Death-row organ donation, revisited.

In 2011, bioethicists turned their attention to the question of whether prisoners on death row ought to be allowed to be organ donors. The discussion began with a provocative anti-procurement article by Arthur Caplan and prompted responses from an impressive lineup of commentators. In the 10 years since, the situation for death-row inmates seeking to donate has hardly changed: U.S. prison authorities consistently refuse to allow death-row procurement. We believe that it is time to revisit the issue. While Caplan's commentators rebutted his narrow contention that organ procurement would undermine the goals of deterrence and retribution, none of them attempted to make a positive, nonconsequentialist case for organ donation as a right of death-row inmates. That is the task we take up in this paper. After sketching and briefly defending a theory of punishment, we show how denial of organ donation is inconsistent with punishment's basic logic.

Dignity and the Founding Myth of Bioethics.

In this article, I reject the "principlism" of Tom Beauchamp and James Childress and argue that respect for autonomy is, and ought to be, the fundamental value of bioethics. To do so, I offer a reconstruction of what I call the field's "founding myth," a genealogy that affords primacy to the right to be respected as a human being with dignity. Next, I examine the relationship between this basic right and a derivative right of autonomy. I suggest that principlism has promulgated an uncharitable understanding of respect for autonomy, one that ensures that the principle cannot occupy the central position I claim for it. Finally, I sketch a more plausible understanding of respect for autonomy and explore its implications.

Are conscientious objectors morally obligated to refer?

In this paper, we argue that providers who conscientiously refuse to provide legal and professionally accepted medical care are not always morally required to refer their patients to willing providers. Indeed, we will argue that refusing to refer is morally admirable in certain instances. In making the case, we show that belief in a sweeping moral duty to refer depends on an implicit assumption that the procedures sanctioned by legal and professional norms are ethically permissible. Focusing on examples of female genital cutting, clitoridectomy and 'normalizing' surgery for children with intersex traits, we argue that this assumption is untenable and that providers are not morally required to refer when refusing to perform genuinely unethical procedures. The fact that acceptance of our thesis would force us to face the challenge of distinguishing between ethical and unethical medical practices is a virtue. This is the central task of medical ethics, and we must confront it rather than evade it.

The Ethics of Elective Growth Hormone Therapy in Children with Idiopathic Short Stature.

In this article, we analyze the ethics of elective growth hormone (GH) therapy in children with idiopathic short stature (ISS). We discuss recent clinical research regarding the efficacy, side-effects, and risks of GH therapy, and argue that GH therapy is ethically unjustifiable for most children with ISS.

Ethical Considerations in Vaccine Allocation.

In an effort to establish a consensus position on the ethical principles and ideals that should guide vaccine allocation during the Covid-19 pandemic, various organizations, including the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine, released sample allocation frameworks to help guide government entities charged with distributing vaccine doses. One area of agreement among these reports is that front line health care workers, especially those who come into regular contact with Covid-19 patients, ought to be afforded highest priority. But this convergence, though significant, raises questions concerning the ethics of vaccine distribution among those highest-priority health care workers: If a hospital has inadequate supply to vaccinate its entire workforce, which of its essential workers should it prioritize? In this paper, we begin with a general overview of ethical questions of vaccine administration before narrowing our focus to some of the most pressing theoretical and practical issues hospital officials must face in building justifiable and actionable frameworks for vaccinating their workers. We discuss and assess some potential ambitions of hospital allocation plans, concentrating especially on the goal of protecting the community from catastrophic loss of life. Finally, we consider some specific questions hospitals will encounter when developing distribution guidelines that aim to realize this aspiration.

The need for a unified ethical stance on child genital cutting.

The American College of Nurse-Midwives, American Society for Pain Management Nursing, American Academy of Pediatrics, and other largely US-based medical organizations have argued that at least some forms of non-therapeutic child genital cutting, including routine penile circumcision, are ethically permissible even when performed on non-consenting minors. In support of this view, these organizations have at times appealed to potential health benefits that may follow from removing sexually sensitive, non-diseased tissue from the genitals of such minors. We argue that these appeals to "health benefits" as a way of justifying medically unnecessary child genital cutting practices may have unintended consequences. For example, it may create a "loophole" through which certain forms of female genital cutting-or female genital "mutilation" as it is defined by the World Health Organization-could potentially be legitimized. Moreover, by comparing current dominant Western attitudes toward female genital "mutilation" and so-called intersex genital "normalization" surgeries (i.e. surgeries on children with certain differences of sex development), we show that the concept of health invoked in each case is inconsistent and culturally biased. It is time for Western healthcare organizations-including the American College of Nurse-Midwives, American Society for Pain Management Nursing, American Academy of Pediatrics, and World Health Organization-to adopt a more consistent concept of health and a unified ethical stance when it comes to child genital cutting practices.

Tolerance for Uncertainty and Professional Development: a Normative Analysis.

Scholars from a range of disciplines including medicine, sociology, psychology, and philosophy have addressed the concepts of ambiguity and uncertainty in medical practice and training. Most of this scholarship has been descriptive, focusing on defining and measuring ambiguity and uncertainty tolerance or tracking clinicians' responses to ambiguous and uncertain situations. Meanwhile, scholars have neglected some fundamental normative questions: Is tolerance of uncertainty good; if so, to what extent? Using a philosophical approach to these questions, we show that neither tolerance nor intolerance of uncertainty is necessarily a good or bad trait. Rather, both tolerance and intolerance of uncertainty can give physicians advantages while at the same time exposing them to pitfalls in clinical practice. After making this case, we argue that cultivating certain virtues-like courage, diligence, and curiosity-could help clinicians avoid the dangers of excessive tolerance and intolerance of uncertainty. Finally, we suggest that medical educators develop curricula and career counseling beginning with matriculation and proceeding through specialty choice and residency training that explicitly address trainees' responses to clinical uncertainty. These programs should encourage trainees, students and residents, to be mindful of their reactions to uncertainty and help them develop virtues that will allow them to avoid the hazards of extreme tolerance or intolerance of uncertainty.

Understanding Autonomy: An Urgent Intervention.

In this paper, I argue that the principle of respect for autonomy can serve as the basis for laws that significantly limit conduct, including orders mandating isolation and quarantine. This thesis is fundamentally at odds with an overwhelming consensus in contemporary bioethics that the principle of respect for autonomy, while important in everyday clinical encounters, must be 'curtailed', 'constrained', or 'overridden' by other principles in times of crisis. I contend that bioethicists have embraced an indefensibly 'thin' notion of autonomy that uproots the concept from its foundations in Kantian ethics. According to this thin conception, respect for autonomy, if unconditioned by competing principles (beneficence, justice, non-maleficence) would give competent adults the right to do anything they desired to do so long as they satisfied certain baseline psychological conditions. I argue that the dominant 'principlist' model of bioethical reasoning depends on this thin view of autonomy and show how it deprives us of powerful analytical tools that would help us to think seriously about the foundations of human rights, justice, and law. Then, I offer a brief sketch of a 'thick', historically grounded notion of autonomy and show what we could gain by taking it seriously.

What 'Just Culture' doesn't understand about just punishment.

Recent years have seen the rise of 'Just Culture' as an ideal in the patient safety movement, with numerous hospitals and professional organisations adopting a Just Culture response to incidents ranging from non-culpable human error to intentional misconduct. This paper argues that there is a deep problem with the Just Culture model, resulting from its impoverished understanding of the value of punitive, fundamentally backward-looking, practices of holding people accountable. I show that the kind of 'accountability' and 'punishment' contemporary Just Culture advocates endorse disrespects both patients and providers. I claim, first, that punishment is good because it respects participants in the healthcare system by restoring an equilibrium of social and moral status that wrongdoing disturbs, and, second, that it only does so when it communicates a backward-looking message of resentful blame.

Freezing Eggs and Creating Patients: Moral Risks of Commercialized Fertility.

There's no doubt that reproductive technologies can transform lives for the better. Infertile couples and single, lesbian, gay, intersex, and transgender people have the potential to form families in ways that would have been inconceivable years ago. Yet we are concerned about the widespread commercialization of certain egg-freezing programs, the messages they propagate about motherhood, the way they blur the line between care and experimentation, and the manipulative and exaggerated marketing that stretches the truth and inspires false hope in women of various ages. We argue that although reproductive technology, and egg freezing in particular, promise to improve women's care by offering more choices to achieve pregnancy and childbearing, they actually have the potential to be disempowering. First, commercial motives in the fertility industry distort women's medical deliberations, thereby restricting their autonomy; second, having the option to freeze their eggs can change the meaning of women's reproductive choices in a way that is limiting rather than liberating.

Are Physicians Blameworthy for Iatrogenic Harm Resulting from Unnecessary Genital Surgeries?

We argue that physicians should, in certain cases, be held accountable by patients and their families for harm caused by "successful" genital surgeries performed for social and aesthetic reasons. We explore the question of physicians' blameworthiness for three types of genital surgeries common in the United States. First, we consider surgeries performed on newborns and toddlers with atypical sex development, or intersex. Second, we discuss routine neonatal male circumcision. Finally, we consider cosmetic vaginal surgery. It is important for physicians not just to know when and why to perform genital surgery, but also to understand how their patients might react to wrongful performance of these procedures. Equally, physicians should know how to respond to their own blameworthiness in socially productive and morally restorative ways.