Orthogonal neural encoding of targets and distractors supports multivariate cognitive control.

The complex challenges of our mental life require us to coordinate multiple forms of neural information processing. Recent behavioural studies have found that people can coordinate multiple forms of attention, but the underlying neural control process remains obscure. We hypothesized that the brain implements multivariate control by independently monitoring feature-specific difficulty and independently prioritizing feature-specific processing. During functional MRI, participants performed a parametric conflict task that separately tags target and distractor processing. Consistent with feature-specific monitoring, univariate analyses revealed spatially segregated encoding of target and distractor difficulty in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex. Consistent with feature-specific attentional priority, our encoding geometry analysis revealed overlapping but orthogonal representations of target and distractor coherence in the intraparietal sulcus. Coherence representations were mediated by control demands and aligned with both performance and frontoparietal activity, consistent with top-down attention. Together, these findings provide evidence for the neural geometry necessary to coordinate multivariate cognitive control.

Humans reconfigure target and distractor processing to address distinct task demands.

When faced with distraction, we can focus more on goal-relevant information (targets) or focus less on goal-conflicting information (distractors). How people use cognitive control to distribute attention across targets and distractors remains unclear. We address this question by developing a novel Parametric Attentional Control Task that can "tag" participants' sensitivity to target and distractor information. We use these precise measures of attention to develop a novel process model that can explain how participants control attention toward targets and distractors. Across three experiments, we find that participants met the demands of this task by independently controlling their processing of target and distractor information, exhibiting distinct adaptations to manipulations of incentives and conflict. Whereas incentives preferentially led to target enhancement, conflict in the previous trial preferentially led to distractor suppression. These distinct drivers of control altered sensitivity to targets and distractors early in the trial, promptly followed by reactive reconfiguration toward task-appropriate feature sensitivity. To provide a process-level account of these empirical findings, we develop a novel neural network model of evidence accumulation with attractor dynamics over feature weights that reconfigure target and distractor processing. These results provide a computational account of control reconfiguration that provides new insights into how multivariate attentional signals are optimized to achieve task goals. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Parametric Cognitive Load Reveals Hidden Costs in the Neural Processing of Perfectly Intelligible Degraded Speech.

Speech is often degraded by environmental noise or hearing impairment. People can compensate for degradation, but this requires cognitive effort. Previous research has identified frontotemporal networks involved in effortful perception, but materials in these works were also less intelligible, and so it is not clear whether activity reflected effort or intelligibility differences. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to assess the degree to which spoken sentences were processed under distraction and whether this depended on speech quality even when intelligibility of degraded speech was matched to that of clear speech (close to 100%). On each trial, male and female human participants either attended to a sentence or to a concurrent multiple object tracking (MOT) task that imposed parametric cognitive load. Activity in bilateral anterior insula reflected task demands; during the MOT task, activity increased as cognitive load increased, and during speech listening, activity increased as speech became more degraded. In marked contrast, activity in bilateral anterior temporal cortex was speech selective and gated by attention when speech was degraded. In this region, performance of the MOT task with a trivial load blocked processing of degraded speech, whereas processing of clear speech was unaffected. As load increased, responses to clear speech in these areas declined, consistent with reduced capacity to process it. This result dissociates cognitive control from speech processing; substantially less cognitive control is required to process clear speech than is required to understand even very mildly degraded, 100% intelligible speech. Perceptual and control systems clearly interact dynamically during real-world speech comprehension.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Speech is often perfectly intelligible even when degraded, for example, by background sound, phone transmission, or hearing loss. How does degradation alter cognitive demands? Here, we use fMRI to demonstrate a novel and critical role for cognitive control in the processing of mildly degraded but perfectly intelligible speech. We compare speech that is matched for intelligibility but differs in putative control demands, dissociating cognitive control from speech processing. We also impose a parametric cognitive load during perception, dissociating processes that depend on tasks from those that depend on available capacity. Our findings distinguish between frontal and temporal contributions to speech perception and reveal a hidden cost to processing mildly degraded speech, underscoring the importance of cognitive control for everyday speech comprehension.

Humans can navigate complex graph structures acquired during latent learning.

Humans appear to represent many forms of knowledge in associative networks whose nodes are multiply connected, including sensory, spatial, and semantic. Recent work has shown that explicitly augmenting artificial agents with such graph-structured representations endows them with more human-like capabilities of compositionality and transfer learning. An open question is how humans acquire these representations. Previously, it has been shown that humans can learn to navigate graph-structured conceptual spaces on the basis of direct experience with trajectories that intentionally draw the network contours (Schapiro, Kustner, & Turk-Browne, 2012; Schapiro, Turk-Browne, Botvinick, & Norman, 2016), or through direct experience with rewards that covary with the underlying associative distance (Wu, Schulz, Speekenbrink, Nelson, & Meder, 2018). Here, we provide initial evidence that this capability is more general, extending to learning to reason about shortest-path distances across a graph structure acquired across disjoint experiences with randomized edges of the graph - a form of latent learning. In other words, we show that humans can infer graph structures, assembling them from disordered experiences. We further show that the degree to which individuals learn to reason correctly and with reference to the structure of the graph corresponds to their propensity, in a separate task, to use model-based reinforcement learning to achieve rewards. This connection suggests that the correct acquisition of graph-structured relationships is a central ability underlying forward planning and reasoning, and may be a core computation across the many domains in which graph-based reasoning is advantageous.

Cognitive Control as a Multivariate Optimization Problem.

A hallmark of adaptation in humans and other animals is our ability to control how we think and behave across different settings. Research has characterized the various forms cognitive control can take-including enhancement of goal-relevant information, suppression of goal-irrelevant information, and overall inhibition of potential responses-and has identified computations and neural circuits that underpin this multitude of control types. Studies have also identified a wide range of situations that elicit adjustments in control allocation (e.g., those eliciting signals indicating an error or increased processing conflict), but the rules governing when a given situation will give rise to a given control adjustment remain poorly understood. Significant progress has recently been made on this front by casting the allocation of control as a decision-making problem. This approach has developed unifying and normative models that prescribe when and how a change in incentives and task demands will result in changes in a given form of control. Despite their successes, these models, and the experiments that have been developed to test them, have yet to face their greatest challenge: deciding how to select among the multiplicity of configurations that control can take at any given time. Here, we will lay out the complexities of the inverse problem inherent to cognitive control allocation, and their close parallels to inverse problems within motor control (e.g., choosing between redundant limb movements). We discuss existing solutions to motor control's inverse problems drawn from optimal control theory, which have proposed that effort costs act to regularize actions and transform motor planning into a well-posed problem. These same principles may help shed light on how our brains optimize over complex control configuration, while providing a new normative perspective on the origins of mental effort.

Dissociable influences of reward and punishment on adaptive cognitive control.

To invest effort into any cognitive task, people must be sufficiently motivated. Whereas prior research has focused primarily on how the cognitive control required to complete these tasks is motivated by the potential rewards for success, it is also known that control investment can be equally motivated by the potential negative consequence for failure. Previous theoretical and experimental work has yet to examine how positive and negative incentives differentially influence the manner and intensity with which people allocate control. Here, we develop and test a normative model of control allocation under conditions of varying positive and negative performance incentives. Our model predicts, and our empirical findings confirm, that rewards for success and punishment for failure should differentially influence adjustments to the evidence accumulation rate versus response threshold, respectively. This dissociation further enabled us to infer how motivated a given person was by the consequences of success versus failure.

Bridging Motor and Cognitive Control: It's About Time!

Is how we control our thoughts similar to how we control our movements? Egger et al. show that the neural dynamics underlying the control of internal states exhibit similar algorithmic properties as those that control movements. This experiment reveals a promising connection between how we control our brain and our body.

Dissociable Forms of Uncertainty-Driven Representational Change Across the Human Brain.

Environmental change can lead decision makers to shift rapidly among different behavioral regimes. These behavioral shifts can be accompanied by rapid changes in the firing pattern of neural networks. However, it is unknown what the populations of neurons that participate in such "network reset" phenomena are representing. Here, we investigated the following: (1) whether and where rapid changes in multivariate activity patterns are observable with fMRI during periods of rapid behavioral change and (2) what types of representations give rise to these phenomena. We did so by examining fluctuations in multivoxel patterns of BOLD activity from male and female human subjects making sequential inferences about the state of a partially observable and discontinuously changing variable. We found that, within the context of this sequential inference task, the multivariate patterns of activity in a number of cortical regions contain representations that change more rapidly during periods of uncertainty following a change in behavioral context. In motor cortex, this phenomenon was indicative of discontinuous change in behavioral outputs, whereas in visual regions, the same basic phenomenon was evoked by tracking of salient environmental changes. In most other cortical regions, including dorsolateral prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortex, the phenomenon was most consistent with directly encoding the degree of uncertainty. However, in a few other regions, including orbitofrontal cortex, the phenomenon was best explained by representations of a shifting context that evolve more rapidly during periods of rapid learning. These representations may provide a dynamic substrate for learning that facilitates rapid disengagement from learned responses during periods of change.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Brain activity patterns tend to change more rapidly during periods of uncertainty and behavioral adjustment, yet the computational role of such rapid transitions is poorly understood. Here, we identify brain regions with fMRI BOLD activity patterns that change more rapidly during periods of behavioral adjustment and use computational modeling to attribute the phenomenon to specific causes. We demonstrate that the phenomenon emerges in different brain regions for different computational reasons, the most common being the representation of uncertainty itself, but that, in a selective subset of regions including orbitofrontal cortex, the phenomenon was best explained as a shifting latent state signal that may serve to control the degree to which recent temporal context affects ongoing expectations.

A Control Theoretic Model of Adaptive Learning in Dynamic Environments.

To behave adaptively in environments that are noisy and nonstationary, humans and other animals must monitor feedback from their environment and adjust their predictions and actions accordingly. An understudied approach for modeling these adaptive processes comes from the engineering field of control theory, which provides general principles for regulating dynamical systems, often without requiring a generative model. The proportional-integral-derivative (PID) controller is one of the most popular models of industrial process control. The proportional term is analogous to the "delta rule" in psychology, adjusting estimates in proportion to each error in prediction. The integral and derivative terms augment this update to simultaneously improve accuracy and stability. Here, we tested whether the PID algorithm can describe how people sequentially adjust their predictions in response to new information. Across three experiments, we found that the PID controller was an effective model of participants' decisions in noisy, changing environments. In Experiment 1, we reanalyzed a change-point detection experiment and showed that participants' behavior incorporated elements of PID updating. In Experiments 2-3, we developed a task with gradual transitions that we optimized to detect PID-like adjustments. In both experiments, the PID model offered better descriptions of behavioral adjustments than both the classical delta-rule model and its more sophisticated variant, the Kalman filter. We further examined how participants weighted different PID terms in response to salient environmental events, finding that these control terms were modulated by reward, surprise, and outcome entropy. These experiments provide preliminary evidence that adaptive learning in dynamic environments resembles PID control.