasons. METHODS: In total, 13 researchers were interviewed; the interviews were analyzed qualitatively. The ethical analysis was based on the principlism approach and a value judgement model. RESULTS: This paper presents 66 reasons underlying the choice of researchers using animal (27 reasons) or alternative models (39). Most of the reasons were assigned to the work environment (29) and scientific standards (22). Other reasons were assigned to personal attitudes (11) and animal welfare (4). Qualitative relevant normative differences are presented in the ethical analysis. Even if few reasons can be rejected outright from an ethical point of view, there are good reasons to give some more weight than others. CONCLUSIONS: The spectrum of reasons and their ethical assessment provide a framework for reflection for researchers who may have to choose between animal models and (investing in) alternatives. This can help to reflect on and ethically justify decisions.

Values, decision-making and empirical bioethics: a conceptual model for empirically identifying and analyzing value judgements.

It can be assumed that value judgements, which are needed to judge what is 'good' or 'better' and what is 'bad' or 'worse', are involved in every decision-making process. The theoretical understanding and analysis of value judgements is, therefore, important in the context of bioethics, for example, to be able to ethically assess real decision-making processes in biomedical practice and make recommendations for improvements. However, real decision-making processes and the value judgements inherent in them must first be investigated empirically ('empirical bioethics'). For this to succeed, what exactly a 'value judgement' is and of what components it might consist must initially be theoretically clarified. A corresponding conceptual model can then support or even enable empirical data collection and analysis and, above all, subsequent ethical analysis and evaluation. This paper, therefore, presents a value judgement model with its theoretical derivation. It also illustrates its application in an interview study of decision-making between animal experimentation and alternative methods in the context of biomedical research. Though the model itself can be theoretically deepened and extended, the application of the model works in general and helps to uncover what value judgements can enter into decision-making. However, the empirical methods, for example, qualitative interviews, can also be better oriented towards eliciting value judgements (as understood according to the model). Further applications of the model to other topics or by means of other empirical methods are conceivable.