Artificial neural networks for model identification and parameter estimation in computational cognitive models.

Computational cognitive models have been used extensively to formalize cognitive processes. Model parameters offer a simple way to quantify individual differences in how humans process information. Similarly, model comparison allows researchers to identify which theories, embedded in different models, provide the best accounts of the data. Cognitive modeling uses statistical tools to quantitatively relate models to data that often rely on computing/estimating the likelihood of the data under the model. However, this likelihood is computationally intractable for a substantial number of models. These relevant models may embody reasonable theories of cognition, but are often under-explored due to the limited range of tools available to relate them to data. We contribute to filling this gap in a simple way using artificial neural networks (ANNs) to map data directly onto model identity and parameters, bypassing the likelihood estimation. We test our instantiation of an ANN as a cognitive model fitting tool on classes of cognitive models with strong inter-trial dependencies (such as reinforcement learning models), which offer unique challenges to most methods. We show that we can adequately perform both parameter estimation and model identification using our ANN approach, including for models that cannot be fit using traditional likelihood-based methods. We further discuss our work in the context of the ongoing research leveraging simulation-based approaches to parameter estimation and model identification, and how these approaches broaden the class of cognitive models researchers can quantitatively investigate.

Artificial neural networks for model identification and parameter estimation in computational cognitive models.

Computational cognitive models have been used extensively to formalize cognitive processes. Model parameters offer a simple way to quantify individual differences in how humans process information. Similarly, model comparison allows researchers to identify which theories, embedded in different models, provide the best accounts of the data. Cognitive modeling uses statistical tools to quantitatively relate models to data that often rely on computing/estimating the likelihood of the data under the model. However, this likelihood is computationally intractable for a substantial number of models. These relevant models may embody reasonable theories of cognition, but are often under-explored due to the limited range of tools available to relate them to data. We contribute to filling this gap in a simple way using artificial neural networks (ANNs) to map data directly onto model identity and parameters, bypassing the likelihood estimation. We test our instantiation of an ANN as a cognitive model fitting tool on classes of cognitive models with strong inter-trial dependencies (such as reinforcement learning models), which offer unique challenges to most methods. We show that we can adequately perform both parameter estimation and model identification using our ANN approach, including for models that cannot be fit using traditional likelihood-based methods. We further discuss our work in the context of the ongoing research leveraging simulation-based approaches to parameter estimation and model identification, and how these approaches broaden the class of cognitive models researchers can quantitatively investigate.

Transition dynamics shape mental state concepts.

People have a unique ability to represent other people's internal thoughts and feelings-their mental states. Mental state knowledge has a rich conceptual structure, organized along key dimensions, such as valence. People use this conceptual structure to guide social interactions. How do people acquire their understanding of this structure? Here we investigate an underexplored contributor to this process: observation of mental state dynamics. Mental states-including both emotions and cognitive states-are not static. Rather, the transitions from one state to another are systematic and predictable. Drawing on prior cognitive science, we hypothesize that these transition dynamics may shape the conceptual structure that people learn to apply to mental states. Across nine behavioral experiments (N = 1,439), we tested whether the transition probabilities between mental states causally shape people's conceptual judgments of those states. In each study, we found that observing frequent transitions between mental states caused people to judge them to be conceptually similar. Computational modeling indicated that people translated mental state dynamics into concepts by embedding the states as points within a geometric space. The closer two states are within this space, the greater the likelihood of transitions between them. In three neural network experiments, we trained artificial neural networks to predict real human mental state dynamics. The networks spontaneously learned the same conceptual dimensions that people use to understand mental states. Together these results indicate that mental state dynamics-and the goal of predicting them-shape the structure of mental state concepts. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Age-related differences in prefrontal glutamate are associated with increased working memory decay that gives the appearance of learning deficits.

The ability to use past experience to effectively guide decision-making declines in older adulthood. Such declines have been theorized to emerge from either impairments of striatal reinforcement learning systems (RL) or impairments of recurrent networks in prefrontal and parietal cortex that support working memory (WM). Distinguishing between these hypotheses has been challenging because either RL or WM could be used to facilitate successful decision-making in typical laboratory tasks. Here we investigated the neurocomputational correlates of age-related decision-making deficits using an RL-WM task to disentangle these mechanisms, a computational model to quantify them, and magnetic resonance spectroscopy to link them to their molecular bases. Our results reveal that task performance is worse in older age, in a manner best explained by working memory deficits, as might be expected if cortical recurrent networks were unable to sustain persistent activity across multiple trials. Consistent with this, we show that older adults had lower levels of prefrontal glutamate, the excitatory neurotransmitter thought to support persistent activity, compared to younger adults. Individuals with the lowest prefrontal glutamate levels displayed the greatest impairments in working memory after controlling for other anatomical and metabolic factors. Together, our results suggest that lower levels of prefrontal glutamate may contribute to failures of working memory systems and impaired decision-making in older adulthood.

Choice Type Impacts Human Reinforcement Learning.

In reinforcement learning (RL) experiments, participants learn to make rewarding choices in response to different stimuli; RL models use outcomes to estimate stimulus-response values that change incrementally. RL models consider any response type indiscriminately, ranging from more concretely defined motor choices (pressing a key with the index finger), to more general choices that can be executed in a number of ways (selecting dinner at the restaurant). However, does the learning process vary as a function of the choice type? In Experiment 1, we show that it does: Participants were slower and less accurate in learning correct choices of a general format compared with learning more concrete motor actions. Using computational modeling, we show that two mechanisms contribute to this. First, there was evidence of irrelevant credit assignment: The values of motor actions interfered with the values of other choice dimensions, resulting in more incorrect choices when the correct response was not defined by a single motor action; second, information integration for relevant general choices was slower. In Experiment 2, we replicated and further extended the findings from Experiment 1 by showing that slowed learning was attributable to weaker working memory use, rather than slowed RL. In both experiments, we ruled out the explanation that the difference in performance between two condition types was driven by difficulty/different levels of complexity. We conclude that defining a more abstract choice space used by multiple learning systems for credit assignment recruits executive resources, limiting how much such processes then contribute to fast learning.

Humans can navigate complex graph structures acquired during latent learning.

Humans appear to represent many forms of knowledge in associative networks whose nodes are multiply connected, including sensory, spatial, and semantic. Recent work has shown that explicitly augmenting artificial agents with such graph-structured representations endows them with more human-like capabilities of compositionality and transfer learning. An open question is how humans acquire these representations. Previously, it has been shown that humans can learn to navigate graph-structured conceptual spaces on the basis of direct experience with trajectories that intentionally draw the network contours (Schapiro, Kustner, & Turk-Browne, 2012; Schapiro, Turk-Browne, Botvinick, & Norman, 2016), or through direct experience with rewards that covary with the underlying associative distance (Wu, Schulz, Speekenbrink, Nelson, & Meder, 2018). Here, we provide initial evidence that this capability is more general, extending to learning to reason about shortest-path distances across a graph structure acquired across disjoint experiences with randomized edges of the graph - a form of latent learning. In other words, we show that humans can infer graph structures, assembling them from disordered experiences. We further show that the degree to which individuals learn to reason correctly and with reference to the structure of the graph corresponds to their propensity, in a separate task, to use model-based reinforcement learning to achieve rewards. This connection suggests that the correct acquisition of graph-structured relationships is a central ability underlying forward planning and reasoning, and may be a core computation across the many domains in which graph-based reasoning is advantageous.

The Role of Executive Function in Shaping Reinforcement Learning.

Reinforcement learning (RL) models have advanced our understanding of how animals learn and make decisions, and how the brain supports some aspects of learning. However, the neural computations that are explained by RL algorithms fall short of explaining many sophisticated aspects of human decision making, including the generalization of learned information, one-shot learning, and the synthesis of task information in complex environments.. Instead, these aspects of instrumental behavior are assumed to be supported by the brain's executive functions (EF). We review recent findings that highlight the importance of EF in learning. Specifically, we advance the theory that EF sets the stage for canonical RL computations in the brain, providing inputs that broaden their flexibility and applicability. Our theory has important implications for how to interpret RL computations in the brain and behavior.