Resolving selfish and spiteful interdependent conflict.

Interdependence occurs when individuals have a stake in the success or failure of others, such that the outcomes experienced by one individual also generate costs or benefits for others. Discussion on this topic has typically focused on positive interdependence (where gains for one individual result in gains for another) and on the consequences for cooperation. However, interdependence can also be negative (where gains for one individual result in losses for another), which can spark conflict. In this article, we explain when negative interdependence is likely to arise and, crucially, the role played by (mis)perception in shaping an individual's understanding of their interdependent relationships. We argue that, owing to the difficulty in accurately perceiving interdependence with others, individuals might often be mistaken about the stake they hold in each other's outcomes, which can spark needless, resolvable forms of conflict. We then discuss when and how reducing misperceptions can help to resolve such conflicts. We argue that a key mechanism for resolving interdependent conflict, along with better sources of exogenous information, is to reduce reliance on heuristics such as stereotypes when assessing the nature of our interdependent relationships.

Paranoia and conspiracy thinking.

Paranoia and conspiracy thinking share many risk factors, such as victimization, poverty and social isolation. They also have many phenomenological features in common, including heightened tendency to attribute negative outcomes to malevolent agents and idiosyncratic pattern detection. Nevertheless, paranoia and conspiracy thinking also differ in key respects. Specifically, paranoid thoughts tend to be held in isolation and involve perceptions of harm to the self. Conspiracy beliefs, on the other hand, are shared by others and involve the perception of collective rather than personal harm. We discuss the similarities and differences between paranoia and conspiracy thinking and outline fruitful avenues for future research.

Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game.

Third-party punishment is thought to act as an honest signal of cooperative intent and such signals might escalate when competing to be chosen as a partner. Here, we investigate whether partner choice competition prompts escalating investment in third-party punishment. We also consider the case of signalling via helpful acts to provide a direct test of the relative strength of the two types of signals. Individuals invested more in third-party helping than third-party punishment and invested more in both signals when observed compared to when investments would be unseen. We found no clear effect of partner choice (over and above mere observation) on investments in either punishment or helping. Third-parties who invested more than a partner were preferentially chosen for a subsequent Trust Game although the preference to interact with the higher investor was more pronounced in the help than in the punishment condition. Third-parties who invested more were entrusted with more money and investments in third-party punishment or helping reliably signalled trustworthiness. Individuals who did not invest in third-party helping were more likely to be untrustworthy than those who did not invest in third-party punishment. This supports the conception of punishment as a more ambiguous signal of cooperative intent compared to help.

No good deed goes unpunished: the social costs of prosocial behaviour.

Performing costly helpful behaviours can allow individuals to improve their reputation. Those who gain a good reputation are often preferred as interaction partners and are consequently better able to access support through cooperative relationships with others. However, investing in prosocial displays can sometimes yield social costs: excessively generous individuals risk losing their good reputation, and even being vilified, ostracised or antisocially punished. As a consequence, people frequently try to downplay their prosocial actions or hide them from others. In this review, we explore when and why investments in prosocial behaviour are likely to yield social costs. We propose two key features of interactions that make it more likely that generous individuals will incur social costs when: (a) observers infer that helpful behaviour is motivated by strategic or selfish motives; and (b) observers infer that helpful behaviour is detrimental to them. We describe how the cognition required to consider ulterior motives emerges over development and how these tendencies vary across cultures - and discuss how the potential for helpful actions to result in social costs might place boundaries on prosocial behaviour as well as limiting the contexts in which it might occur. We end by outlining the key avenues and priorities for future research.

An evolutionary perspective on paranoia.

Paranoia is the most common symptom of psychosis but paranoid concerns occur throughout the general population. Here, we argue for an evolutionary approach to paranoia across the spectrum of severity that accounts for its complex social phenomenology - including the perception of conspiracy and selective identification of perceived persecutors - and considers how it can be understood in light of our evolved social cognition. We argue that the presence of coalitions and coordination between groups in competitive situations could favour psychological mechanisms that detect, anticipate and avoid social threats. Our hypothesis makes testable predictions about the environments in which paranoia should be most common as well as the developmental trajectory of paranoia across the lifespan. We suggest that paranoia should not solely be viewed as a pathological symptom of a mental disorder but also as a part of a normally-functioning human psychology.

Punishment: one tool, many uses.

Humans are outstanding in their ability to cooperate with unrelated individuals, and punishment - paying a cost to harm others - is thought to be a key supporting mechanism. According to this view, cooperators punish defectors, who respond by behaving more cooperatively in future interactions. However, a synthesis of the evidence from laboratory and real-world settings casts serious doubts on the assumption that the sole function of punishment is to convert cheating individuals into cooperators. Instead, punishment often prompts retaliation and punishment decisions frequently stem from competitive, rather than deterrent motives. Punishment decisions often reflect the desire to equalise or elevate payoffs relative to targets, rather than the desire to enact revenge for harm received or to deter cheats from reoffending in future. We therefore suggest that punishment also serves a competitive function, where what looks like spiteful behaviour actually allows punishers to equalise or elevate their own payoffs and/or status relative to targets independently of any change in the target's behaviour. Institutions that reduce or remove the possibility that punishers are motivated by relative payoff or status concerns might offer a way to harness these competitive motives and render punishment more effective at restoring cooperation.

Experimentally induced social threat increases paranoid thinking.

The ability to attribute intentions to others is a hallmark of human social cognition but is altered in paranoia. Paranoia is the most common positive symptom of psychosis but is also present to varying degrees in the general population. Epidemiological models suggest that psychosis risk is associated with low social rank and minority status, but the causal effects of status and group affiliation on paranoid thinking remain unclear. We examined whether relative social status and perceived group affiliation, respectively, affect live paranoid thinking using two large-N (N = 2030), pre-registered experiments. Interacting with someone from a higher social rank or a political out-group led to an increase in paranoid attributions of harmful intent for ambiguous actions. Pre-existing paranoia predicted a general increase in harmful intent attribution, but there was no interaction with either type of social threat: highly paranoid people showed the same magnitude of increase as non-paranoid people, although from a higher baseline. We conclude social threat in the form of low social status and out-group status affects paranoid attributions, but ongoing paranoia represents a lowered threshold for detecting social threat rather than an impaired reactivity to it.

Helping in humans and other animals: a fruitful interdisciplinary dialogue.

Humans are arguably unique in the extent and scale of cooperation with unrelated individuals. While pairwise interactions among non-relatives occur in some non-human species, there is scant evidence of the large-scale, often unconditional prosociality that characterizes human social behaviour. Consequently, one may ask whether research on cooperation in humans can offer general insights to researchers working on similar questions in non-human species, and whether research on humans should be published in biology journals. We contend that the answer to both of these questions is yes. Most importantly, social behaviour in humans and other species operates under the same evolutionary framework. Moreover, we highlight how an open dialogue between different fields can inspire studies on humans and non-human species, leading to novel approaches and insights. Biology journals should encourage these discussions rather than drawing artificial boundaries between disciplines. Shared current and future challenges are to study helping in ecologically relevant contexts in order to correctly interpret how payoff matrices translate into inclusive fitness, and to integrate mechanisms into the hitherto largely functional theory. We can and should study human cooperation within a comparative framework in order to gain a full understanding of the evolution of helping.

Paranoia and the social representation of others: a large-scale game theory approach.

Current definitions of paranoia include two key components: unfounded ideas of harm and the idea that the harm is intended by others. However, attributions of harmful intent have been poorly studied and mainly using artificial scenarios rather than participation in genuine social interactions where genuine resources are at stake. Using a large non-clinical population (N = 3229) recruited online, we asked people to complete a measure of paranoid ideation before playing a modified Dictator Game, where the 'dictator' can allocate money to the partner (the 'receiver'). Participants were allocated to the role of receiver or of an uninvolved observer; and evaluated to what extent they believed dictator decisions were motivated by (i) self-interest or (ii) harmful intent. All participants attributed more harmful intent to unfair as opposed to fair dictators. Paranoia had a positive effect on harmful intent attribution, for both fair and unfair dictators. Paranoia did not interact with attributions of self-interest. Importantly, highly paranoid participants attributed equally strong harmful intent to the dictator in the observer role as in the receiver role. This challenges the assumption that paranoia is mainly due to an exaggerated sense of personalised threat and suggests instead that paranoia involves a negative social representations of others.

Children are sensitive to norms of giving.

People across societies engage in costly sharing, but the extent of such sharing shows striking cultural variation, highlighting the importance of local norms in shaping generosity. Despite this acknowledged role for norms, it is unclear when they begin to exert their influence in development. Here we use a Dictator Game to investigate the extent to which 4- to 9-year-old children are sensitive to selfish (give 20%) and generous (give 80%) norms. Additionally, we varied whether children were told how much other children give (descriptive norm) or what they should give according to an adult (injunctive norm). Results showed that children generally gave more when they were exposed to a generous norm. However, patterns of compliance varied with age. Younger children were more likely to comply with the selfish norm, suggesting a licensing effect. By contrast, older children were more influenced by the generous norm, yet capped their donations at 50%, perhaps adhering to a pre-existing norm of equality. Children were not differentially influenced by descriptive or injunctive norms, suggesting a primacy of norm content over norm format. Together, our findings indicate that while generosity is malleable in children, normative information does not completely override pre-existing biases.

Exploring the trade-off between quality and fairness in human partner choice.

Partner choice is an important force underpinning cooperation in humans and other animals. Nevertheless, the mechanisms individuals use to evaluate and discriminate among partners who vary across different dimensions are poorly understood. Generally, individuals are expected to prefer partners who are both able and willing to invest in cooperation but how do individuals prioritize the ability over willingness to invest when these characteristics are opposed to one another? We used a modified Dictator Game to tackle this question. Choosers evaluated partners varying in quality (proxied by wealth) and fairness, in conditions when wealth was relatively stable or liable to change. When both partners were equally fair (or unfair), choosers typically preferred the richer partner. Nevertheless, when asked to choose between a rich-stingy and a poor-fair partner, choosers prioritized fairness over wealth-with this preference being particularly pronounced when wealth was unstable. The implications of these findings for real-world partner choice are discussed.

Exploring the Motivations for Punishment: Framing and Country-Level Effects.

Identifying the motives underpinning punishment is crucial for understanding its evolved function. In principle, punishment of distributional inequality could be motivated by the desire to reciprocate losses ('revenge') or by the desire to reduce payoff asymmetries between the punisher and the target ('inequality aversion'). By separating these two possible motivations, recent work suggests that punishment is more likely to be motivated by disadvantageous inequality aversion than by a desire for revenge. Nevertheless, these findings have not consistently replicated across different studies. Here, we suggest that considering country of origin-previously overlooked as a possible source of variation in responses-is important for understanding when and why individuals punish one another. We conducted a two-player stealing game with punishment, using data from 2,400 subjects recruited from the USA and India. US-based subjects punished in response to losses and disadvantageous inequality, but seldom invested in antisocial punishment (defined here as punishment of non-stealing partners). India-based subjects, on the other hand, punished at higher levels than US-based subjects and, so long as they did not experience disadvantageous inequality, punished stealing and non-stealing partners indiscriminately. Nevertheless, as in the USA, when stealing resulted in disadvantageous inequality, India-based subjects punished stealing partners more than non-stealing partners. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that variation in punitive behavior varies across societies, and support the idea that punishment might sometimes function to improve relative status, rather than to enforce cooperation.

Power Asymmetries and Punishment in a Prisoner's Dilemma with Variable Cooperative Investment.

In many two-player games, players that invest in punishment finish with lower payoffs than those who abstain from punishing. These results question the effectiveness of punishment at promoting cooperation, especially when retaliation is possible. It has been suggested that these findings may stem from the unrealistic assumption that all players are equal in terms of power. However, a previous empirical study which incorporated power asymmetries into an iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game failed to show that power asymmetries stabilize cooperation when punishment is possible. Instead, players cooperated in response to their partner cooperating, and punishment did not yield any additional increase in tendency to cooperate. Nevertheless, this previous study only allowed an all-or-nothing-rather than a variable-cooperation investment. It is possible that power asymmetries increase the effectiveness of punishment from strong players only when players are able to vary their investment in cooperation. We tested this hypothesis using a modified IPD game which allowed players to vary their investment in cooperation in response to being punished. As in the previous study, punishment from strong players did not increase cooperation under any circumstances. Thus, in two-player games with symmetric strategy sets, punishment does not appear to increase cooperation.

Competitive helping in online giving.

Unconditional generosity in humans is a puzzle. One possibility is that individuals benefit from being seen as generous if there is competition for access to partners and if generosity is a costly-and therefore reliable-signal of partner quality [1-3]. The "competitive helping" hypothesis predicts that people will compete to be the most generous, particularly in the presence of attractive potential partners [1]. However, this key prediction has not been directly tested. Using data from online fundraising pages, we demonstrate competitive helping in the real world. Donations to fundraising pages are public and made sequentially. Donors can therefore respond to the behavior of previous donors, creating a potential generosity tournament. Our test of the competitive helping hypothesis focuses on the response to large, visible donations. We show that male donors show significantly stronger responses (by donating more) when they are donating to an attractive female fundraiser and responding to a large donation made by another male donor. The responses for this condition are around four times greater than when males give to less-attractive female (or male) fundraisers or when they respond to a large donation made by a female donor. Unlike males, females do not compete in donations when giving to attractive male fundraisers. These data suggest that males use competitive helping displays in the presence of attractive females and suggest a role for sexual selection in explaining unconditional generosity.

Why humans might help strangers.

Humans regularly help strangers, even when interactions are apparently unobserved and unlikely to be repeated. Such situations have been simulated in the laboratory using anonymous one-shot games (e.g., prisoner's dilemma) where the payoff matrices used make helping biologically altruistic. As in real-life, participants often cooperate in the lab in these one-shot games with non-relatives, despite that fact that helping is under negative selection under these circumstances. Two broad explanations for such behavior prevail. The "big mistake" or "mismatch" theorists argue that behavior is constrained by psychological mechanisms that evolved predominantly in the context of repeated interactions with known individuals. In contrast, the cultural group selection theorists posit that humans have been selected to cooperate in anonymous one-shot interactions due to strong between-group competition, which creates interdependence among in-group members. We present these two hypotheses before discussing alternative routes by which humans could increase their direct fitness by cooperating with strangers under natural conditions. In doing so, we explain why the standard lab games do not capture real-life in various important aspects. First, asymmetries in the cost of perceptual errors regarding the context of the interaction (one-shot vs. repeated; anonymous vs. public) might have selected for strategies that minimize the chance of making costly behavioral errors. Second, helping strangers might be a successful strategy for identifying other cooperative individuals in the population, where partner choice can turn strangers into interaction partners. Third, in contrast to the assumptions of the prisoner's dilemma model, it is possible that benefits of cooperation follow a non-linear function of investment. Non-linear benefits result in negative frequency dependence even in one-shot games. Finally, in many real-world situations individuals are able to parcel investments such that a one-shot interaction is turned into a repeated game of many decisions.

Third-party punishers are rewarded, but third-party helpers even more so.

Punishers can benefit from a tough reputation, where future partners cooperate because they fear repercussions. Alternatively, punishers might receive help from bystanders if their act is perceived as just and other-regarding. Third-party punishment of selfish individuals arguably fits these conditions, but it is not known whether third-party punishers are rewarded for their investments. Here, we show that third-party punishers are indeed rewarded by uninvolved bystanders. Third parties were presented with the outcome of a dictator game in which the dictator was either selfish or fair and were allocated to one of three treatments in which they could choose to do nothing or (1) punish the dictator, (2) help the receiver, or (3) choose between punishment and helping, respectively. A fourth player (bystander) then sees the third-party's decision and could choose to reward the third party or not. Third parties that punished selfish dictators were more likely to be rewarded by bystanders than third parties that took no action in response to a selfish dictator. However, helpful third parties were rewarded even more than third-party punishers. These results suggest that punishment could in principle evolve via indirect reciprocity, but also provide insights into why individuals typically prefer to invest in positive actions.

The reputation of punishers.

Punishment is a potential mechanism to stabilise cooperation between self-regarding agents. Theoretical and empirical studies on the importance of a punitive reputation have yielded conflicting results. Here, we propose that a variety of factors interact to explain why a punitive reputation is sometimes beneficial and sometimes harmful. We predict that benefits are most likely to occur in forced play scenarios and in situations where punishment is the only means to convey an individual's cooperative intent and willingness to uphold fairness norms. By contrast, if partner choice is possible and an individual's cooperative intent can be inferred directly, then individuals with a nonpunishing cooperative reputation should typically be preferred over punishing cooperators.

The effect of power asymmetries on cooperation and punishment in a prisoner's dilemma game.

Recent work has suggested that punishment is detrimental because punishment provokes retaliation, not cooperation, resulting in lower overall payoffs. These findings may stem from the unrealistic assumption that all players are equal: in reality individuals are expected to vary in the power with which they can punish defectors. Here, we allowed strong players to interact with weak players in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game with punishment. Defecting players were most likely to switch to cooperation if the partner cooperated: adding punishment yielded no additional benefit and, under some circumstances, increased the chance that the partner would both defect and retaliate against the punisher. Our findings show that, in a two-player game, cooperation begets cooperation and that punishment does not seem to yield any additional benefits. Further work should explore whether strong punishers might prevail in multi-player games.

The proximate-ultimate confusion in teaching and cooperation.

Kline does an admirable job of extending the functionalist framework developed by comparative researchers to help understand the function and form of human teaching. Functionalist approaches consider the adaptive value and underlying mechanisms of behaviour as separate but complementary questions, avoiding the conflation of ultimate and proximate explanations that has long hindered research on teaching and other forms of cooperation.

Dictator Game Giving: The Importance of Descriptive versus Injunctive Norms.

Human behaviour is influenced by social norms but norms can entail two types of information. Descriptive norms refer to what others do in this context, while injunctive norms refer to what ought to be done to ensure social approval. In many real-world situations these norms are often presented concurrently meaning that their independent effects on behaviour are difficult to establish. Here we used an online Dictator Game to test how descriptive and injunctive norms would influence dictator donations when presented independently of one another. In addition, we varied the cost of complying with the norm: By stating that $0.20 or $0.50 cent donations from a $1 stake were normal or suggested, respectively. Specifying a higher target amount was associated with increased mean donation size. In contrast to previous studies, descriptive norms did not seem to influence giving behaviour in this context, whereas injunctive norms were associated with increased likelihood to give at least the target amount to the partner. This raises the question of whether injunctive norms might be more effective than descriptive norms at promoting prosocial behaviour in other settings.