Popperian ecology is a delusion.

During the last 50 years, a group of ecologists has repeatedly used Popper's falsificationism in normative claims concerning how research in ecology should be conducted and/or how ecology should be corrected. Other ecologists seem to be dissatisfied with these criticisms. Nevertheless, they have not provided systematic analyses of how and why the Popperian criticisms of ecology fail. I have two aims in this article First, I show how so-called Popperian ecologists have not only failed to use but have misused - if not abused - Popper in their criticisms of ecology. That is, the Popperian criticisms of ecology lack the justification the critics claim it has. Second, I claim that Popper's falsificationism is an unsuitable philosophy of science for ecology. In other words, ecology should not be criticized nor evaluated from the Popperian perspective in the first place.

Myths of past biases and progress in biology.

Two ideas are popular among biologists. The first idea is concerned with the biased nature of biology, especially the idea that biologists have overemphasized the importance of competition in the past. The second idea is concerned with progress in correcting for biases, namely, that the biased nature of biology decreases with time. To test these ideas, data on the popularity of interaction topics, such as competition, predation, and mutualism, was collected from articles published in biology journals. Research biases should be visible in publication data as systematic over- and underemphases regarding the popularity of alternative, viable research topics. Were the two ideas correct, data should show that the popularity of a historically dominant topic(s) diminishes with time, whereas the popularity of historically marginal, alternative topics increases with time. The data show that the two ideas are false. According to publication data, the biased nature of biology increases with time, which is a sign of regress rather than progress in biology.

Multiple realizability and biological laws.

We critically analyze Alexander Rosenberg's argument based on the multiple realizability of biological properties that there are no biological laws. The argument is intuitive and suggestive. Nevertheless, a closer analysis reveals that the argument rests on dubious assumptions about the nature of natural selection, laws of nature, and multiple realizability. We also argue that the argument is limited in scope, since it applies to an outmoded account of laws and the applicability of the argument to other more promising accounts of laws is questionable. Another concern of ours is that the relation between multiple realizability and natural selection is more complex than Rosenberg acknowledges. Finally, we claim that an explanation for why Rosenberg's argument appears persuasive and appealing is that the argument is based on an inflated concept of multiple realizability that rests on unreliable intuitions concerning what counts as a different realization of the same property. Consequently, we argue that the argument is at best inconclusive and at worst false insofar as its implications for the existence of biological laws are concerned.

Causal and mechanistic explanations in ecology.

How are scientific explanations possible in ecology, given that there do not appear to be many-if any-ecological laws? To answer this question, I present and defend an account of scientific causal explanation in which ecological generalizations are explanatory if they are invariant rather than lawlike. An invariant generalization continues to hold or be valid under a special change-called an intervention-that changes the value of its variables. According to this account, causes are difference-makers that can be intervened upon to manipulate or control their effects. I apply the account to ecological generalizations to show that invariance under interventions as a criterion of explanatory relevance provides interesting interpretations for the explanatory status of many ecological generalizations. Thus, I argue that there could be causal explanations in ecology by generalizations that are not, in a strict sense, laws. I also address the issue of mechanistic explanations in ecology by arguing that invariance and modularity constitute such explanations.