"All hands on deck": a qualitative study of safeguarding and the transition to telemedical abortion care in England and Wales.

The COVID-19 pandemic raised significant challenges for in-person healthcare provision, leading healthcare providers to embrace digital health like never before. Whilst changes were made as part of a public health response, many have now become permanent fixtures of the healthcare landscape, significantly altering the way care is provided not only for patients, but also for the healthcare professionals that provide care. In abortion care in England and Wales, previously stringent regulations on in-person care provision were relaxed to permit the use of telemedicine and self-administration of medications at home. These changes have since been made permanent. However, there remains opposition to remote abortion care pathways on the basis of safeguarding. Opponents argue that it is not feasible to effectively safeguard patients accessing abortion care remotely. We conducted a qualitative study using semi-structured interviews with abortion care providers in England and Wales. Participants were asked about their views and experiences of the transition to remote care provision, with a particular focus on how they adapted their safeguarding practice. In this article, we present three themes that highlight the changing roles of healthcare professionals in abortion care: (1) a challenging backdrop and resulting apprehension, (2) adaptive practices, and (3) the continued importance of professional curiosity. Across all three themes, participants reflected significantly on how changes were made and what they experienced in the period of transition to telemedicine. In particular, they discussed the changing nature of their professional roles amidst digitalisation. Our findings provide a basis for reflection on the increasing introduction of digital approaches to healthcare provision, highlighting points for caution and emphasising the need to involve professionals in the transition process to ensure vital buy-in. Through this, we articulate two novel understandings of digitalisation: (1) the impact of speed-associated pressures on professional adaptation during digitalisation, and (2) off-proforma safeguarding through telemedicine as a form of invisible non-routine work.

Translational or translationable? A call for ethno-immersion in (empirical) bioethics research.

The shift towards "empirical bioethics" was largely triggered by a recognition that stakeholders' views and experiences are vital in ethical analysis where one hopes to produce practicable recommendations. Such perspectives can provide a rich resource in bioethics scholarship, perhaps challenging the researcher's perspective. However, overreliance on a picture painted by a group of research participants-or on pre-existing literature in that field-can lead to a biased view of a given context, as the subjectivity of data generated in these ways cannot (and should not wholly) be escaped. In response, we propose the implementation of a complementary approach of ethno-immersion in bioethics research. By positioning oneself in the context being researched, the researcher can better understand the realities of that context. The researcher's understanding will, naturally, be subjective too. However, it will act as a better developed and more informed outsider view, when considering the picture painted by participants and previous studies, thus enabling the researcher to introduce more nuance when analysing data. We introduce this approach after examining what we call the context detachment problem, whereby some bioethics scholarship-empirical or otherwise-fails to reflect the reality of the healthcare setting it concerns. Our proposed ethno-immersion (which differs from formal ethnography) is then explored as a response, highlighting its benefits, and answering the question of timing within a research project. Finally, we reflect on the applicability of our proposal to non-empirical bioethics scholarship, concluding that it remains important but may require some adjustments.

'The law is very, very outdated and not keeping up with the technology': novel forms of assisted gestation, legal challenges, and perspectives of reproductive rights advocates in England and Wales.

A growing body of literature examines the ethico-legal challenges resulting from novel forms of assisted gestation like uterus transplantation and artificial placentas (also known as 'artificial wombs'). However, there has not yet been consideration of reproductive rights organizations/advocates' understandings of novel forms of assisted gestation and their challenges. These perspectives provide critical insight into how novel procreative practices are understood and the problems and pressures that might arise from their use. This is the first legal article to engage with reproductive rights organizations/advocates and thus it provides important contextual grounding to existing scholarship about assisted gestation. Focus group discussion epitomized the need for legal reform in key areas surrounding reproduction. Themes were constructed that exemplify what participants highlighted as critical: the need to re-evaluate the fundamentals of legal parenthood, consideration of how novel technologies could further enable the policing of gestation, and the space and time needed for law-making.

Artificial placentas, pregnancy loss and loss-sensitive care.

In this paper, we explore how the prospect of artificial placenta technology (nearing clinical trials in human subjects) should encourage further consideration of the loss experienced by individuals when their pregnancy ends unexpectedly. Discussions of pregnancy loss are intertwined with procreative loss, whereby the gestated entity has died when the pregnancy ends. However, we demonstrate how pregnancy loss can and does exist separate to procreative loss in circumstances where the gestated entity survives the premature ending of the pregnancy. In outlining the value that can be attached to pregnancy beyond fetal-centric narratives, we illustrate how pregnancy loss, separate to procreative loss, can be experienced. This loss has already been recognised among parents who have experienced an unexpected early ending of their pregnancy, resulting in their child being cared for in neonatal intensive care unit. Artificial placentas, however, may exacerbate these feelings and make pregnancy loss (without procreative loss) more visible. We argue that pregnancy is an embodied state in which gestation is facilitated by the body but gestation itself should be recognised as a process-and one that could be separable from pregnancy. In demarcating the two, we explore the different ways in which pregnancy loss can be understood. Our objective in this paper goes beyond contributing to our philosophical understanding of pregnancy towards practical-orientated conclusions regarding the care pathways surrounding the artificial placenta. We make recommendations including the need for counselling and careful consideration of the language used when an artificial placenta is used.

Cryopreservation and current legal problems: seeking and selling immortality.

Cryonics, the 'freezing' of the human body after death in the hope of reanimation in the future, remains a remote possibility, and yet it is becoming a more popular choice. There has been much academic discussion of the ethics of cryopreservation; however, the legal problems have received little attention. There are, however, several potential current conflicts that might arise, as was illustrated by the case of JS in England, in which a 14-year-old girl who sought cryopreservation against her father's wishes. In the USA, there have been disputes within families about cryonic preservation, and between cryonics organizations and loved ones of the deceased when there is negligent preservation. Cryopreservation raises questions concerning the law on death and posthumous interests, property in the body, contract law, and (potentially) negligence. We argue that, in the absence of proper regulation, cryonics organizations may be able to exploit the dying and dead. The potential legal problems that we have identified in relation to the law in England and Wales demonstrate that the law is ill-equipped to protect the interests of the dead and their next of kin.

The relationship between speculation and translation in Bioethics: methods and methodologies.

There are increasing pressures for bioethics to emphasise 'translation'. Against this backdrop, we defend 'speculative bioethics'. We explore speculation as an important tool and line of bioethical inquiry. Further, we examine the relationship between speculation and translational bioethics and posit that speculation can support translational work. First, speculative research might be conducted as ethical analysis of contemporary issues through a new lens, in which case it supports translational work. Second, speculation might be a first step prior to translational work on a topic. Finally, speculative bioethics might constitute different content altogether, without translational objectives. For each conception of speculative bioethics, important methodological aspects determine whether it constitutes good bioethics research. We conclude that whether speculative bioethics is compatible with translational bioethics-and to what extent-depends on whether it is being employed as tool or content. Applying standards of impact uniformly across bioethics may inappropriately limit speculative bioethics.

Equality-enhancing potential of novel forms of assisted gestation: Perspectives of reproductive rights advocates.

Novel forms of assisted gestation-uterus transplantation and artificial placentas-are highly anticipated in the ethico-legal literature for their capacity to enhance reproductive autonomy. There are also, however, significant challenges anticipated in the development of novel forms of assisted gestation. While there is a normative exploration of these challenges in the literature, there has not yet, to my knowledge, been empirical research undertaken to explore what reproductive rights organisations and advocates identify as potential benefits and challenges. This perspective is invaluable. These organisations/individuals have an awareness not only of the needs of individuals but also of the political landscape in which regulatory decisions are made and which individuals navigate when seeking reproductive assistance. In this study, data was generated from two semi-structured focus groups (n = 11). Reflective thematic analysis was used to examine the views raised by study participants in these focus groups. This paper explores two of the themes constructed in the data. First, the equality-enhancing potential of assisted gestation exploring the multifaceted ways in which assisted gestation has structural benefits for marginalised groups. Second, realising the equality-enhancing potential of assisted gestation explores the intersecting barriers to access to reproductive technologies and how they may impede the benefits of these technologies in practice. These results can enhance conceptual understanding of the importance of novel forms of assisted gestation and ensure that attention is paid to practical barriers in further normative research.

The (mis)use of fetal viability as the determinant of non-criminal abortion in the Netherlands and England and Wales.

Time plays a fundamental role in abortion regulation. In this article, we compare the regulatory frameworks in England and Wales and the Netherlands as examples of the centrality accorded to viability in the determination of the parameters of non-criminal abortion, demonstrating that the use of viability as a threshold renders the law uncertain. We assess the role played by the concept of viability, analysing its impact upon the continued criminalization of abortion and categorization of abortion as a medical matter, rather than a reproductive choice. We conclude that viability is misconceived in its application to abortion and that neonatal viability (relating to treatment of the premature infant) and fetal viability (related to the capacity to survive birth) must be distinguished to better reflect the social context within which the law and practice of abortion operate. We show how viability thresholds endanger pregnant people.

Early telemedical abortion, safeguarding, and under 18s: a qualitative study with care providers in England and Wales.

BACKGROUND: Telemedical early medical abortion (TEMA) was introduced in England and Wales as a temporary measure in 2020 and was made permanent in 2022. While there are considerable data showing the safety, efficacy, and acceptability of TEMA for patients, there have been objections raised to TEMA based on safeguarding-particularly for people under 18 years of age. Little is known about abortion care providers' views and experiences of carrying out their safeguarding duties with people aged under 18 in the shift to TEMA. METHODS: This is a qualitative study involving online semi-structured interviews and reflexive thematic analysis. Audio-recorded, semi-structured interviews with abortion providers in England and Wales (n=20) generated data about their views and experiences of safeguarding in telemedical abortion care. Recordings were transcribed verbatim and then subject to reflexive thematic analysis to construct themes. RESULTS: While the study was designed with adult safeguarding in mind, the safeguarding of under 18s became a key area of discussion. Three major themes were constructed in relation to under 18s: (1) age as a risk factor in safeguarding; (2) telemedicine as improving access to care; and (3) telemedicine as enhancing communication. CONCLUSION: Care providers believe TEMA has benefitted the under 18s. There was a strong feeling both that TEMA had improved access (which, in turn, improved safeguarding) and that under 18s were comfortable communicating using remote means. Providers believe safeguarding proformas must account for the different nature of risks where service users are under 18, but that it is disproportionate to assume that TEMA is unsuitable for all under 18s or groups of under 18s.

Abortion Access and the Benefits and Limitations of Abortion-Permissive Legal Frameworks: Lessons from the United Kingdom.

This paper argues that abortion access is an important subject for bioethics scholarship and reflects on the relationship between legal frameworks and access to care. The author uses the example of the United Kingdom to examine the benefits and limitations of abortion-permissive legal frameworks in terms of access. These are legal frameworks that enable the provision of abortion but subject to restrictions. An abortion-permissive regime-first in Great Britain and then in Northern Ireland-has gone some way to improving access to care over time. However, aspects of the regime (that lead to its description as permissive rather than supportive of abortion) have the potential to endanger abortion access in the future and so legal reform is necessary.

ON GESTATION AND MOTHERHOOD.

In English law, legal motherhood is allocated to the person who gestated. However, we argue that gestation-legally denoted as the "natural" source of parenting obligations-is often constructed as mothering, rather than the precursor to it. This means that women and pregnant people are treated as mothers prior to birth in legal and medical contexts. Since legal motherhood is an important status, defining the role an individual plays in a child's life, the conflation of gestation and motherhood does not reflect that, legally, a fetus does not have personhood. This blurring between gestation and motherhood is metaphysically incoherent, as a fetus is not an entity that can be parented. This conflation poses a real harm to pregnant people's autonomy, specifically those who do not intend to parent or who do not identify as women. More broadly, the medico-legal conflation of gestation and mothering is autonomy-limiting for all pregnant people as, resultantly, they may be coerced into obstetric intervention through legal processes. We argue for a better recognition of the differences between gestation and mothering, to promote autonomy and reflect the very different ways families may be formed.

Ethical, Translational, and Legal Issues Surrounding the Novel Adoption of Ectogestative Technologies.

Increasing numbers of research teams are investigating the feasibility of developing artificial amnion and placenta technology (AAPT), commonly referred to as "artificial womb technology". This technology, aimed at supporting ex vivo gestation, has not yet been tested in humans, but it has been stated that we are closer to clinical application than ever before as breakthroughs in animal studies demonstrate good proof of principle. With these proof-of-concept models, further dissemination of AAPT as a research modality is expected. In this review article, we consider the ethical implications of the most imminent anticipated applications for AAPT. We focus specifically on the specific ethical complications regarding the improvements this technology may offer to conventional neonatal intensive care, its potential utility in facilitating prenatal interventions, and some of the broader socio-legal implications such as the debates about abortion access and reproductive and gestational choices. We discuss translational and societal questions when it comes to designing and developing this technology, like commitments to value-sensitive design, along with an examination of the legal and moral status of the entity gestating ex utero, which will be relevant for how it ought to be treated in the context of these various applications. From these perspectives, this review identifies the ethical questions that we believe to be most pressing in the development and potential introduction of AAPT, with due attention to their manifestation as translational and legal issues.

Directed and conditional uterus donation.

Uterus transplantation (UTx) is highly anticipated for the benefits that it might bring to individuals wanting to carry a pregnancy in order to reproduce who do not have a functioning uterus. The surgery-now having been performed successfully in several countries around the world-remains experimental. However, UTx is at some point expected to become a routine treatment for people without a uterus and considering themselves in need of one: women with absolute uterine factor infertility; transgender women; and even cisgender men who wish to gestate. Given the unique benefits UTx offers, uteri are likely to be 'in demand', and such demand, we suggest, will feasibly outstrip supply. Therefore, allocation of those uteri available for transplant may become a pressing issue. In this paper, we consider one aspect of organ allocation-the preferences of donors in making a directed or conditional donation of their uterus. To what extent, in the context of uterus donation, would such donations be ethically permissible?

Artificial womb technology, pregnancy, and EU employment rights.

This article considers challenges for the European Union (EU) maternity and pregnancy rights framework when faced with advances in reproductive technology. Specifically, we consider how the introduction of the 'artificial womb' technology, an alternative to bodily gestation, would impact the availability of rights that exist under the maternity and discrimination framework. Employment rights in the EU context have already been confronted by the challenges of advancements in reproduction. We use the case law on in vitro fertilization (IVF) and surrogacy as a baseline for unpacking the challenges that 'artificial wombs' will bring. This analysis of the legal framework on maternity rights and sex discrimination will highlight potential avenues for integrating this technology and ensuring the continuation of rights for those opting for it. We advocate against the stratification of maternity and pregnancy rights based on the reproductive and gestational choices made by the pregnant person.

Assisted gestative technologies.

A large body of literature considers the ethico-legal and regulatory issues surrounding assisted conception. Surrogacy, however, within this body of literature is an odd-fit. It involves a unique demand of another person-a form of reproductive labour-that many other aspects of assisted conception, such as gamete donation do not involve. Surrogacy is a form of assisted gestation. The potential alternatives for individuals who want a genetically related child but who do not have the capacity to gestate are ever increasing: with the advent of uterus transplantation (UTx), and the anticipated development of artificial placentas.In this paper, I highlight the pertinent conceptual differences between technologies assisting conception and those assisting gestation to demonstrate that distinct issues arise when assisted gestative technologies (AGTs) are used. I argue that there is utility in considering AGTs as a genus of technologies. These technologies perform the same function from the perspective of putative parents and might exist on a spectrum of alternatives when they become more available. Moreover, since many of the same or very similar ethical, social and legal issues are raised by surrogacy, UTx and ectogestation, analysis of these issues will be better contextualised by considering these technologies together. Many of the matters currently being highlighted for reform in the context of surrogacy will inevitably impact on how other forms of assisted gestation are governed. The conversation should be broadened; we should consider how far other emerging technologies might be accommodated in revised regulatory schemes.

Appropriately framing maternal request caesarean section.

In their paper, 'How to reach trustworthy decisions for caesarean sections on maternal request: a call for beneficial power', Eide and Bærøe present maternal request caesarean sections (MRCS) as a site of conflict in obstetrics because birthing people are seeking access to a treatment 'without any anticipated medical benefit'. While I agree with the conclusions of their paper -that there is a need to reform the approach to MRCS counselling to ensure that the structural vulnerability of pregnant people making birth decisions is addressed-I disagree with the framing of MRCS as having 'no anticipated medical benefit'. I argue that MRCS is often inappropriately presented as unduly risky,without supporting empirical evidence,and that MRCS is most often sought by birthing people on the basis of a clinical need. I argue that there needs to be open conversation and frank willingness to acknowledge the values that are currently underpinning the presentation of MRCS as 'clinically unnecessary'; specifically there needs to be more discussion of where and why the benefits of MRCS that are recognised by individual birthing people are not recognised by clinicians. This is important to ensure access to MRCS for birthing people that need it.

Twin pregnancy reduction is not an 'all or nothing' problem: a response to Räsänen.

In his paper, 'Twin pregnancy, fetal reduction and the 'all or nothing problem', Räsänen sets out to apply Horton's 'all or nothing' problem to the ethics of multifetal pregnancy reduction from a twin to a singleton pregnancy (2-to-1 MFPR). Horton's problem involves the following scenario: imagine that two children are about to be crushed by a collapsing building. An observer would have three options: do nothing, save one child by allowing their arms to be crushed, or save both by allowing their arms to be crushed. Horton offers two intuitively plausible claims: (1) it is morally permissible not to save either child and (2) it is morally impermissible to save only one of the children, which taken together lead to the problematic conclusion that (3) if an observer does not save both children, then it is better to save neither than save only one. Räsänen applies this problem to the case of 2-to-1 MFPR, arguing ultimately that, in cases where there is no medical reason to reduce, the woman ought to bring both fetuses to term. We will argue that Räsänen does not provide adequate support for the claim, crucial to his argument, that aborting only one of the fetuses in a twin pregnancy is wrong, so the 'all or nothing' problem does not arise in this context. Furthermore, we argue that the scenario Räsänen presents is highly unrealistic because of the clinical realities of 2-to-1 MFPR, making his argument of limited use for real-life decision making in this area.