ABSTRACT
The debate about whether or not animals have foresight has focused on whether animals can be shown to have episodic future thinking, that is the ability to travel mentally in time and see themselves in the future. This focus has distracted from consideration of other forms of foresight that animals demonstrate. We propose a framework for examining future-oriented behaviours and then discuss the evidence for future thinking in animals. In the final section we examine some perspectives of future thinking and suggest that there are future-oriented capabilities of animals that do not involve mental time travel but may yet involve future thinking which deserve further investigation.
Subject(s)
Behavior, Animal/physiology , Cognition/physiology , Concept Formation/physiology , Imagination/physiology , Time Perception/physiology , AnimalsABSTRACT
Knowledge of and planning for the future is a complex skill that is considered by many to be uniquely human. We are not born with it; children develop a sense of the future at around the age of two and some planning ability by only the age of four to five. According to the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis, only humans can dissociate themselves from their current motivation and take action for future needs: other animals are incapable of anticipating future needs, and any future-oriented behaviours they exhibit are either fixed action patterns or cued by their current motivational state. The experiments described here test whether a member of the corvid family, the western scrub-jay (Aphelocoma californica), plans for the future. We show that the jays make provision for a future need, both by preferentially caching food in a place in which they have learned that they will be hungry the following morning and by differentially storing a particular food in a place in which that type of food will not be available the next morning. Previous studies have shown that, in accord with the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis, rats and pigeons may solve tasks by encoding the future but only over very short time scales. Although some primates and corvids take actions now that are based on their future consequences, these have not been shown to be selected with reference to future motivational states, or without extensive reinforcement of the anticipatory act. The results described here suggest that the jays can spontaneously plan for tomorrow without reference to their current motivational state, thereby challenging the idea that this is a uniquely human ability.