Cause typicality and the continued influence effect.

A large body of research has focused on whether and how readers update their knowledge of events when an initial piece of causal information is corrected. These studies have indicated that corrections can reduce, but do not eliminate, readers' reliance on the initial cause when drawing inferences or making decisions about the events (i.e., the continued influence effect). Additional studies suggest that supplementing a correction with an alternative cause can further reduce reliance on discredited initial causes. In three experiments, we interrogated the importance of cause typicality for the generalizable utility of these correction strategies by manipulating the typicality of initial and alternative causes. We found evidence that participants showed greater reliance on a typical than an atypical initial cause both before and after correction, but no consistent evidence that this typicality impacted the effectiveness of the correction. Furthermore, the typicality of the alternative causes used to supplement a correction did not seem to matter with respect to updating. These results highlight the importance that characteristics of an initial cause can have for event encodings and corrections, identifying critical boundary conditions for understanding the effects of corrections on knowledge revision and the continued influence effect. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Does evaluating belief prior to its retraction influence the efficacy of later corrections?

News stories unfold over time, with initial reports sometimes containing mistaken accounts of the newsworthy outcome that are ultimately revised or corrected. Because facts associated with newsworthy events are accumulated in this piecemeal fashion, readers often have repeated opportunities to reflect upon, discuss, and evaluate their belief in these accounts before they learn that initial news reports have been revised or retracted. The primary goal of the present study was to assess whether rating the strength of one's belief in the initially reported, mistaken cause might influence the efficacy of a later correction. In the current study, participants evaluated their belief in the target cause by either rating how much they believed it caused the outcome (Experiment 1) or rating the probability that the target caused the outcome (Experiment 2). The results showed that evaluating belief in a target cause prior to its retraction (relative to not doing so) rendered the correction more effective. This enhanced correction effect was not observed when participants generated the target information prior to its retraction (Experiment 3). Collectively, the results suggest that it is not how much people believe something, but whether they have thought about why they do or do not believe it, that affects their later willingness to revise their mistaken beliefs.

Belief in corrective feedback for common misconceptions: Implications for knowledge revision.

When correcting a common misconception, it seems likely that for corrective feedback to be effective, it needs to be believed. In 2 experiments, we assessed how participants' belief in the validity of corrective feedback regarding individual misconceptions influenced knowledge revision. After responding about the validity of a set of misconceptions, participants received either a refutation alone (feedback that they were correct or incorrect) or a refutation accompanied by a supporting explanation, and then rated their belief in the corrective feedback. One week later, participants once again responded about the validity of the misconceptions. Across both experiments, participants corrected their misconceptions more often when they believed the corrective feedback. In addition, participants corrected their misconceptions more often when they had earlier received a refutation with a supporting explanation than when they had received the refutation only. This benefit of supportive explanations on knowledge revision was mediated by belief in the feedback, suggesting that explanations enhance the effectiveness of a correction by increasing belief in the feedback. These findings imply that successful correction of common misconceptions is likely enhanced by techniques that increase people's belief in the validity of the corrective feedback. (PsycINFO Database Record

Analyzing Confabulations in Schizophrenia and Healthy Participants.

OBJECTIVES: Confabulations occur in schizophrenia and certain severe neuropsychiatric conditions, and to a lesser degree in healthy individuals. The present study used a forced confabulation paradigm to assess differences in confabulation between schizophrenia patients and healthy controls. METHODS: Schizophrenia patients (n=60) and healthy control participants (n=19) were shown a video with missing segments, asked to fill in the gaps with speculations, and tested on their memory for the story. Cognitive functions and severity of symptoms were also evaluated. RESULTS: Schizophrenia patients generated significantly more confabulations than healthy control participants and had a greater tendency to generate confabulations that were related to each other. Schizophrenic confabulations were positively associated with temporal context confusions and formal thought disorder, and negatively with delusions. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings show that the schizophrenia patients generate more confabulations than healthy controls and schizophrenic confabulations are associated with positive symptoms. (JINS, 2016, 22, 911-919).

Does reactivating a witnessed memory increase its susceptibility to impairment by subsequent misinformation?

In a recent PNAS article, Chan and LaPaglia (2013) provided arguments and evidence to support the claim that reactivating a witnessed memory (by taking a test) renders the memory labile and susceptible to impairment by subsequent misinformation. In the current article, we argue that Chan and LaPaglia's (2013) findings are open to alternative interpretations, and further test the hypothesis that reactivation increases a witnessed memory's susceptibility to impairment. To this end, the current studies used a different set of materials and a different measure of memory impairment, the Modified Recognition Test (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985). In Experiment 1a, we established that our reactivation manipulation was effective by showing that we could replicate the well-established retrieval enhanced suggestibility effect with our materials. However, when we assessed potential impairment of the witnessed memory with the Modified Recognition Test (Experiments 1a and 1b), we failed to find evidence that reactivating the witnessed memory prior to misinformation impaired memory for the originally witnessed event. In Experiment 2, we replicated Chan and LaPaglia's (2013) findings when we used their memory impairment measure (misinformation-free True/False Recognition Test) and showed why that test does not permit clear inferences about memory impairment. Collectively, the results showed that, although the reactivation manipulation increased susceptibility to suggestion (i.e., as evidenced by increased reporting of suggested misinformation), there was no evidence that reactivation through testing increased the original memory's susceptibility to impairment.

The continued influence of implied and explicitly stated misinformation in news reports.

The piecemeal reporting of unfolding news events can lead to the reporting of mistaken information (or misinformation) about the cause of the newsworthy event, which later needs to be corrected. Studies of the continued influence effect have shown, however, that corrections are not entirely effective in reversing the effects of initial misinformation. Instead, participants continue to rely on the discredited misinformation when asked to draw inferences and make judgments about the news story. Most prior studies have employed misinformation that explicitly states the likely cause of an outcome. However, news stories do not always provide misinformation explicitly, but instead merely imply that something or someone might be the cause of an adverse outcome. Two experiments employing both direct and indirect measures of misinformation reliance were conducted to assess whether implied misinformation is more resistant to correction than explicitly stated misinformation. The results supported this prediction. Experiment 1 showed that corrections reduced misinformation reliance in both the explicit and implied conditions, but the correction was much less effective following implied misinformation. Experiment 2 showed that implied misinformation was more resistant to correction than explicit misinformation, even when the correction was paired with an alternative explanation. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that greater resistance to correction in the implied misinformation condition did not reflect greater disbelief in the correction. Potential reasons why implied misinformation is more difficult to correct than explicitly provided misinformation are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record