Assessment of Ebola virus disease preparedness in the WHO South-East Asia Region.

OBJECTIVE: To conduct assessments of Ebola virus disease preparedness in countries of the World Health Organization (WHO) South-East Asia Region. METHODS: Nine of 11 countries in the region agreed to be assessed. During February to November 2015 a joint team from WHO and ministries of health conducted 4-5 day missions to Bangladesh, Bhutan, Indonesia, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Timor-Leste. We collected information through guided discussions with senior technical leaders and visits to hospitals, laboratories and airports. We assessed each country's Ebola virus disease preparedness on 41 tasks under nine key components adapted from the WHO Ebola preparedness checklist of January 2015. FINDINGS: Political commitment to Ebola preparedness was high in all countries. Planning was most advanced for components that had been previously planned or tested for influenza pandemics: multilevel and multisectoral coordination; multidisciplinary rapid response teams; public communication and social mobilization; drills in international airports; and training on personal protective equipment. Major vulnerabilities included inadequate risk assessment and risk communication; gaps in data management and analysis for event surveillance; and limited capacity in molecular diagnostic techniques. Many countries had limited planning for a surge of Ebola cases. Other tasks needing improvement included: advice to inbound travellers; adequate isolation rooms; appropriate infection control practices; triage systems in hospitals; laboratory diagnostic capacity; contact tracing; and danger pay to staff to ensure continuity of care. CONCLUSION: Joint assessment and feedback about the functionality of Ebola virus preparedness systems help countries strengthen their core capacities to meet the International Health Regulations.

Switch from oral to inactivated poliovirus vaccine in Yogyakarta Province, Indonesia: summary of coverage, immunity, and environmental surveillance.

BACKGROUND: Inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) is rarely used in tropical developing countries. To generate additional scientific information, especially on the possible emergence of vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) in an IPV-only environment, we initiated an IPV introduction project in Yogyakarta, an Indonesian province. In this report, we present the coverage, immunity, and VDPV surveillance results. METHODS: In Yogyakarta, we established environmental surveillance starting in 2004; and conducted routine immunization coverage and seroprevalence surveys before and after a September 2007 switch from oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) to IPV, using standard coverage and serosurvey methods. Rates and types of polioviruses found in sewage samples were analyzed, and all poliovirus isolates after the switch were sequenced. RESULTS: Vaccination coverage (>95%) and immunity (approximately 100%) did not change substantially before and after the IPV switch. No VDPVs were detected. Before the switch, 58% of environmental samples contained Sabin poliovirus; starting 6 weeks after the switch, Sabin polioviruses were rarely isolated, and if they were, genetic sequencing suggested recent introductions. CONCLUSIONS: This project demonstrated that under almost ideal conditions (good hygiene, maintenance of universally high IPV coverage, and corresponding high immunity against polioviruses), no emergence and circulation of VDPV could be detected in a tropical developing country setting.

A large vaccine-derived poliovirus outbreak on Madura Island--Indonesia, 2005.

Between June and October 2005, 45 laboratory-confirmed type 1 vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) cases were identified on Madura Island in Indonesia. Genetic sequencing data on VDPV isolates were consistent with replication and circulation for up to approximately 2 years. Concurrent circulation with type 1 wild poliovirus (WPV) enabled comparisons of VDPV and WPV cases and found that clinical and epidemiological features of both were similar. Attack rates for VDPV were as high as those for WPV. Of 41 VDPV case patients with known vaccination status, 25 (61%) had received zero oral polio vaccine (OPV) doses. Low population immunity due to low routine OPV coverage in rural areas and the absence of WPV circulation for more than a decade were major predisposing factors for the emergence of VDPV. Suboptimal surveillance and a limited initial immunization response may have contributed to widespread circulation. Sensitive surveillance and prompt high-quality immunization responses are recommended to prevent the spread of VDPVs.