Visual Attention to Semantic and Orthographic Associations in Fluent Aphasia: Evidence from Eye-Tracking.

BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE: We examined the allocation of visual attention in an association task by both neurotypical participants (n = 11) and adults with fluent aphasia (n = 12). RESEARCH DESIGN: Participants were presented with a picture (e.g., a basket) followed by a semantically related association (i.e., "strawberry") and an orthographically related association (i.e., "b," the first letter of "basket"). ANALYSIS: An eye tracker recorded their eye movements for three areas of interest (AOI): the picture, the semantic associate, and the orthographic associate, over 1396 observations. RESULTS: Results showed that both neurotypical participants and participants with aphasia looked longer at the semantic associate than at the picture, and this difference was more pronounced for neurotypicals than for people with aphasia (PWA). Neurotypicals also looked longer than the PWA group at the orthographic associate than at the prior picture. Regarding eye fixation counts, both participant groups looked more frequently at the semantic associate than at either the picture or the orthographic associate. Notably, this pattern was more pronounced among neurotypical participants than PWA. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings emphasize the importance of semantic associations in fluent aphasia and suggest a potential rehabilitative approach in speech and language therapy.

'Three is better than two': Increasing donations with the attraction effect.

Five experiments (Ntotal  = 2,503) tested the attraction effect and its boundary conditions in the context of helping behaviour. Participants could choose one donation appeal in a set of either two or three alternatives. The three alternatives set included a decoy - an alternative that resembled but was clearly inferior to a target (i.e., the most beneficial) alternative. A clear and consistent pattern emerged: Participants chose the target alternative more frequently and perceived it as more beneficial (and somewhat less costly) when the decoy was present compared to when it was absent. This finding was robust when the attribute ratings of the alternatives were unclear, when the target alternative offered a bundle of unrelated products, and when participants could refrain from donating altogether, or contribute any amount they wished. Our findings offer concrete and simple strategies that charities can implement at zero cost to increase giving and the perceived benefits that people's good deed bring about to those in need.

Visual saliency influences ethical blind spots and (dis)honesty.

Recent work suggests that dishonesty results from ethical blind spots: people's lack of attention to ethical information. In two experiments (one pre-registered) we used eye tracking to investigate when ethical blind spots emerge, and whether they can be reduced through a simple, non-invasive intervention. Participants reported a Target Digit indicated by a jittery cue that was slightly biased in the direction of another digit (the Second-Cued Digit), which could be either higher or lower than the Target Digit. Participants were paid more for reporting higher digits, and were not penalized for making mistakes, thus providing an incentive to cheat. Results showed that participants frequently made self-serving (and rarely self-hurting) mistakes by reporting the Second-Cued Digit when it was more valuable than the target. Importantly, they rapidly gazed at the digit that they would later report, regardless of whether this report was correct or a self-serving mistake. Finally, we were able to reduce or increase the number of self-serving mistakes by respectively increasing or reducing the visual saliency of the Target Digit. We suggest that increasing the visual saliency of morally desirable options is a promising cost-effective tool to curb dishonesty.

Emotional intelligence buffers the effect of physiological arousal on dishonesty.

We studied the emotional processes that allow people to balance two competing desires: benefitting from dishonesty and keeping a positive self-image. We recorded physiological arousal (skin conductance and heart rate) during a computer card game in which participants could cheat and fail to report a certain card when presented on the screen to avoid losing their money. We found that higher skin conductance corresponded to lower cheating rates. Importantly, emotional intelligence regulated this effect; participants with high emotional intelligence were less affected by their physiological reactions than those with low emotional intelligence. As a result, they were more likely to profit from dishonesty. However, no interaction emerged between heart rate and emotional intelligence. We suggest that the ability to manage and control emotions can allow people to overcome the tension between doing right or wrong and license them to bend the rules.

Impulsivity influences betting under stress in laboratory gambling.

Although recent research suggests that acute stress influences subsequent decision-making under ambiguity, less is known about the role of personality variables in this relationship. This study tested whether impulsivity traits and acute stress differentially influence the way in which a prior feedback is incorporated into further decisions involving ambiguity. Sixty college students (50% male; aged 18-25 years) were randomly assigned to a stress versus a non-stress condition before completing a laboratory gambling task. The results revealed that independently of the stress condition, subjects behaved as if the odds of winning increase after a single loss. Additionally, stress effects varied as a function of impulsivity traits. Individuals who lacked perseverance (i.e., had difficulty focusing on a difficult or boring task) gambled more after experiencing a loss in the stress condition than did those in the control condition. The present study supports that impulsivity traits can explain the differential effect of stress on the relationship between prior feedback and choices made under ambiguity.

Not taking responsibility: Equity trumps efficiency in allocation decisions.

When allocating resources, equity and efficiency may conflict. When resources are scarce and cannot be distributed equally, one may choose to destroy resources and reduce societal welfare to maintain equity among its members. We examined whether people are averse to inequitable outcomes per se or to being responsible for deciding how inequity should be implemented. Three scenario-based experiments and one incentivized experiment revealed that participants are inequity responsibility averse: when asked to decide which of the 2 equally deserving individuals should receive a reward, they rather discarded the reward than choosing who will get it. This tendency diminished significantly when participants had the possibility to use a random device to allocate the reward. The finding suggests that it is more difficult to be responsible for the way inequity is implemented than to create inequity per se. (PsycINFO Database Record

The relationship between attention allocation and cheating.

Little is known about the relationship between attention allocation and dishonesty. The goal of the present work was to address this issue using the eyetracking methodology. We developed a novel task in which participants could honestly report seeing a particular card and lose money, or they could falsely report not seeing the card and not lose money. When participants cheated, they allocated less attention (i.e., shorter fixation durations and fewer fixations) to the card than when they behaved honestly. Our results suggest that when dishonesty pays, shifting attention away from undesirable information can serve as a self-deception strategy that allows individuals to serve their self-interests while maintaining a positive self-concept.

"Give, but Give until It Hurts": The Modulatory Role of Trait Emotional Intelligence on the Motivation to Help.

Two studies investigated the effect of trait Emotional Intelligence (trait EI) on people's motivation to help. In Study 1, we developed a new computer-based paradigm that tested participants' motivation to help by measuring their performance on a task in which they could gain a hypothetical amount of money to help children in need. Crucially, we manipulated participants' perceived efficacy by informing them that they had been either able to save the children (positive feedback) or unable to save the children (negative feedback). We measured trait EI using the Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire-Short Form (TEIQue-SF) and assessed participants' affective reactions during the experiment using the PANAS-X. Results showed that high and low trait EI participants performed differently after the presentation of feedback on their ineffectiveness in helping others in need. Both groups showed increasing negative affective states during the experiment when the feedback was negative; however, high trait EI participants better managed their affective reactions, modulating the impact of their emotions on performance and maintaining a high level of motivation to help. In Study 2, we used a similar computerized task and tested a control situation to explore the effect of trait EI on participants' behavior when facing failure or success in a scenario unrelated to helping others in need. No effect of feedback emerged on participants' emotional states in the second study. Taken together our results show that trait EI influences the impact of success and failure on behavior only in affect-rich situation like those in which people are asked to help others in need.

Justifications shape ethical blind spots.

To some extent, unethical behavior results from people's limited attention to ethical considerations, which results in an ethical blind spot. Here, we focus on the role of ambiguity in shaping people's ethical blind spots, which in turn lead to their ethical failures. We suggest that in ambiguous settings, individuals' attention shifts toward tempting information, which determines the magnitude of their lies. Employing a novel ambiguous-dice paradigm, we asked participants to report the outcome of the die roll appearing closest to the location of a previously presented fixation cross on a computer screen; this outcome would determine their pay. We varied the value of the die second closest to the fixation cross to be either higher (i.e., tempting) or lower (i.e., not tempting) than the die closest to the fixation cross. Results of two experiments revealed that in ambiguous settings, people's incorrect responses were self-serving. Tracking participants' eye movements demonstrated that people's ethical blind spots are shaped by increased attention toward tempting information.