The Role of Burden and Deviation in Ostracizing Others.

Ostracism (being excluded and ignored) is a painful experience, so why do individuals ostracize others? Previous research suggests individuals often ostracize those who are deviate, but not always. We posit that there may be two types of deviation, burdensome and non-burdensome, and the former is most likely to be ostracized. Study 1 manipulated burdensome deviation by programming a group member to perform more slowly (8 or 16 sec.) than others (4 sec.) in a virtual ball-toss game. Participants perceived slower players as more burdensome and deviate than normal speed players. Additionally, participants ostracized (gave fewer ball tosses to) the slowest player. Study 2 examined participant responses to both burdensome deviation (8- and 16-sec. players) and non-burdensome deviation (goth appearance). Participants again perceived the slower players to be burdensome and deviate, and ostracized them. They perceived the goth player to be deviate but not burdensome and did not ostracize this player.

Perceptions of intentionality for goal-related action: behavioral description matters.

Perceptions of intentionality critically guide everyday social interactions, though the literature provides diverging portraits of how such judgments are made. One view suggests that people have an "intentionality bias," predisposing them toward labeling behaviors as intentional. A second view focuses on a more complex pattern of reasoning whereby judgments of intentionality are shaped by information about social context and mental states. Drawing on the theory of action-identification, we attempt to integrate these two perspectives. We propose that people parse intentionality into two categories: judgments about concrete, low-level behaviors and judgments about relatively more abstract, high-level behaviors. Evidence from five studies supports this distinction. Low-level behaviors were perceived as intentional regardless of mental state information, supporting the "intentionality bias" view. In contrast, judgments about the intentionality of high-level behaviors varied depending on social context and mental states, supporting the systematic view of intentionality.

The influence of social norms upon behavioral expressions of implicit and explicit weight-related stigma in an interactive game.

This research explored the roles of social influence and stigma-related attitudes in how people behaved toward an overweight female in an interactive computer game. Photographs were used to manipulate whether one of the players in the game was overweight or average weight. We found that both explicit and implicit anti-fat attitudes influenced interactions with an overweight player, but only when other players ostracized the overweight player, not when they included her. Under conditions of ostracism, explicit attitudes were better predictors of more controllable behaviors, while implicit attitudes were better predictors of more automatic behaviors.

The infection of bad company: stigma by association.

Stigma by association represents the process through which the companions of stigmatized persons are discredited. Conduits for stigma by association range from the strong and enduring bonds of kinship to the arbitrary occasions of being seen in the company of someone who is stigmatized. A theoretical model is proposed in which both deliberative and spontaneous processes result in the spread of stigma to the companions of stigmatized persons. Support for this model was found across 3 studies that examined how explicit and implicit stigma-relevant attitudes moderate stigma-by-association effects. When social relationships were meaningful (e.g., kinship), both explicit and implicit attitudes moderated the devaluation of stigmatized persons' companions. On the other hand, when social relationships appeared coincidental only implicit attitudes moderated companion devaluation.

Impressions of Milgram's obedient teachers: situational cues inform inferences about motives and traits.

The research investigated impressions formed of a "teacher" who obeyed an experimenter by delivering painful electric shocks to an innocent person (S. Milgram, 1963, 1974). Three findings emerged across different methodologies and different levels of experimenter-induced coercion. First, contrary to conventional wisdom, perceivers both recognized and appreciated situational forces, such as the experimenter's orders that prompted the aggression. Second, perceivers' explanations of the teacher's behavior focused on the motive of obedience (i.e., wanting to appease the experimenter) rather than on hurtful (or evil) motivation. Despite this overall pattern, perceptions of hurtful versus helpful motivation varied as a function of information regarding the level of coercion applied by the experimenter. Finally, theoretically important relationships were revealed among perceptions of situations, motives, and traits. In particular, situational cues (such as aspects of the experimenter's behavior) signaled the nature of the teacher's motives, which in turn informed inferences of the teacher's traits. Overall, the findings pose problems for the lay dispositionism perspective but fit well with multiple inference models of dispositional inference.

Dual psychological processes underlying public stigma and the implications for reducing stigma.

People with serious illness or disability are often burdened with social stigma that promotes a cycle of poverty via unemployment, inadequate housing and threats to mental health. Stigma may be conceptualized in terms of self-stigma (e.g., shame and lowered self-esteem) or public stigma (e.g., the general public's prejudice towards the stigmatized). This article examines two psychological processes that underlie public stigma: associative processes and rule-based processes. Associative processes are quick and relatively automatic whereas rule-based processes take longer to manifest themselves and involve deliberate thinking. Associative and rule-based thinking require different assessment instruments, follow a different time course and lead to different effects (e.g., stigma-by-association vs attributional processing that results in blame). Of greatest importance is the fact that each process may require a different stigma-prevention strategy.

On attributing negative motives to others who disagree with our opinions.

The research explores the tendency for people to attribute negative motives to others who hold an attitude position that is discrepant from their own. In Studies 1 and 2, American and Canadian respondents indicated their perceptions of U.S. President Bush's motives for initiating war in Iraq. Consistent with the proposed bias, respondents who disagreed with the war attributed more selfish motivations than did those who supported the war. Study 3 revealed a similar bias when respondents rated the motives of the general citizenry concerning their attitudes about the war, and Study 4 provided evidence of the bias on different attitudinal issues (e.g., abortion and gay marriage). Study 4 also indicated that biased attributions of motive were primarily confined to respondents who were highly involved in the attitude issue. Discussion centers on naïve realism, social identity concerns, and attitude justification as relevant underlying theoretical factors.

A dual-process model of reactions to perceived stigma.

The authors propose a theoretical model of individual psychological reactions to perceived stigma. This model suggests that 2 psychological systems may be involved in reactions to stigma across a variety of social contexts. One system is primarily reflexive, or associative, whereas the other is rule based, or reflective. This model assumes a temporal pattern of reactions to the stigmatized, such that initial reactions are governed by the reflexive system, whereas subsequent reactions or "adjustments" are governed by the rule-based system. Support for this model was found in 2 studies. Both studies examined participants' moment-by-moment approach-avoidance reactions to the stigmatized. The 1st involved participants' reactions to persons with HIV/AIDS, and the 2nd, participants' reactions to 15 different stigmatizing conditions.

Dispositional attribution: multiple inferences about motive-related traits.

This research views dispositional inference as a process whereby perceivers integrate multiple inferences about a target person's motives and traits. The findings suggest that although perceived motives may stimulate extra attributional processing (S. Fein, 1996), the content of the inferred motive is important as well. Perceivers learned about situational forces implying that a target person had free choice, no choice, or an ulterior motive for helpful behavior. Inferences about the target's helpfulness differed depending on whether the target's behavior was attributed to an obedience motive (no-choice condition) or to a selfish motive (ulterior-motive condition). In general, inferences about motives were more predictive of dispositional inferences than were global causal attributions (to situational vs. dispositional forces) or base rate assumptions.

Inferences about the morality of an aggressor: the role of perceived motive.

The research investigated perceivers' inferences about the morality of target persons who engaged in aggressive behavior. Across several experiments, inferences about the morality of an aggressor were based more on the perceived motives of the target than on the presence of facilitating situational forces. For example, when a target's aggression was facilitated by personal rewards for aggression (instrumental aggression), perceivers inferred more negative motives and attributed lower morality to the target than when the target's aggression was facilitated by situational provocation (reactive aggression). The results suggest that perceived motives play an important role in dispositional inference and pose a problem for models that focus primarily on perceived causality, assumptions about base rates (consensus), or diagnosticity.