Epidemiology-driven approaches to surveillance in HPAI-vaccinated poultry flocks aiming to demonstrate freedom from circulating HPAIV.

Incursion pressure of high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (HPAIV) by secondary spread among poultry holdings and/or from infected migratory wild bird populations increases worldwide. Vaccination as an additional layer of protection of poultry holdings using appropriately matched vaccines aims at reducing clinical sequelae of HPAIV infection, disrupting HPAIV transmission, curtailing economic losses and animal welfare problems and cutting exposure risks of zoonotic HPAIV at the avian-human interface. Products derived from HPAIV-vaccinated poultry should not impose any risk of virus spread or exposure. Vaccination can be carried out with zero-tolerance for infection in vaccinated herds and must then be flanked by appropriate surveillance which requires tailoring at several levels: (i) Controlling appropriate vaccination coverage and adequate population immunity in individual flocks and across vaccinated populations; (ii) assessing HPAI-infection trends in unvaccinated and vaccinated parts of the poultry population to provide early detection of new/re-emerged HPAIV outbreaks; and (iii) proving absence of HPAIV circulation in vaccinated flocks ideally by real time-monitoring. Surveillance strategies, i.e. selecting targets, tools and random sample sizes, must be accommodated to the specific epidemiologic and socio-economic background. Methodological approaches and practical examples from three countries or territories applying AI vaccination under different circumstances are reviewed here.

Correction: Generation by Reverse Genetics of an Effective, Stable, Live-Attenuated Newcastle Disease Virus Vaccine Based on a Currently Circulating, Highly Virulent Indonesian Strain.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0052751.].

Antigenic variation of clade 2.1 H5N1 virus is determined by a few amino acid substitutions immediately adjacent to the receptor binding site.

UNLABELLED: Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of the H5N1 subtype are genetically highly variable and have diversified into multiple phylogenetic clades over the past decade. Antigenic drift is a well-studied phenomenon for seasonal human influenza viruses, but much less is known about the antigenic evolution of HPAI H5N1 viruses that circulate in poultry. In this study, we focused on HPAI H5N1 viruses that are enzootic to Indonesia. We selected representative viruses from genetically distinct lineages that are currently circulating and determined their antigenic properties by hemagglutination inhibition assays. At least six antigenic variants have circulated between 2003, when H5N1 clade 2.1 viruses were first detected in Indonesia, and 2011. During this period, multiple antigenic variants cocirculated in the same geographic regions. Mutant viruses were constructed by site-directed mutagenesis to represent each of the circulating antigenic variants, revealing that antigenic differences between clade 2.1 viruses were due to only one or very few amino acid substitutions immediately adjacent to the receptor binding site. Antigenic variants of H5N1 virus evaded recognition by both ferret and chicken antibodies. The molecular basis for antigenic change in clade 2.1 viruses closely resembled that of seasonal human influenza viruses, indicating that the hemagglutinin of influenza viruses from different hosts and subtypes may be similarly restricted to evade antibody recognition. IMPORTANCE: Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 viruses are responsible for severe outbreaks in both commercial and backyard poultry, causing considerable economic losses and regular zoonotic transmissions to humans. Vaccination is used increasingly to reduce the burden of HPAI H5N1 virus in poultry. Influenza viruses can escape from recognition by antibodies induced upon vaccination or infection through genetic changes in the hemagglutinin protein. The evolutionary patterns and molecular basis of antigenic change in HPAI H5N1 viruses are poorly understood, hampering formulation of optimal vaccination strategies. We have shown here that HPAI H5N1 viruses in Indonesia diversified into multiple antigenic variants, that antigenic differences were due to one or a very few substitutions near the receptor binding site, and that the molecular basis for antigenic change was remarkably similar to that for seasonal human influenza viruses. These findings have consequences for future vaccination and surveillance considerations and contribute to the understanding of the antigenic evolution of influenza viruses.

Complete genome sequences of Newcastle disease virus strains circulating in chicken populations of Indonesia.

Eight highly virulent Newcastle disease virus (NDV) strains were isolated from vaccinated commercial chickens in Indonesia during outbreaks in 2009 and 2010. The complete genome sequences of two NDV strains and the sequences of the surface protein genes (F and HN) of six other strains were determined. Phylogenetic analysis classified them into two new subgroups of genotype VII in the class II cluster that were genetically distinct from vaccine strains. This is the first report of complete genome sequences of NDV strains isolated from chickens in Indonesia.

Generation by reverse genetics of an effective, stable, live-attenuated newcastle disease virus vaccine based on a currently circulating, highly virulent Indonesian strain.

Newcastle disease virus (NDV) can cause severe disease in chickens. Although NDV vaccines exist, there are frequent reports of outbreaks in vaccinated chickens. During 2009-2010, despite intense vaccination, NDV caused major outbreaks among commercial poultry farms in Indonesia. These outbreaks raised concern regarding the protective immunity of current vaccines against circulating virulent strains in Indonesia. In this study, we investigated whether a recombinant attenuated Indonesian NDV strain could provide better protection against prevalent Indonesian viruses. A reverse genetics system for the highly virulent NDV strain Banjarmasin/010/10 (Ban/010) isolated in Indonesia in 2010 was constructed. The Ban/010 virus is classified in genotype VII of class II NDV, which is genetically distinct from the commercial vaccine strains B1 and LaSota, which belong to genotype II, and shares only 89 and 87% amino acid identity for the protective antigens F and HN, respectively. A mutant virus, named Ban/AF, was developed in which the virulent F protein cleavage site motif "RRQKR↓F" was modified to an avirulent motif "GRQGR↓L" by three amino acid substitutions (underlined). The Ban/AF vaccine virus did not produce syncytia or plaques in cell culture, even in the presence of added protease. Pathogenicity tests showed that Ban/AF was completely avirulent. Ban/AF replicated efficiently during 10 consecutive passages in chickens and remained genetically stable. Serological analysis showed that Ban/AF induced higher neutralization and hemagglutination inhibition antibody titers against the prevalent viruses than the commercial vaccines B1 or LaSota. Both Ban/AF and commercial vaccines provided protection against clinical disease and mortality after challenge with virulent NDV strain Ban/010 (genotype VII) or GB Texas (genotype II). However, Ban/AF significantly reduced challenge virus shedding from the vaccinated birds compared to B1 vaccine. These results suggest that Ban/AF can provide better protection than commercial vaccines and is a promising vaccine candidate against NDV strains circulating in Indonesia.

Minute excretion of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus A/chicken/Indonesia/2003 (H5N1) from experimentally infected domestic pigeons (Columbia livia) and lack of transmission to sentinel chickens.

Five out of sixteen domestic pigeons, inoculated oculo-nasally with a high dose of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus A/chicken/Indonesia/2003 (H5N1), developed clinical signs and neurological lesions leading to death of three pigeons 5-7 days after inoculation [Klopfleisch, R., Werner, O., Mundt, E., Harder, T. & Teifke, J. P. (2006). Vet Pathol 43, 463-470]. H5N1 virus was recovered from all organs sampled from two apparently healthy pigeons at 3 days post-infection and from the three pigeons which died spontaneously. All surviving birds shed virus via the oropharynx and the cloaca at minimal titres and seroconverted. Sentinel chickens reared in direct contact to the pigeons neither developed clinical signs nor seroconverted to the H5N1 virus.