ABSTRACT
AbstractDefault positions, predetermined starting points that aid in complex decision-making, are common in clinical medicine. In this article, we identify and critically examine common default positions in clinical ethics practice. Whether default positions ought to be held is an important normative question, but here we are primarily interested in the descriptive, rather than normative, properties of default positions. We argue that default positions in clinical ethics function to protect and promote important values in medicine-respect for persons, utility, and justice. Further, default positions in clinical ethics may also guard against harm. Where default positions exist, there are epistemic burdens to overturn them. The person wishing to reject the default position, rather than the person endorsing it, bears this burden. The person who bears the burden of meeting the epistemic requirements must provide evidence proportional to the degree of harm the default position protects against. Default positions that protect against significant harm impose significant epistemic requirements to overturn. This asymmetry not only makes medical decision-making more economical but also serves to promote and protect certain values. The identification and analysis of common and recognizable default positions can help to identify other default positions and the conditions under which their associated epistemic requirements are met. The article concludes with considerations of potential problems with the use of default positions in clinical ethics.
Subject(s)
Ethics, Clinical , HumansABSTRACT
Integrated behavioral health models of care offer many benefits for patient experience and outcomes. However, multidisciplinary teams are comprised of professionals who each may have different professional norms and ethical obligations, which may at times be in conflict. This article offers a framework for negotiating potential conflicts between professional norms and expectations across disciplines involved in integrated behavioral health teams.
Subject(s)
Delivery of Health Care , Mental Health Services , Pediatrics , Quality of Health Care , Child , Clinical Competence , Delivery of Health Care/ethics , Delivery of Health Care/standards , Ethics, Medical , Humans , Mental Health Services/ethics , Mental Health Services/standards , Patient Care Team/ethics , Patient Care Team/standards , Pediatrics/ethics , Pediatrics/standards , Professionalism/ethics , Professionalism/standards , Quality of Health Care/ethics , Quality of Health Care/standardsABSTRACT
One of the more draining aspects of being a clinical ethicist is dealing with the emotions of patients, family members, as well as healthcare providers. Generally, by the time a clinical ethicist is called into a case, stress levels are running high, patience is low, and interpersonal communication is strained. Management of this emotional burden of clinical ethics is an underexamined aspect of the profession and academic literature. The emotional nature of doing clinical ethics consultation may be better addressed by utilizing concepts and tools from clinical psychology. Management of countertransference, the natural emotional reaction by the therapist toward the patient, is a widely discussed topic in the psychotherapeutic literature. This concept can be adapted to the clinical ethics encounter by broadening it beyond the patient-therapist relationship to refer to the ethics consultant's emotional response toward the patient, the family, or other members the healthcare team. Further, it may aid the consultant because a recognition of the source and nature of these reactions can help maintain 'critical distance' and minimize bias in the same way that a psychologist maintains neutrality in psychotherapy. This paper will offer suggestions on how to manage these emotional responses and their burden in the clinical ethics encounter, drawing upon techniques and strategies recommended in the psychotherapeutic literature. Using these techniques may improve consultation outcomes and reduce the emotional burden on the clinical ethicist.
Subject(s)
Countertransference , Ethicists , Ethics Consultation , Emotions , Humans , Intention , Physician-Patient Relations/ethicsABSTRACT
Despite the lack of evidence for the effectiveness of physical restraints, their use in patients is widespread. The best ethical justification for restraining patients is that it prevents them from harming themselves. We argue that even if the empirical evidence supported their effectiveness in achieving this aim, the use of restraints would nevertheless be unethical, so long as well-known exceptions to informed consent fail to apply. Specifically, we argue that ethically justifiable restraint use demands certain necessary and sufficient conditions. These conditions are that the physician obtained informed consent for their application, that their application be medically appropriate, and that restraints be the least liberty-restricting way of achieving the intended benefit. It is a further question whether their application is ever medically appropriate, given the dearth of evidence for their effectiveness.
Subject(s)
Clinical Decision-Making/ethics , Restraint, Physical , Accident Prevention , Humans , Informed Consent/ethics , Informed Consent/standards , Restraint, Physical/ethics , Restraint, Physical/methods , Risk AssessmentSubject(s)
Expert Testimony , Mental Disorders/diagnosis , Politics , Societies , Guidelines as Topic , Humans , United StatesABSTRACT
In its simplest interpretation, this is a case about goals of care and appropriate code status. At the outset, we must confess that we found this case to be extremely interesting-not for the novelty of the issues or its ethical complexity but because it is truly a case of the ordinary. Too often when teaching or discussing clinical ethics cases, we are distracted by the exotic and the unusual and ignore the mundane cases that every practicing clinical ethicist must be able to competently manage. 1,2,3.
