ABSTRACT
In the Fall of 2020, many universities saw extensive transmission of SARS-CoV-2 among their populations, threatening the health of students, faculty and staff, the viability of in-person instruction, and the health of surrounding communities.1, 2 Here we report that a multimodal "SHIELD: Target, Test, and Tell" program mitigated the spread of SARS-CoV-2 at a large public university, prevented community transmission, and allowed continuation of in-person classes amidst the pandemic. The program combines epidemiological modelling and surveillance (Target); fast and frequent testing using a novel and FDA Emergency Use Authorized low-cost and scalable saliva-based RT-qPCR assay for SARS-CoV-2 that bypasses RNA extraction, called covidSHIELD (Test); and digital tools that communicate test results, notify of potential exposures, and promote compliance with public health mandates (Tell). These elements were combined with masks, social distancing, and robust education efforts. In Fall 2020, we performed more than 1,000,000 covidSHIELD tests while keeping classrooms, laboratories, and many other university activities open. Generally, our case positivity rates remained less than 0.5%, we prevented transmission from our students to our faculty and staff, and data indicate that we had no spread in our classrooms or research laboratories. During this fall semester, we had zero COVID-19-related hospitalizations or deaths amongst our university community. We also prevented transmission from our university community to the surrounding Champaign County community. Our experience demonstrates that multimodal transmission mitigation programs can enable university communities to achieve such outcomes until widespread vaccination against COVID-19 is achieved, and provides a roadmap for how future pandemics can be addressed.
ABSTRACT
The dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 replication and shedding in humans remain poorly understood. We captured the dynamics of infectious virus and viral RNA shedding during acute infection through daily longitudinal sampling of 60 individuals for up to 14 days. By fitting mechanistic models, we directly estimate viral reproduction and clearance rates, and overall infectiousness for each individual. Significant person-to-person variation in infectious virus shedding suggests that individual-level heterogeneity in viral dynamics contributes to superspreading. Viral genome load often peaked days earlier in saliva than in nasal swabs, indicating strong compartmentalization and suggesting that saliva may serve as a superior sampling site for early detection of infection. Viral loads and clearance kinetics of B.1.1.7 and non-B.1.1.7 viruses in nasal swabs were indistinguishable, however B.1.1.7 exhibited a significantly slower pre-peak growth rate in saliva. These results provide a high-resolution portrait of SARS-CoV-2 infection dynamics and implicate individual-level heterogeneity in infectiousness in superspreading.
ABSTRACT
What is already known about this topic?Diagnostic tests and sample types for SARS-CoV-2 vary in sensitivity across the infection period. What is added by this report?We show that both RTqPCR (from nasal swab and saliva) and the Quidel SARS Sofia FIA rapid antigen tests peak in sensitivity during the period in which live virus can be detected in nasal swabs, but that the sensitivity of RTqPCR tests rises more rapidly in the pre-infectious period. We also use empirical data to estimate the sensitivities of RTqPCR and antigen tests as a function of testing frequency. What are the implications for public health practice?RTqPCR tests will be more effective than rapid antigen tests at identifying infected individuals prior to or early during the infectious period and thus for minimizing forward transmission (provided results reporting is timely). All modalities, including rapid antigen tests, showed >94% sensitivity to detect infection if used at least twice per week. Regular surveillance/screening using rapid antigen tests 2-3 times per week can be an effective strategy to achieve high sensitivity (>95%) for identifying infected individuals.