Feasibility, Acceptability, and Barriers to Implementing Select Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions to Reduce the Transmission of Pandemic Influenza - United States, 2019.

OBJECTIVES: This study aimed to assess the feasibility and acceptability of implementing non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) reserved for influenza pandemics (voluntary home quarantine, use of face masks by ill persons, childcare facility closures, school closures, and social distancing at schools, workplaces, and mass gatherings). METHODS: Public health officials in all 50 states (including Washington, DC) and 8 territories, and a random sample of 822 local health departments (LHDs), were surveyed in 2019. RESULTS: The response rates for the states/ territories and LHDs were 75% (44/ 59) and 25% (206/ 822), respectively. Most of the state/ territorial respondents stated that the feasibility and acceptability of implementing NPIs were high, except for K-12 school closures lasting up to 6 weeks or 6 months. The LHD respondents also indicated that feasibility and acceptability were lowest for prolonged school closures. Compared to LHD respondents in suburban or urban areas, those in rural areas expressed lower feasibility and acceptability. Barriers to implementing NPIs included financial impact, compliance and difficulty in enforcement, perceived level of disease threat, and concerns regarding political implications. CONCLUSION: Proactive strategies to systematically address perceived barriers and promote disease prevention ahead of a new pandemic are needed to increase receptivity and consistent adoption of NPIs and other evidence-based countermeasures.

Nonpharmaceutical Interventions for Pandemic Influenza: Communication, Training, and Guidance Needs of Public Health Officials.

OBJECTIVES: The aim of this study was to identify the needs of state, tribal, local, and territorial (STLT) public health officials in communicating, implementing, and monitoring nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an influenza pandemic. METHODS: A Web-based survey collected data from a nonrandom sample of STLT health departments. RESULTS: A total of 267 of 346 public health officials responded (77.2% response rate). STLTs identified the general public, families, childcare programs, K-12 schools, and workplaces as their priority audiences for NPI communication. Training needs included NPI decision-making strategies, triggers for implementing NPIs, and communicating NPI recommendations to families and communities, as well as a more practical orientation and real-world examples of how to incorporate NPI guidance into preparedness and response activities. Information is needed on health messaging for various populations and settings and on the legal authority for implementing specific NPIs. CONCLUSIONS: Future NPI recommendations by CDC should continue to be based on feedback solicited from STLT health departments. To fill identified gaps, CDC used these findings to create NPI guidance and materials to assist in prepandemic planning and preparedness for STLTs and various community settings.

Preventive behaviors adults report using to avoid catching or spreading influenza, United States, 2015-16 influenza season.

INTRODUCTION: Influenza vaccination can prevent influenza and potentially serious influenza-related complications. Although the single best way to prevent influenza is annual vaccination, everyday preventive actions, including good hygiene, health, dietary, and social habits, might help, too. Several preventive measures are recommended, including: avoiding close contact with people who are sick; staying home when sick; covering your mouth and nose when coughing or sneezing; washing your hands often; avoiding touching your eyes, nose, and mouth; and practicing other good health habits like cleaning and disinfecting frequently touched surfaces, getting plenty of sleep, and drinking plenty of fluids. Understanding public acceptance and current usage of these preventive behaviors can be useful for planning both seasonal and pandemic influenza prevention campaigns. This study estimated the percentage of adults in the United States who reported practicing preventive behaviors to avoid catching or spreading influenza, and explored associations of reported behaviors with sociodemographic factors. METHODS: We analyzed data from 2015 National Internet Flu Survey, a nationally representative probability-based Internet panel survey of the non-institutionalized U.S. population ≥18 years. The self-reported behaviors used to avoid catching or spreading influenza were grouped into four and three non-mutually exclusive subgroups, respectively. Weighted proportions were calculated. Multivariable logistic regression models were used to calculate adjusted prevalence differences and to determine independent associations between sociodemographic characteristics and preventive behavior subgroups. RESULTS: Common preventive behaviors reported were: 83.2% wash hands often, 80.0% cover coughs and sneezes, 78.2% stay home if sick with a respiratory illness, 64.4% avoid people sick with a respiratory illness, 51.7% use hand sanitizers, 50.2% get treatment as soon as possible, and 49.8% report getting the influenza vaccination. Race/ethnicity, gender, age, education, income, region, receipt of influenza vaccination, and household size were associated with use of preventive behaviors after controlling for other factors. CONCLUSION: Many adults in the United States reported using preventive behaviors to avoid catching or spreading influenza. Though vaccination is the most important tool available to prevent influenza, the addition of preventive behaviors might play an effective role in reducing or slowing transmission of influenza and complement prevention efforts.

Community Mitigation Guidelines to Prevent Pandemic Influenza - United States, 2017.

When a novel influenza A virus with pandemic potential emerges, nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) often are the most readily available interventions to help slow transmission of the virus in communities, which is especially important before a pandemic vaccine becomes widely available. NPIs, also known as community mitigation measures, are actions that persons and communities can take to help slow the spread of respiratory virus infections, including seasonal and pandemic influenza viruses.These guidelines replace the 2007 Interim Pre-pandemic Planning Guidance: Community Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Mitigation in the United States - Early, Targeted, Layered Use of Nonpharmaceutical Interventions (https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/11425). Several elements remain unchanged from the 2007 guidance, which described recommended NPIs and the supporting rationale and key concepts for the use of these interventions during influenza pandemics. NPIs can be phased in, or layered, on the basis of pandemic severity and local transmission patterns over time. Categories of NPIs include personal protective measures for everyday use (e.g., voluntary home isolation of ill persons, respiratory etiquette, and hand hygiene); personal protective measures reserved for influenza pandemics (e.g., voluntary home quarantine of exposed household members and use of face masks in community settings when ill); community measures aimed at increasing social distancing (e.g., school closures and dismissals, social distancing in workplaces, and postponing or cancelling mass gatherings); and environmental measures (e.g., routine cleaning of frequently touched surfaces).Several new elements have been incorporated into the 2017 guidelines. First, to support updated recommendations on the use of NPIs, the latest scientific evidence available since the influenza A (H1N1)pdm09 pandemic has been added. Second, a summary of lessons learned from the 2009 H1N1 pandemic response is presented to underscore the importance of broad and flexible prepandemic planning. Third, a new section on community engagement has been included to highlight that the timely and effective use of NPIs depends on community acceptance and active participation. Fourth, to provide new or updated pandemic assessment and planning tools, the novel influenza virus pandemic intervals tool, the Influenza Risk Assessment Tool, the Pandemic Severity Assessment Framework, and a set of prepandemic planning scenarios are described. Finally, to facilitate implementation of the updated guidelines and to assist states and localities with prepandemic planning and decision-making, this report links to six supplemental prepandemic NPI planning guides for different community settings that are available online (https://www.cdc.gov/nonpharmaceutical-interventions).

Health department costs of managing persons with suspected and noncounted tuberculosis in New York City, Three Texas counties, and Massachusetts.

OBJECTIVES: To describe persons with suspected (did not meet the national tuberculosis [TB] surveillance case definition) and noncounted TB (met the TB case definition but transferred and were counted by another jurisdiction) and estimate costs incurred by public health departments for managing them. METHODS: We reviewed TB registry, medical records, budgets, bills, salaries, organizational charts, and travel/activity logs from the year 2000 at health departments in New York City (NYC), three Texas (TX) counties (El Paso, Hidalgo, and Webb), and Massachusetts (MA). We also interviewed or observed personnel to estimate the time spent on activities for these patients. RESULTS: In 2000, NYC and MA had more persons with suspected (n = 2,996) and noncounted (n = 163) TB than with counted (n = 1,595) TB. TX counties had more persons with counted TB (n = 179) than with suspected (n = 55) and noncounted (n = 15) TB. Demographic and clinical characteristics varied widely. For persons with suspected TB, NYC spent an estimated $1.7 million, with an average cost of $636 for each person; TX counties spent $60,928 ($1,108 per patient); and MA spent $1.1 million ($3,330 per patient). For persons with noncounted TB, NYC spent $303,148 ($2,180 per patient), TX counties spent $40,002 ($2,667 per patient), and MA spent $84,603 ($3,525 per patient). CONCLUSIONS: Health departments incurred substantial costs in managing persons with suspected and noncounted TB. These costs should be considered when allocating TB program resources.

Applying a new conceptual framework to evaluate tuberculosis surveillance and action performance and measure the costs, Hillsborough County, Florida, 2002.

PURPOSE: Tuberculosis (TB) elimination is an important US public health goal and improving the performance of TB surveillance and action and reducing the costs will help achieve it. But, there exists the need to better evaluate the performance and measure the costs. METHODS: We pilot tested an evaluation strategy in Hillsborough County, Florida using a conceptual framework of TB surveillance and action with eight core and four support activities. To evaluate performance, we developed indicators and validated their accuracy, usefulness, and measurability. To measure the costs, we obtained financial information. RESULTS: In 2001, Hillsborough County reported 78 (7%) of the 1145 Florida TB cases. Nineteen (24%) were previously arrested. While 13 (68%) of the 19 were incarcerated during the 2 years prior to being reported, only 1 (5%) of 19 was reported from the jail. From 111 TB suspects, 219 (25%) of 894 sputum specimens were inadequately collected. Of the $1.08 million annual budget, 22% went for surveillance, 29% for support, and 49% for action. CONCLUSIONS: This conceptual framework allowed measurement of TB surveillance and action performance and cost. The evaluation performed using it revealed missed opportunities for detection of TB cases and wasted resources. This conceptual framework could serve as a model for evaluation of TB surveillance and action.

Tuberculosis contact investigation policies, practices, and challenges in 11 U.S. communities.

To describe the policies and procedures used by 11 urban tuberculosis control programs to conduct contact investigations, written policies were reviewed and semistructured interviews were conducted with program managers and staff. Qualitative analysis showed that contact investigation policies and procedures vary widely. Most policies address risk factor assessment and contact prioritization; however, none of the policies provide comprehensive guidance for the entire process. Staffing patterns vary, but, overall, staff receive little formal training; informal monitoring practices predominate. Comprehensive guidelines and programmatic support are needed to improve the quality of contact investigation processes.

Estimated costs of false laboratory diagnoses of tuberculosis in three patients.

We estimated direct medical and nonmedical costs associated with a false diagnosis of tuberculosis (TB) caused by laboratory cross-contamination of Mycobacterium tuberculosis cultures in Massachusetts in 1998 and 1999. For three patients who received misdiagnoses of active TB disease on the basis of laboratory cross-contamination, the costs totaled U.S. dollars 32618. Of the total, 97% was attributed to the public sector (local and state health departments, public health hospital and laboratory, and county and state correctional facilities); 3% to the private sector (physicians, hospitals, and laboratories); and <1% to the patient. Hospitalizations and inpatient tests, procedures, and TB medications accounted for 69% of costs, and outpatient TB medications accounted for 18%. The average cost per patient was dollars 10873 (range, dollars 1033-dollars 21306). Reducing laboratory cross-contamination and quickly identifying patients with cross-contaminated cultures can prevent unnecessary and potentially dangerous treatment regimens and anguish for the patient and financial burden to the health-care system.