The Role of Subjective Experiences in Conflict Tasks: A Review.

Cognitive control research is concerned with the question how we install adaptive behaviour in the case of (cognitive) conflict. In this review we focus on the role that awareness of this conflict plays in our ability to exert cognitive control. We will argue that visual conflict is not the only building block of metacognitive experiences of conflict and discuss how they are related to cognitive control. So, a first aim of the current review is to understand how these different metacognitive judgements are created. To do so, we draw some remarkable parallels with research on metacognition in decision making and memory research. Next, we elaborate on the relationship between metacognition and adaptive behaviour, with a specific focus on the role of subjective experiences in the Gratton effect. The grey areas that persist in the current literature are highlighted. In addition to deciphering the mechanisms of metacognitive judgements in cognitive control, this overview also aims to further enlarge our understanding of metacognitive abilities at a more general level.

Metacognition and cognitive control: behavioural adaptation requires conflict experience.

Cognitive control allows adapting our behaviour to improve performance. A behavioural signature of cognitive control is the Gratton effect. This effect is observed in conflict tasks and indicates smaller congruency effects after incongruent trials than after congruent trials. Metacognitive experience may play a role in this effect: When participants introspect on their conflict experience, the Gratton effect follows the conflict introspection instead of the stimulus congruency. However this Gratton effect could also be triggered by the labelling that the introspective method implies and/or by a misperception of the stimulus conflict. The current study investigated whether the experiential component of the introspection is necessary to trigger cognitive control or whether labelling a trial as conflicting or not can be sufficient. In a priming task, Gratton effects following metacognitive conflict experience and conflict label were contrasted. Replicating earlier reports, results showed that the metacognitive experience of conflict can trigger a Gratton effect. However a conflict label, either generated by the participants themselves or presented to the participants via feedback was not able to induce cognitive control. Results are discussed in light of current theories of cognitive control.

Introspection of subjective feelings is sensitive and specific.

Conversely to behaviorist ideas, recent studies suggest that introspection can be accurate and reliable. However, an unresolved question is whether people are able to report specific aspects of their phenomenal experience, or whether they report more general nonspecific experiences. To address this question, we investigated the sensitivity and validity of our introspection for different types of conflict. Taking advantage of the congruency sequence effect, we dissociated response conflict while keeping visual conflict unchanged in a Stroop and in a priming task. Participants were subsequently asked to report on either their experience of urge to err or on their feeling of visual conflict. Depending on the focus of the introspection, subjective reports specifically followed either the response conflict or the visual conflict. These results demonstrate that our introspective reports can be sensitive and that we are able to dissociate specific aspects of our phenomenal experiences in a valid manner. (PsycINFO Database Record

Objectifying the subjective: Building blocks of metacognitive experiences in conflict tasks.

Metacognitive appraisals are essential for optimizing our information processing. In conflict tasks, metacognitive appraisals can result from different interrelated features (e.g., motor activity, visual awareness, response speed). Thanks to an original approach combining behavioral and electromyographic measures, the current study objectified the contribution of three features (reaction time [RT], motor hesitation with and without response competition, and visual congruency) to the subjective experience of urge-to-err in a priming conflict task. Both RT and motor hesitation with response competition were major determinants of metacognitive appraisals. Importantly, motor hesitation in absence of response competition and visual congruency had limited effect. Because science aims to rely on objectivity, subjective experiences are often discarded from scientific inquiry. The current study shows that subjectivity can be objectified. (PsycINFO Database Record

Low Hopes, High Expectations: Expectancy Effects and the Replicability of Behavioral Experiments.

This article revisits two classical issues in experimental methodology: experimenter bias and demand characteristics. We report a content analysis of the method section of experiments reported in two psychology journals (Psychological Science and the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology), focusing on aspects of the procedure associated with these two phenomena, such as mention of the presence of the experimenter, suspicion probing, and handling of deception. We note that such information is very often absent, which prevents observers from gauging the extent to which such factors influence the results. We consider the reasons that may explain this omission, including the automatization of psychology experiments, the evolution of research topics, and, most important, a view of research participants as passive receptacles of stimuli. Using a situated social cognition perspective, we emphasize the importance of integrating the social context of experiments in the explanation of psychological phenomena. We illustrate this argument via a controversy on stereotype-based behavioral priming effects.