Test-retest reliability of eye tracking measures in a computerized Trail Making Test.

The Trail Making Test (TMT) is a frequently applied neuropsychological test that evaluates participants' executive functions based on their time to connect a sequence of numbers (TMT-A) or alternating numbers and letters (TMT-B). Test performance is associated with various cognitive functions ranging from visuomotor speed to working memory capabilities. However, although the test can screen for impaired executive functioning in a variety of neuropsychiatric disorders, it provides only little information about which specific cognitive impairments underlie performance detriments. To resolve this lack of specificity, recent cognitive research combined the TMT with eye tracking so that eye movements could help uncover reasons for performance impairments. However, using eye-tracking-based test scores to examine differences between persons, and ultimately apply the scores for diagnostics, presupposes that the reliability of the scores is established. Therefore, we investigated the test-retest reliabilities of scores in an eye-tracking version of the TMT recently introduced by Recker et al. (2022). We examined two healthy samples performing an initial test and then a retest 3 days (n = 31) or 10 to 30 days (n = 34) later. Results reveal that, although reliabilities of classic completion times were overall good, comparable with earlier versions, reliabilities of eye-tracking-based scores ranged from excellent (e.g., durations of fixations) to poor (e.g., number of fixations guiding manual responses). These findings indicate that some eye-tracking measures offer a strong basis for assessing interindividual differences beyond classic behavioral measures when examining processes related to information accumulation processes but are less suitable to diagnose differences in eye-hand coordination.

Warning signals only support the first action in a sequence.

Acting upon target stimuli from the environment becomes faster when the targets are preceded by a warning (alerting) cue. Accordingly, alerting is often used to support action in safety-critical contexts (e.g., honking to alert others of a traffic situation). Crucially, however, the benefits of alerting for action have been established using laboratory tasks assessing only simple choice reactions. Real-world actions are considerably more complex and mainly consist of sensorimotor sequences of several sub-actions. Therefore, it is still unknown if the benefits of alerting for action transfer from simple choice reactions to such sensorimotor sequences. Here, we investigated how alerting affected performance in a sequential action task derived from the Trail-Making-Test, a well-established neuropsychological test of cognitive action control (Experiment 1). In addition to this task, participants performed a classic alerting paradigm including a simple choice reaction task (Experiment 2). Results showed that alerting sped up responding in both tasks, but in the sequential action task, this benefit was restricted to the first action of a sequence. This was the case, even when multiple actions were performed within a short time (Experiment 3), ruling out that the restriction of alerting to the first action was due to its short-lived nature. Taken together, these findings reveal the existence of an interface between phasic alertness and action control that supports the next action.

Emphasizing speed or accuracy in an eye-tracking version of the Trail-Making-Test: Towards experimental diagnostics for decomposing executive functions.

The Trail-Making-Test (TMT) is one of the most widely used neuropsychological tests for assessing executive functions, the brain functions underlying cognitively controlled thought and action. Obtaining a number of test scores at once, the TMT allows to characterize an assortment of executive functions efficiently. Critically, however, as most test scores are derived from test completion times, the scores only provide a summary measure of various cognitive control processes. To address this problem, we extended the TMT in two ways. First, using a computerized eye-tracking version of the TMT, we added specific eye movement measures that deliver a richer set of data with a higher degree of cognitive process specificity. Second, we included an experimental manipulation of a fundamental executive function, namely participants' ability to emphasize speed or accuracy in task performance. Our study of healthy participants showed that eye movement measures differed between TMT conditions that are usually compared to assess the cognitive control process of alternating between task sets for action control. This demonstrates that eye movement measures are indeed sensitive to executive functions implicated in the TMT. Crucially, comparing performance under cognitive control sets of speed vs. accuracy emphasis revealed which test scores primarily varied due to this manipulation (e.g., trial duration, number of fixations), and which were still more sensitive to other differences between individuals (e.g., fixation duration, saccade amplitude). This provided an experimental construct validation of the test scores by distinguishing scores primarily reflecting the executive function of emphasizing speed vs. accuracy and those independent from it. In sum, both the inclusion of eye movement measures and of the experimental manipulation of executive functions in the TMT enabled a more specific interpretation of the TMT in terms of cognitive functions and mechanisms, which offers more precise diagnoses in clinical applications and basic research.

Transsaccadic object associations shape peripheral perception: The role of reliability.

Faced with inhomogeneous representations, the visual system has to rely on pre- and postsaccadic processing mechanisms to assure perceptual continuity across eye movements. While postsaccadically, memorized peripheral and postsaccadic foveal information are integrated according to their reliabilities, here we investigated whether this also holds true for the presaccadic combination of peripheral input and internal associated foveal images. In three experiments, participants learned associations between objects changing transsaccadically in one feature dimension (spatial frequency in Experiment 1 and color in Experiments 2 and 3). Subsequently, participants judged the respective feature of only peripherally presented objects. Importantly, the reliability of this peripheral input was manipulated by lowering the contrast (Experiment 1) or adding color noise (Experiment 3). We hypothesized that participants' presaccadic peripheral percepts would be biased toward the internal associated foveal image and that the biasing effect would be stronger the lower the peripheral reliability. In all experiments, perception was biased in the direction of the associated foveal image. However, the strength of the bias did not differ between reliability conditions. The presaccadic perceptual bias effect had previously not been tested with the feature color. By showing that yet another feature incorporates prior transsaccadic knowledge, our results highlight the scope of the effect. Furthermore, they point to important differences between pre- and postsaccadic processing mechanisms. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).