Canadian Undergraduate Perspectives on Medical Assistance in Dying for Mental Illness: Does Psychiatric Illness Type, Age, and Exposure to Information Influence Acceptance of MAiD?

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: In 2027, Canadians whose only medical condition is an untreatable mental illness and who otherwise meet all eligibility criteria will be able to request Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD). This study investigates the attitudes of undergraduate students towards widening the scope of MAiD for physical illness for certain psychiatric conditions. We were interested in understanding if age, information, and type of mental illness influenced undergraduates' acceptance or rejection of MAiD for mental illness (MAiD-MI). METHOD: 413 undergraduate students participated in this study which examined the factors that correlate with the acceptance or rejection of MAiD-MI. Four scenarios were presented in which age (older or younger) and illness type (depression or schizophrenia) were manipulated. Demographic questions and measures assessing personality, religion, and attitudes towards euthanasia were administered. Questions assessing participants' general understanding of MAiD and their life experiences with death and suicide were also asked. RESULTS: Most of the participants accepted MAiD-MI for both depression and schizophrenia. As hypothesized, support for MAiD-MI was higher for patients with schizophrenia than for depression. Also as hypothesized, support was higher for older patients than for younger patients. Variables such as religion, personality and political affiliation were also associated with acceptance or rejection of MAiD-MI. Finally, consistent with our hypotheses, participants' understanding of MAiD and experiences with death and suicide was predictive of support for MAiD-MI.

Canadian Undergraduates' Perspectives on Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD): A Quantitative Study.

Background and Objectives: In 2016, Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD) became legal in Canada for those suffering a grievous and untreatable medical condition. Currently, it is not available to minors or to those with an untreatable mental illness, although it is likely the scope of MAiD will be widened to include persons with severe and untreatable mental illnesses. However, little is known about the factors predicting acceptance or rejection of MAiD for persons with either a grievous medical condition or an untreatable mental illness. Methods: A survey was administered to 438 undergraduate students to examine factors associated with their acceptance or rejection of MAiD. The survey included four different scenarios: a young or old person with an untreatable medical condition, and a young or old person with an untreatable mental illness. Demographic questions (age, sex, religion, etc), personality measures, and an attitude towards euthanasia scale were also administered, as well as questions assessing participants' general understanding of MAiD and their life experiences with death and suicide. Results/Conclusion: Overall, most of the Canadian undergraduate participants accepted MAiD for both terminally ill and mentally ill patients; however, different variables, such as age, religion, and ethnicity, predicted the acceptance or rejection of MAiD for each scenario.

Unbreakable Resolutions as an Effective Tactic for Self-Control: Lessons From Mahatma Gandhi and a 19th-Century Prussian Prince.

Despite the relative consensus in the self-management literature that personal resolutions are not an effective stand-alone tactic for self-control, some individuals seem capable of using them to exert a remarkable level of control over their behavior. One such individual was Mahatma Gandhi, the famous Indian statesman. Gandhi often used personal resolutions-or "vows"-to commit himself to a range of challenging behaviors, such as extreme diets, sexual abstinence, and fasting. Similarly, Prince Pückler-Muskau, a celebrated 19th-Century adventurer, landscape designer and travel author, described using personal resolutions to unfailingly accomplish numerous tasks in his everyday life. In this article, we examine the historical writings of Gandhi and Pückler-Muskau concerning their use of resolutions. We describe three defining characteristics of their resolutions, which we will refer to as unbreakable resolutions, and outline Gandhi's advice for making and keeping such resolutions. Our analysis suggests that the effectiveness of unbreakable resolutions may be primarily due to the temporally extended contingencies of reinforcement associated with their use, and can be usefully interpreted from the perspective of delay-discounting and say-do correspondence models of self-control. The implications of this examination for understanding the concept of willpower and for enhancing modern research into self-control training are also discussed. Based on this analysis, we additionally offer a tentative set of guidelines on how to make and keep unbreakable resolutions.

Did Little Albert actually acquire a conditioned fear of furry animals? What the film evidence tells us.

Watson and Rayner's (1920) attempt to condition a fear of furry animals and objects in an 11-month-old infant is one of the most widely cited studies in psychology. Known as the Little Albert study, it is typically presented as evidence for the role of classical conditioning in fear development. Some critics, however, have noted deficiencies in the study that suggest that little or no fear conditioning actually occurred. These criticisms were primarily based on the published reports of the study. In this article, we present a detailed analysis of Watson's (1923) film record of the study to determine the extent to which it provides evidence of conditioning. Our findings concur with the view that Watson and Rayner's conditioning procedure was largely ineffective, and that the relatively weak signs of distress that Albert does display in the film can be readily accounted for by such factors as sensitization and maturational influences. We suggest that the tendency for viewers to perceive the film as a valid demonstration of fear conditioning is likely the result of expectancy effects as well as, in some cases, an ongoing mistrust of behaviorism as dehumanizing and manipulative. Our analysis also revealed certain anomalies in the film which indicate that Watson engaged in some "literary license" when editing it, most likely with a view toward using the film mainly as a promotional device to attract financial support for his research program. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Metabolic and microbial perspectives on the "evolution of evolution".

Identifying and theorizing major turning points in the history of life generates insights into not only world-changing evolutionary events but also the processes that bring these events about. In his treatment of these issues, Bonner identifies the evolution of sex, multicellularity, and nervous systems as enabling the "evolution of evolution," which involves fundamental transformations in how evolution occurs. By contextualizing his framework within two decades of theorizing about major transitions in evolution, we identify some basic problems that Bonner's theory shares with much of the prevailing literature. These problems include implicit progressivism, theoretical disunity, and a limited ability to explain major evolutionary transformations. We go on to identify events and processes that are neglected by existing views. In contrast with the "vertical" focus on replication, hierarchy, and morphology that preoccupies most of the literature on major transitions, we propose a "horizontal" dimension in which metabolism and microbial innovations play a central explanatory role in understanding the broad-scale organization of life.

'Rethinking "Disease": a fresh diagnosis and a new philosophical treatment'.

Despite several decades of debate, the concept of disease remains hotly contested. The debate is typically cast as one between naturalism and normativism, with a hybrid view that combines elements of each staked out in between. In light of a number of widely discussed problems with existing accounts, some theorists argue that the concept of disease is beyond repair and thus recommend eliminating it in a wide range of practical medical contexts. Any attempt to reframe the 'disease' discussion should answer the more basic sceptical challenge, and should include a meta-methodological critique guided by our pragmatic expectations of what the disease concept ought to do given that medical diagnosis is woven into a complex network of healthcare institutions. In this paper, we attempt such a reframing, arguing that while prevailing accounts do not suffer from the particular defects that prominent critics have identified, they do suffer from other deficits-and this leads us to propose an amended hybrid view that places objectivist approaches to disease on stronger theoretical footing, and satisfies the institutional-ethical desiderata of a concept of disease in human medicine. Nevertheless, we do not advocate a procrustean approach to 'disease'. Instead, we recommend disease concept pluralism between medical and biological sciences to allow the concept to serve the different epistemic and institutional goals of these respective disciplines.

Is behavioural flexibility evidence of cognitive complexity? How evolution can inform comparative cognition.

Behavioural flexibility is often treated as the gold standard of evidence for more sophisticated or complex forms of animal cognition, such as planning, metacognition and mindreading. However, the evidential link between behavioural flexibility and complex cognition has not been explicitly or systematically defended. Such a defence is particularly pressing because observed flexible behaviours can frequently be explained by putatively simpler cognitive mechanisms. This leaves complex cognition hypotheses open to 'deflationary' challenges that are accorded greater evidential weight precisely because they offer putatively simpler explanations of equal explanatory power. This paper challenges the blanket preference for simpler explanations, and shows that once this preference is dispensed with, and the full spectrum of evidence-including evolutionary, ecological and phylogenetic data-is accorded its proper weight, an argument in support of the prevailing assumption that behavioural flexibility can serve as evidence for complex cognitive mechanisms may begin to take shape. An adaptive model of cognitive-behavioural evolution is proposed, according to which the existence of convergent trait-environment clusters in phylogenetically disparate lineages may serve as evidence for the same trait-environment clusters in other lineages. This, in turn, could permit inferences of cognitive complexity in cases of experimental underdetermination, thereby placing the common view that behavioural flexibility can serve as evidence for complex cognition on firmer grounds.

Episodic-like memory in zebrafish.

Episodic-like memory tests often aid in determining an animal's ability to recall the what, where, and which (context) of an event. To date, this type of memory has been demonstrated in humans, wild chacma baboons, corvids (Scrub jays), humming birds, mice, rats, Yucatan minipigs, and cuttlefish. The potential for this type of memory in zebrafish remains unexplored even though they are quickly becoming an essential model organism for the study of a variety of human cognitive and mental disorders. Here we explore the episodic-like capabilities of zebrafish (Danio rerio) in a previously established mammalian memory paradigm. We demonstrate that when zebrafish were presented with a familiar object in a familiar context but a novel location within that context, they spend more time in the novel quadrant. Thus, zebrafish display episodic-like memory as they remember what object they saw, where they saw it (quadrant location), and on which occasion (yellow or blue walls) it was presented.

Convergent evolution as natural experiment: the tape of life reconsidered.

Stephen Jay Gould argued that replaying the 'tape of life' would result in radically different evolutionary outcomes. Recently, biologists and philosophers of science have paid increasing attention to the theoretical importance of convergent evolution-the independent origination of similar biological forms and functions-which many interpret as evidence against Gould's thesis. In this paper, we examine the evidentiary relevance of convergent evolution for the radical contingency debate. We show that under the right conditions, episodes of convergent evolution can constitute valid natural experiments that support inferences regarding the deep counterfactual stability of macroevolutionary outcomes. However, we argue that proponents of convergence have problematically lumped causally heterogeneous phenomena into a single evidentiary basket, in effect treating all convergent events as if they are of equivalent theoretical import. As a result, the 'critique from convergent evolution' fails to engage with key claims of the radical contingency thesis. To remedy this, we develop ways to break down the heterogeneous set of convergent events based on the nature of the generalizations they support. Adopting this more nuanced approach to convergent evolution allows us to differentiate iterated evolutionary outcomes that are probably common among alternative evolutionary histories and subject to law-like generalizations, from those that do little to undermine and may even support, the Gouldian view of life.

In Genes We Trust: Germline Engineering, Eugenics, and the Future of the Human Genome.

Liberal proponents of genetic engineering maintain that developing human germline modification technologies is morally desirable because it will result in a net improvement in human health and well-being. Skeptics of germline modification, in contrast, fear evolutionary harms that could flow from intervening in the human germline, and worry that such programs, even if well intentioned, could lead to a recapitulation of the scientifically and morally discredited projects of the old eugenics. Some bioconservatives have appealed as well to the value of retaining our "given" human biological nature as a reason for restraining the development and use of human genetic modification technologies even where they would tend to increase well-being. In this article, I argue that germline intervention will be necessary merely to sustain the levels of genetic health that we presently enjoy for future generations-a goal that should appeal to bioliberals and bioconservatives alike. This is due to the population-genetic consequences of relaxed selection pressures in human populations caused by the increasing efficacy and availability of conventional medicine. This heterodox conclusion, which I present as a problem of intergenerational justice, has been overlooked in medicine and bioethics due to certain misconceptions about human evolution, which I attempt to rectify, as well as the sordid history of Darwinian approaches to medicine and social policy, which I distinguish from the present argument.

Dreams of the Rarebit Fiend: food and diet as instigators of bizarre and disturbing dreams.

In the early 1900s, the Dream of the Rarebit Fiend comic strip conveyed how the spicy cheese dish Welsh rarebit leads to bizarre and disturbing dreams. Today, the perception that foods disturb dreaming persists. But apart from case studies, some exploratory surveys, and a few lab studies on how hunger affects dreaming, there is little empirical evidence addressing this topic. The present study examines three aspects of the food/dreaming relationship; it attempts to: (1) assess the prevalence of the perception of food-dependent dreaming and the types of foods most commonly blamed; (2) determine if perceived food-dependent dreaming is associated with dietary, sleep or motivational factors; and (3) explore whether these factors, independent of food/dreaming perceptions, are associated with reports of vivid and disturbing dreams. Three hundred and ninety six students completed questionnaires evaluating sleep, dreams, and dietary habits and motivations. Items queried whether they had noticed if foods produced bizarre or disturbing dreams and if eating late at night influenced their dreams. The perception of food-dependent dreaming had a prevalence of 17.8%; with dairy products being the most frequently blamed food category (39-44%). Those who perceived food-dependent dreaming differed from others by reporting more frequent and disturbing dreams, poorer sleep, higher coffee intake, and lower Intuitive Eating Scale scores. Reports of disturbing dreams were associated with a pathological constellation of measures that includes poorer sleep, binge-eating, and eating for emotional reasons. Reports of vivid dreams were associated with measures indicative of wellness: better sleep, a healthier diet, and longer times between meals (fasting). Results clarify the relationship between food and dreaming and suggest four explanations for the perception of food-dependent dreaming: (1) food specific effects; (2) food-induced distress; (3) folklore influences, and (4) causal misattributions. Research and clinical implications are discussed.

Correcting the record on Watson, Rayner, and Little Albert: Albert Barger as "psychology's lost boy".

In 1920, John B. Watson and Rosalie Rayner attempted to condition a phobia in a young infant named "Albert B." In 2009, Beck, Levinson, and Irons proposed that Little Albert, as he is now known, was actually an infant named Douglas Merritte. More recently, Fridlund, Beck, Goldie, and Irons (2012) claimed that Little Albert (Douglas) was neurologically impaired at the time of the experiment. They also alleged that Watson, in a severe breach of ethics, probably knew of Little Albert's condition when selecting him for the study and then fraudulently hid this fact in his published accounts of the case. In this article, we present the discovery of another individual, Albert Barger, who appears to match the characteristics of Little Albert better than Douglas Merritte does. We examine the evidence for Albert Barger as having been Little Albert and, where relevant, contrast it with the evidence for Douglas Merritte. As for the allegations of fraudulent activity by Watson, we offer comments at the end of this article. We also present evidence concerning whether Little Albert (Albert Barger) grew up with the fear of furry animals, as Watson and Rayner speculated he might.

Little Albert's alleged neurological impairment: Watson, Rayner, and historical revision.

In 2012, Fridlund, Beck, Goldie, and Irons (2012) announced that "Little Albert"-the infant that Watson and Rayner used in their 1920 study of conditioned fear (Watson & Rayner, 1920)-was not the healthy child the researchers described him to be, but was neurologically impaired almost from birth. Fridlund et al. also alleged that Watson had committed serious ethical breaches in regard to this research. Our article reexamines the evidentiary bases for these claims and arrives at an alternative interpretation of Albert as a normal infant. In order to set the stage for our interpretation, we first briefly describe the historical context for the Albert study, as well as how the study has been construed and revised since 1920. We then discuss the evidentiary issues in some detail, focusing on Fridlund et al.'s analysis of the film footage of Albert, and on the context within which Watson and Rayner conducted their study. In closing, we return to historical matters to speculate about why historiographical disputes matter and what the story of neurologically impaired Albert might be telling us about the discipline of psychology today.

Nightmare frequency is related to a propensity for mirror behaviors.

We previously reported that college students who indicated engaging in frequent dream-enacting behaviors also scored high on a new measure of mirror behaviors, which is the propensity to imitate another person's emotions or actions. Since dream-enacting behaviors are frequently the culmination of nightmares, one explanation for the observed relationship is that individuals who frequently display mirror behaviors are also prone to nightmares. We used the Mirror Behavior Questionnaire (MBQ) and self-reported frequencies of nightmares to assess this possibility. A sample of 480 students, consisting of 188 males (19.2±1.73 years) and 292 females (19.0±1.55 years) enrolled in a first-year university psychology course, participated for course credit. They completed a battery of questionnaires that included the 16-item MBQ, plus an item about nightmare frequency (NMF) in the past 30 days. NMF scores were split to create low, medium, and high NMF groups. MBQ total scores were significantly higher for female than for male subjects, but an interaction revealed that this was true only for Hi-NMF subjects. MBQ Factor 4, Motor Skill Imitation, paralleled this global interaction for females, whereas MBQ Factor 3, Sleepiness/Anger Contagion, was elevated only for Hi-NMF males. Item analyses indicated that Hi- and Med-NMF females scored higher than Lo-NMF females on the 3 items of Factor 4 that reflect voluntary imitation (imitating famous/cartoon voices, being a physically active spectator, and learning new skills by observing), as well as on 2 other items that reflect involuntary imitation (contagious yawning and self-rated empathy). Although Hi- and Lo-NMF males differed most clearly on the sleepiness item of Factor 3, all 3 items on this factor (including anger contagion and contagious yawning) are plausibly associated with perception of and response to social threat. Results provide evidence that among females nightmares are associated with voluntary and involuntary mirror behaviors during wakefulness, while among males nightmares are associated with threat-related mirror behaviors during wakefulness. They thus support the possibility that the association between mirror behaviors and dream-enacting behaviors is due to a common mirror neuron mechanism that underlies mirror behaviors and nightmares and that involves motor, rather than emotional, resonance. These results have implications for understanding the comorbidity of nightmares and other pathological symptoms such as imitative suicidal behaviors, the influence of observational learning on dissociative symptomatology, and the predominance of threat and aggression in the dream enacting behaviors of REM sleep behavior disorder.

Organism, machine, artifact: The conceptual and normative challenges of synthetic biology.

Synthetic biology is an emerging discipline that aims to apply rational engineering principles in the design and creation of organisms that are exquisitely tailored to human ends. The creation of artificial life raises conceptual, methodological and normative challenges that are ripe for philosophical investigation. This special issue examines the defining concepts and methods of synthetic biology, details the contours of the organism-artifact distinction, situates the products of synthetic biology vis-à-vis this conceptual typology and against historical human manipulation of the living world, and explores the normative implications of these conclusions. In addressing the challenges posed by emerging biotechnologies, new light can be thrown on old problems in the philosophy of biology, such as the nature of the organism, the structure of biological teleology, the utility of engineering metaphors and methods in biological science, and humankind's relationship to nature.